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BLUMENFELD-JONES, DONALD S., Ed.D. Body, Pleasure, Language and 
World: A Framework for the Critical Analysis of Dance Education. 
(1990) Directed by Dr. David E. Purpel. 206 pp. 
This dissertation is a philosophical analysis of the 
language of dance education. In particular the writer analyses 
the relation between language and body understanding. 
The Introduction presents an initial metaphor of 
consciousness as "world". The dance classroom is characterized 
as a space for the negotiation of the worlds of the students and 
teachers. The negotiation is political with unequal distribution 
of influence over the formation of the classroom world, such 
negotiation ordinarily favoring the teacher's world. Berger and 
Luckmann and Rorty are major sources for the analysis. 
Chapter One relates language to the formation of 
consciousness. Language functions to prevent us from knowing the 
world and enables us to come to know the world. Language is 
characterized as metaphorical, as a set of conflicting languages 
vying for social ascension and as incorporating a set of 
dialectical relationships. The individual consciousness is 
understood to be, at base, socially constructed. Nietzsche, 
Gadamer, Bakhtin and Jacoby are cited. 
Chapter T~o analyzes three seminal dance education texts, 
written by Margaret H'Doubler and Alma Hawkins, as cultural 
artifacts, setting out the major ideas and describing the 
language used.to set the ideas out. The problematic character of 
the relation between ideas and language and the cultural basis of 
the texts is examined. 
Chapter Three presents the author's dance experience of 
becoming a dance body, negotiating meanings with teachers, 
choreographers and audiences. The concept of pleasure is used as 
a conceptual framework. The author's experieuce is aphorised as 
"personal body" and is analyzed in cultural terms. 
Chapter Four analyzes Chapters Two and Three in the light of 
Julia Kristeva, H~lene Cixous and Luce Iragaray. The 
dissertation takes the position that we learn to become bodies. 
Langua.ge is related to the patriarchy and bodily pleasure. 
Language is found to participate in suppressing pleasure. 
Chapter Five critiques the analysis and provides ideas for 
further work. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation has to do with developing a framework for 
critically examining dance education for high school and college 
students in the U.S. (from now on to be called, in short hand, 
dance education) . I will base much of my analytic framework on a 
critical examination of some central texts in the field. These 
texts provide what, for me, is a central metaphor of current 
dance education practice, i.e. technique. Dance education, when 
viewed from the perspective of examining dance education texts 
which purport to say how dance education ought to be, has, for 
the most part, been conducted in an atmosphere of technical 
practicality by which I mean the focus has been upon how to make 
good dancers so that society may have in its midst good dancers 
for the making of quality art dance. This practical, technical 
orientation has been conducted without inquiring into the basic 
premise that society needs good dancers and quality art dance 
and, in addition, without examining the implications of other 
premises which ground the curricular prescriptions which flow out 
of the basic premise. For purposes of the present study I am 
going to focus on these other premises, although I believe that 
what I will develop as a critical understanding will have meaning 
for the validity of the basic premise. 
It would be fair to say that while the field of dance 
education is dominated by a "how-to" consciousness in the 
texts which I will analyze ~ttention is turned toward a more 
substantive examination of dance education. Of these few I am 
going to focus upon two of the most important figures in the 
field, Margaret H'Doubler (1940} and Alma Hawkins (1954, 1988} 
and, specifically, upon the books which they have written. 
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These books have come to be considered classic theoretical 
treatments of dance education. Unlike the rest of the field, 
these treatments are presented as arguments in favor of teaching 
dance in a certain way without detailing how the teaching will 
be concretely manifested in the classroom. Because of their 
predominantly theoretical cast I do not need to surmise their 
premises (as I would have to do with most other texts) but can 
directly examine thei~ version of their premises. There are 
other educators who offer some validating principles along with 
lesson plans (M.Turner, 1954, Pease, 1966, Lockhart & Pease, 
1973, Sherban, 1982, Hayes, 1980, and Radir, 1944, to name a 
few) but in not so developed a manner as do H'Doubler and 
Hawkins. This makes H'Doubler and Hawkins good choices for my 
purposes. 
I have written that their works are considered classics in 
the field. This status of "classic" is attested to by the fact 
that H'Doubler's major work, Dance, A Creative Art Experience 
(1940}, was originally published in 1940 and yet is still in 
print today. Hawkins's first major work, Modern .Dance in Higher 
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Education (1954), was first published in 1954, was reissued in 
1982 and is still available for purchase. Hawkins's other 
important work, Creating Through Dance (1988), was published in 
1964, was revised in 1988 and is, according to Richard Carlin of 
Princeton Book Company, a major distributor of dance books, the 
most adopted college text in their catalogue. On the back of 
Creating Through Dance, Helen Alkire, a long-time dance 
educator, writes, "The book should be in the required reading 
list of all dance majors -undergraduate and graduate" (Hawkins, 
1988). Succinctly put, the point here is that, despite the age 
of these books, 50 years, 36 years and 26 years respectively, 
they continue to be important sources of information and 
understanding for dance educators. 
In the above I have suggested that, in one way or another, 
their discourse grounds the thinking of dance educators. It is 
important to understand that I am not making the corvllary claim 
that all dance educators attempt to model thejr classrooms on 
the H'Doubler or Hawkins's frameworks. Indeed in Charlotte 
Irey's "Introduction" to the revised edition of Creating Through 
Dance (1988) she reminds the reader that this is not a how-to 
book, that its value is based on its conceptualizations of dance 
pedagogy and that these concepts must be in place in order to 
make dance pedagogy what it ought to be. Implied in this is the 
notion that dance educators have not been attending to Hawkins's 
point of view. So I will not claim that H'Doubler's and 
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Hawkins's discourse has effected the practice of dance 
education. What I will claim is that H'Doubler and Hawkins 
continue to be seminal thinkers for the field. It is their 
thoughts and theories in which I, and the field, are interested. 
There is a metaphor which I am going to offer at this time 
as a way of focusing the development of a framework for 
critically analyzing dance education. The metaphor has to do 
with the relationship between teachers and students as they meet 
in their common space, the classroom and the metaphor begins in 
the notion that each person, in this relationship, brings to the 
relationship a world. 
What I mean by "worJ.d" is similar to what is meant by 
"world-view" where it can be said that a person has an inter-
related set of understandings by which he or she orients him or 
herself to all of the phenomena which constitute what can be 
called the \'torld "out-there". This set of understandings, 
located, metaphorically, in the mind of the person, has no 
necessary correspondence to the world "out there 11 but is only 
one set of understandings about it (Rorty, 1989). What I am 
calling the world of the "mind" is akin to what Peter Berger and 
Thomas Luckmann (1966) have called the world of everyday life. 
They write, 
[The] world of everyday life [is] taken for granted as 
reality by the ordinary members of society in the 
subjectively meaningful conduct of their lives. It is a 
world that originates in their thoughts and actions, and 
is maintained as real by these. (pp.19-20) 
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As each person moves through the world "out there" he or she 
carries this world with him or her and looks out through its 
lens of understanding on all the phenomena which passes before 
him or her and uses his or her world to make sense of the 
shifting landscape of the world "out there". Part of this 
shifting landscape are the other people who also have worlds 
through which they make sense of the world "out there". Berger 
and Luckmann (1966) refer to the presence of other people as the 
"intersubjective world" (p.23) They write of this world, 
I cannot exist in everyday life without continually 
interacting and communicating with others. I know that my 
natural attitude to this world corresponds to the natural 
attitude of others, thai: they also comprehe!ld the 
objectifications by which this world is ordered, that they 
also organize this world ... and have projects for working 
in it. (p.23) 
On the other hand they admit that "my projects differ from and 
may even conflict with theirs" (p.23). 
This situation of interaction and conflict between worlds 
in the intersubjective world is found within the teacher/student 
relationship. Teachers have worlds with particular 
specifications and so do students. Their pedagogical 
relationship may be understood as the interaction of their 
worlds as they proceed to negotiate the creation of the world of 
the classroom which is some sort of amalgam of their separate 
worlds. These negotiations may result in either unified 
communal life or social dissonance or some other outcome. 
The possibility for being able to negotiate is predicated 
on the sharing of social and cultural institutions, primary 
among which is language. These institutions set the terms of 
and present items for the process of negotiation. 
Metaphorically, while the people may want to share a meal when 
they decide to eat togethex it is theix culture or cultures 
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which set the table with certain foods and certain utensils for 
eating from which they choose their meal. 
I have characterized language as a primary social and 
cultural institution for mediating the relationship between 
individual worlds. What I mean by this is the simple notion 
that negotiation requires arriving at some sort of understanding 
of each other or not, of coming to understand or not, in 
particular, the intended meanings of the words and actions of 
the other. I would say, extrapolating from the work of Richard 
Rorty (1989}, that coming to successfully understand one another 
necessitates coming to share a common vocabulary and 
constructing a common world based on the shared vocabulary. The 
failure to understand, on the other hand, is due to a conflict 
between languages. These notions of language will be elaborated 
in Chapter One (along with a more detailed discussion of how 
language functions to aid in constructing the individual's world 
which is brought into the classroom} . 
If, as I am arguing, language is central to making worlds, 
then an examination of specific language involved in presenting 
a world (as I would argue occurs in writing and publishing a 
book) ought to reveal the contours of the world presented. In 
the case of the texts to be examined, while H'Doubler and 
Hawkins do not claim to be presenting worlds, embedded in their 
language choices are the profiles of worlds. In Chapter Two it 
is the profiles of their worlds which I wish to excavate from 
those worlds' unarticulated positions within the discourses. 
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The excavated profiles are not idiosyncratic worlds but are, 
rather, worlds connected to the worlds of other people by virtue 
of sharing a common language with others. The common world of 
the group of people who share the language is what I would call 
the larger world of society and culture. In profiling the 
worlds of the texts I will attempt to make apparent some of the 
connections between the worlds of H'Doubler and Hawkins and the 
social and cultural world that is the context ~f their texts. 
At the same time as I argue that a common language welds 
individual worlds together, in the classroom and out of it, 
there is yet the individual's particularity, manifest in his/her 
personal biology and history, which makes specific his or her 
version of the common world. This individual particularity can 
problematize the interactions between people, between these 
different versions of the world, these different versions 
constituting individual, separate worlds. For the 
teacher/student relationship this problematizing comes not only 
because they bring different worlds to the enterprise, but that 
there also exist differential influence relations between the 
teacher and student. I would say that influence often favors, 
in the classrooms with which I am familiar, the teacher's world 
over the student's world. This differential comes to be 
represented by the language of the classroom, the language of 
"teacher" and "student". The label "teach can automatically 
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confer upon that person (who is, in addition, simply a whole, 
autonomous person) power over the person labeled "student" (also 
a whole, autonomous person). This power may be interpreted by 
the "teacher" as nurturing and caring and by the "student" as 
interfering, manipulative and intrusive. Subsequent negotiation 
between the worlds may result in the "student" coming to view 
the "teacher" as teacher does or the teacher coming to alter 
his/her definition of "teacher", or the student coming to 
internalize dissent or coming to openly def;;,• the power of the 
teacher. The language of "teacher" and "student" initially 
represented the relationship and has subsequently been 
negotiated and come to mean specific and shifting social 
relations. The issue comes back to what Rorty has written abo~t 
in terms of the changing of vocabularies. The individuals offer 
differing explanations of ·the world in an effort to convince 
each other of the adequacy of their different vocabularies used 
to describe the world. In Chapter Three I will explore t"';e 
process of interacting and negotiating worlds with dance 
pedagogy by describing my own experience of the different 
vocabularies which I and my teachers and peers brought to our 
common dance life. 
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The interaction of worlds, like the worlds th~~selves, is 
not idiosyncratic to particular individuals in relation to each 
other. As with the embedding of individual world in the social 
and cultural surround (as described in Chapter Three) I will in 
Chapter Three expose some of the cultural influences upon my own 
dance experience. 
In terms of developing a framework for critically 
examining dance education, by themselves these connections made 
to the social and cultural surround do not constitute the 
critical framework which I wish to develop. What is required 
for that effort is to attempt to draw together the disparate 
threads of analysis into some point of view with which to 
understand the meanings of H'Doubler's and Hawkins's curricular 
theories and connections to their culture and society and the 
meanings of the problematics of my own experience. The meaning 
making framework (which I will develop in Chapter Four) will 
focus on the major issue which has arisen in my own experience 
and investigations into the experiences of others and that is 
the issue of the place of the body in dance education. By "the 
experiences of others" I mean that in my many meetings with 
other like-minded scholars we have come wonder, "Where is the 
body in all this discourse on dance? The body seems to be 
missing." This has seemed anomalous to us since dancing is 
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purportedly so much about the body. In a sense this 
dissertation is an attempt to ascertain whether or not the body 
is missing and, if so, in what sense. Thus, in Chapter Four I 
will offer a framework which focuses upon a social and cultural 
understanding of the body and the relation of body and language 
and shall review the profiles of H'Doubler's and Hawkins's and 
my own worlds in terms of this analysis. 
Offering a framework cannot be the end of this work. To 
do so without considering the weaknesses and problems of that 
framework is, borrowing an oft-used term found in my own 
readings, to over-determine the framework. No analytic 
framework can thoroughly explicate all the phenomena of a 
particular concrete situation but can only highlight and 
prioritize certain portions of the situation. While I believe 
tnat what I will present is important, I also know that I run 
the risk of simplifying the dance education situation so that it 
is no longer recognizable by the concrete individuals who 
participate in it. In Chapter Five I will offer a discussion of 
the problematics within the framework in an effort to loosen its 
possibly totalizing grip upon my consideration of dance pedagogy 
and in the hope that the framework becomes a reference point for 
thinking rather than becoming thought itself. 
Introduction 
CHAPTER 1 
LANGUAGE AND THE WORLD 
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I wrote in the Introduction that I am going to focus in 
this chapter on the function of language for negotiating the 
intersection of individual worlds. I will also attend to how 
individuals use language for making sense of and participating 
in the world aside from direct intersubjective negotiations. 
When I speak of language I mean language in all its forms, 
written and spoken and other forms of language such as movement 
language. 
I am particularly interested in ways o= understanding a 
text (the process of understanding being a process involving 
the intersection of worlds) since this dissertation focuses, in 
part, upon how to understand dance education texts. The written 
text presents, I believe, an ostensibly closed, complete world-
view as the author has struggled to present a full articulation 
of his/her ideas. Whenever we read a text, we, in turn, 
construct a world from that reading. Both reader and writer 
have worlds and the process of reading is the intersection of 
those worlds out of which the reader's world is reconstructed. 
What both the reader and writer bring to the process are their 
individual mixtures of pre-understanding and immediate 
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happenstance with the writer's pre-understandings and immediate 
circumstances being "frozen", as it were, wichin the text and 
with the reader's pre-understandings and immediate circumstances 
being more available to change as he or she proceeds through the 
reading. 
By pre-understanding I mean a pre-understanding we have of 
what the world is like and by immediate circumstances I mean 
responding to the immediate moment which always contains the 
unforeseen. In this mix of pre-understanding and immediacy we 
construct the world as it occurs to us. There is constant 
tension in the process of sense making as what bears down upon 
'lS from immediate experience must somehow be fit into or made 
sense of in terms of what is already known (the pre-
understanding). The fit or sense may be ill-fitting or 
nonsensical in any number of ways and, in addition, our pre-
understandings are not always consciously available to us. The 
unconscious pre-understandings function in unseen determinative 
ways out of our conscious control. Immediate external factors, 
not generated by our own consciousness, are also out of our 
control. 
This examination of the process of understanding will 
utilize sociological/historical, philosophical and psychological 
modes of understanding in order to analyze the process of 
understanding a text. "Pre-understanding" can be understood 
sociologically as social acculturation, historically as the ways 
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in which culture is a summation of historical forces, 
philosophically as the issue of the origins of knowleclg~ and the 
nature of truth and reality, and psychologically as the 
sedimentation within the unconscious of personal interaction 
with sociological, historical and philosophical encounters. 
Immediacy, in like fashion, can be understood as the outstanding 
sociological forces to which we are in immediate response, as 
historical forces which we take up in our choice-making, world-
forming process, as philosophical understandings of perception 
and cognition and as psychological response in terms of our 
affective experience of our immediate situation. It is 
important to add to all these considerations that the location 
of pre-understanding and immediate experience is both in the 
body and the mind, that what is felt in relation to all these 
forces is felt in all dimensions of our being. This will be 
particularly important when I come to discuss the specifics of 
the dance education curricula and my own dance experience. 
Two major questions occur within these issues. First, 
what are the factors of pre-understanding which give shape to 
the individual world? Second, and perhaps most importantly, if 
we say that each individual makes an individual world out of the 
one world "out there" {as I will claim), how are we able to 
intersect worlds and understand each other, able to communicate 
so that, in some fashion, we have the sense that we are all 
writing of, talking of and presenting the same one world? 
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The easiest answer to the last question is that because we 
all inhabit the same one world, the world "out there", we 
already possess common ground upon which to base interhuman 
communication. Similarly, the process of individual world-
making and its factors are commonly held because we are all 
essentially alike. At the same time, however, there are ways we 
in which we are indissolubly different from each other 
(differing combinations of genes, social history, family 
life)and this indissoluble otherness and the inevitable 
separation which grows out of it ought to suggest that 
commonness is complicated by difference. To what degree is this 
difference significant? I shall take this up when I discuss how 
we may make new worlds. 
Language and Metaphor 
I have already written that language is a primary common 
factor in making a world capable of communicating to others. 
Language is, also, one of the primary locations of pre-
understanding and language functions to both bring the world and 
others to us and hold the world and others away from us. 
By now it is a commonplace among philosophers that 
language determines our world. Tracy Strong describes language 
determination this way: 
Our language ... repeats, in a sort of neurotic 
compulsion, our history and our selves to us. 
Language pulls together and is the world: this 
language, our world. The very ability to give 
names - to extend the control of language over the 
world - must then be a masterly t~ait, for it 
consists of saying what the world is. To name is to 
define and bring under control; the allocation of 
names creates the world in the image of he who names. 
Such creations are properly termed metaphors, they 
are artefacts which carry an intellectual process 
beyond the mind into the world. (99) 
St~ong identifies language specifically as metaphor. Here 
metaphor serves as a definition of all language rather than as 
its usual position within language as a particular rhetorical 
device. Metaphor, as a name or interpretation of the world 
beyond the mind, provides an image of the world which itself 
(the world) does not appear to us in its (the world's) 
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nakedness. A metaphor is a linguistic symbol which presents the 
world in a pattern and design which the world does not actually 
possess. This linguistic symbol is (according to Sallie 
McFague) "a word or phrase used inappropriately. It belongs 
properly in one context but is being used in another" 
(McFague,MT,33). She goes on to write, 
[A metaphor] is an attempt to say something about the 
unfamiliar in terms of the familiar .•• Metaphor always has 
the character of 'is' and 'is not': an assertion is made 
but as a likely account rather than a definition ..• The 
point that metaphor underscores is that in certain matters 
there can be no direct description. (McFague,1982,pp.33-
34) 
These patterns are always ambiguous due to their 
suggestiveness and lack of being definitional in character. The 
ambiguity of language is familiar as when, for instance, we 
become frustrated with our inability to make another understand 
our meaning which to us seems obvious. Language as metaphor, 
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not being a literal representation of reality, complicates 
interhuman communication as it presents individual 
interpretations of the world to another who must interpret the 
interpretations with the strong possibility that 
misunderstanding will occur. This is how language holds us 
apart from each other and how language, being an interpretation 
of the world holds us and the world apart. Because language is 
our vehicle for understanding it can be seen that it has the 
positive function of making the world available to us, bringing 
the world to us, even though it is acknowledged that this aspect 
of language represents a partial knowledge of the world. This 
"holding away" and "bringing to" provide two dimensions of 
language as certain kinds of politics or power in that the 
holding away is "power against" and bringing to is "power for". 
I shall first discuss "holding away" and , then, discuss 
"bringing to" (in terms of the potential of language for 
creative action) . 
In understanding language and metaphors as holding the 
world and others away from us there is a "power against" our 
knowing the world and others. The world is plural and 
dizzyingly full of unique beings, events, things. Without 
language and metaphors this I'lurality would appear chaotic, for 
every incoming "fact" would '=lppear unique and different from all 
others and yet undifferentiated from all others in the constancy 
of the uniqueness. Language intervenes in this chaos, 
17 
organizing the incoming "facts" (sense facts or language focts) 
through the metaphorical ca.tegories already present. 
It is this intervention which holds the world and others 
away and mitigates against our knowing the world and others. 
Language can only give "voice" to what is already known by it. 
Through language we make space for the incoming novelty of 
events, beings and things hitherto not encountered by finding a 
place for the novelty among the known categories of language. 
In order to do this we suppress the uniqueness of each incoming 
"fact" in order to fit it to the already existing schema of 
language (Dews, 1986) . 
Nietzsche understood this language reduction of the world 
"out there" through language as a limit case for understanding 
and he aphorised language as "the prison-house of language" 
(Jamison,1972). Nietzsche wrote, 
[U]nspeakably more depends on what things are called, 
than on what they axe. The reputation, the name and 
appearance, ... each being in origin most frequently an 
error and arbitrariness, thrown over things like a 
garment, and quite foreign to their essence ... and 
even to their exterior, have gradually by belief 
therein and growth fro1n generation to 
generation ... grown on to things and into things and 
have become its very body. {Strong, pp.S9) 
Strong goes on to comment, "The metaphors which first lie on our 
life like a light cloak become an iron cage" (p.99). He then 
quotes Nietzsche again: "'Truths are illusions about which one 
has forgotten that this is what they are'" (p.100). Foe 
Nietzsche, language imprisons us through the deception that we 
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can know anything and yet prevents us from knowing anything or 
anyone in it8 autonomous fullness. (The notion of autonomy is 
problematic for I shall attempt to show later on how all events, 
things and beings are interdependent necessarily and inevitably. 
The value of autonomy has been demonstrated by Russel Jacoby to 
be a particular political imposition from bourgeois culture, an 
argument developed from his reading of Freud and the Frankfurt 
School.) 
The idea of language determinacy images a system which 
cannot absorb or encounter new events, things or beings. In 
addition, upon our initiation into language we seem to tread the 
same paths all before us have trod and upon which our successors 
will, also, tread. Language, in this vision, is a closed world 
and a world in which the idea of the multiplicity of worlds has 
no place. Through a common language the multiple worlds seem to 
dissolve into a unitary world perspective (which is still not 
synonymous with the one world from which we are totally 
separated). This is the thinking of Louis Althusser who claimed 
that there were no individuals in the world but only 
"Ideological State Apparatus" where subjectivity was an illusion 
and all were made into images of the state. It is also the 
thinking of Michel Foucault with his notion of discursive 
practices which feed upon preceding generations of discourse and 
become locations for the replenishment of discourse through the 
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ingestion of the established forms. Such views present a world 
in which nothing ever changes. 
In contrast to these imprisoning descriptions of language 
there are those who understand language as bringing the world to 
us and making change possible. This occurs because language or 
metaphor enables us to develop new patterns of interpretation. 
Several theorists (among them Hans-Georg Gadamer, 1975,and Paul 
Ricoeur, 1970, 1976. 1981) understand language not as a 
limitation but as a site of messages and creativity through 
which we can remake our world. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975) 
provides an image of this enabling power of language when he 
writes, 
In reality, language is the single word whose 
virtuality opens up the infinity of discourse, of 
discourse with others, and of the freedom of 
"speaking oneself" and of "allowing oneself to be 
spoken". Language is not its elaborate 
conventionalism, nor the burden of pre-schematization 
with which it loads us, but the generative and 
creative power unceasingly to make this whole fluid. 
(1975, p.498) 
Gadamer recognizes not only the formative power of language 
("the burden of pre-schematization with which it loads us") but, 
also, the creative power of language to open up the 
possibilities of growth and change which "make this whole 
fluid." Language is a virtuality in that it provides the 
possibility of speech but does not limit what the speech will 
actualize. 
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Gadamer uses the metaphorical quality of language to 
counter the notion of language determination. Metaphors are the 
interpJ.ay of images and it is this quality of play which makes 
language productive. Gadamer writes of play: 
Thus we speak of the play of colours and do not mean 
only that there is one colour, that plays against 
another, but that there is one process or sight, in 
which one can see a changing variety of colours. 
(1975, p.93) 
Metaphor! are the "one process" of constant shifting back and 
forth between images, having no determinant end. This lack of 
determinant ending counters the oppressive notion of language 
determination by refusing to yield to univocal meaning. 
Metaphors and language become sites for new ideas and new 
metaphors. 
Through asserting relationship between disparate terms 
(two things, beings, events are like each other) the metaphor 
presents a new image which heuristically presents a new idea 
about the world which was not and could not be apparent to us 
prior to our consciousness of the metaphor. This new idea or 
interpretation becomes a focus for accounting for the shape of 
the world as we conceive it and provides new patterns for such 
conceiving. 
The refusal of univocal meaning in a metaphor is also 
refusal to represent completion. Gadamer (1975) focuses upon 
the play aspect of metaphor and writes of play in general, that 
the purpose of playing a game "is not really the solution of the 
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task, but the ordering and shaping of the movement of the game 
itself" (1975, p.97). Metaphors do not move 1;1s towards bounded 
endstates but are processual means for understanding which, in 
thei.r ordering and shaping, are always ongoing. 
The notion of understanding is central here. Play, 
according to Gadamer, is self-representation which is "a 
universal aspect of the being of nature" (1975, p.97). The 
player comes to re-present him/herself to him/herself through 
the pretend of play as he/she adopts different persona which 
call out different aspects of him/herself. This representation 
makes the world and self constantly new and emerging. As with 
play, so, too, metaphors re-present the world to us, calling out 
different aspects of the world for re-newed and re-freshed 
understanding and in their universality they are our means for 
understanding which is the ground upon which the world is made. 
The Gadamerian notion of play and the notion of metaphor 
·which makes the whole of the world fluid rather than rigidly 
determined provide an understanding that language makes possible 
newness. M.M.Bakhtin (1981) gives some alternative ideas about 
the productivity of language which release ideas of language 
from pure determinacy. He writes of the way different languages 
contain differing intentions and possibilities for making 
meaning and goes on to write, 
[A}ll socially significant world views have the capacity 
to exploit the intentional possibilities of language ... in 
proportion to their social significance; the~ are capable 
of attracting its words and forms into their orbit by 
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means of their own characteristic intentions and accents, 
and in so doing to a certain extent alienating these words 
and forms from other tendencies, parties, artistic works 
and persons. 
Every socially significant verbal performance has the 
ability ... to infect with its own intention certain aspects 
of language that had been effacted by its semantic and 
expressive impulse, imposing on them specific semantic 
nuances and specific axiological overtones. (p.290) 
In this formulation individuals can "create" lan~~age and, as he 
puts it, the "'languages' of heteroglossia intersect each other 
in a variety of ways, forming new socially typifying 
rlanguages'" (p.291). 
An important distinction exists between the Gadarnerian and 
Bakhtinian formulations. Gadarner (1975) invokes the naturalness 
and the universality of the actions of metaphor. Gadamer's 
images are, for the most part, either drawn from the physical 
world ("play of colours") or from the play of children, but not 
from a clearly social world. This places his discourse in a 
different form from Bakhtin who locates the action of language 
within the social construct. Bakhtin (1981) indicates that 
language has "intentional possibilities" which become activated 
via social appropriation which moves the potential 
meaningfulness of language into specific concrete spheres of 
understanding. These spheres, in appropriating language 
"alienate" language from the possibility of other kinds of 
usage. A contemporary example of this would be the 
appropriation of the word "moral" by the Moral Majority. Their 
use of that word has made it difficult for other equally moral 
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groups to use the word because the word has come to reference a 
specific form of morality. 
It is at the juncture of newness and language that we can 
find the opening for understanding how we can construct new 
worlds. At this juncture new language is needed, called for, in 
order to bring the unforeseen into fuller view. In this process 
both the language accommodates and is modified to the newness 
and the newness is allowed in to the extent that it can be 
connected with the already existing world in some way. A 
metaphor for this might be that the novelty finds a foothold or 
purchase upon the face of the world and, like a seed blown by 
the wind to an inhospitable site, if the seed can find some 
nourishment and shelter it may be able to grow roots and so 
become part of the world. The world is altered and has been 
added to. The world has not merely absorbed the novelty but has 
given some of itself to sustaining and extending the novelty .. 
The process of the new is a process of accommodation from both 
sides, a dialectical give and take. The seed and plant may grow 
in specific and different ways in response to particular 
environments. The various plants at different sites can be 
shown to be of the same family of plants (have similar schemata, 
configurations) and yet are individualized. Or it may be that 
the various plants scattered among various sites do not "belong 
to the same family of plants". "Family of plants" is a 
conceptualization, a piece of language, used to subsume 
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differences in order to make the world comprehensible. It is a 
sign whose origins are not in the world but in the possibility 
of language which handles the world. Either way, metaphorically 
the plant gives up some of its individuality to be allowed to 
grow in this particular world and exist in the conceptual world. 
Bakhtin (1981), in addition to imaging the social 
character of language, provides an image of language which 
mediates between the notions of language determinacy and 
creativity. He writes that language is intentional and that 
this intention is directed toward the objects of the world. 
Discourse lives, as it were, beyond itself, in a living 
impulse ... toward the object, .. to study the word as 
such,ignorinq the impulse that reaches out beyond it, is 
just as senseless as to study psychological experience 
outside the context of that real life toward which it was 
directed and by which it is determined. (p.292, emphasis 
in the original) 
"[T]oward which it was direct~d and by which it is 
determined" incorporates the use of language for coming to know 
the wo~ld {intentionality) and language which determines, in 
part, what it is possible to know. In addition Bakhtin 
suggests, I think, that language is for contact with other 
humans about and through the world. 
[The] actual meaning [of a given utterance - ed.] is 
understood against the background of other concrete 
utterances on the same theme, a background made up of 
contradictory opinions, points of view and value judgments 
- that is, precisely that background that, as we see 
complicates the path of any word toward its object ... this 
contradictory environment ... is present to the speaker not 
in the object, but rather in the consciousness of the 
listener~ as his apperceptive background, pregnant with 
responses and objections .•. a ba~kground ... composed of 
specific objects and emotional expressions. (p.281) 
Discourse exists in dialogue with a "listener as his 
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apperceptive background" and language also binds us closely to 
the objects of the world through the dialogical expressions 
about the world. And further, the objects and expressions are 
themselves bound together to each other in inextricable manners 
because it is the expressive dialogue with others that animates 
the objects. Knowing is predicated on the dialogue. 
Bakhtin gives, I think, a nice summation of the complexity 
of the power of language and connects with the relation between 
the individual and the sociality of language and images what I 
have meant by the intersection of and negotiation between 
individual worlds. He writes, 
[A]ny concrete discourse (utterance) finds the object at 
which it was directe~ already as it were overlain with 
quaJ.ifications, open to dispute, charged with value, 
already enveloped in an obscuring mist - or, on the 
contrary, by the "light" of alien words that have already 
been spoken about it. It is entangled, shot through with 
shared thoughts, points of view, alien value judgments and 
accents. The word, directed toward its object, enters a 
dialogically agitated and tension-filled environment of 
alien words, value judgments and accents, weaves in and 
out of complex interrelationships, merges with some, 
recoils from others, intersects with yet a third group: 
and all this may crucially shape discourse, may leave a 
trace in all its semantic layers, may complicate its 
expression and influence its entire stylistic profile. 
The living utterance, having taken meaning and shape 
at a particular historical moment in a socially specific 
environment, cannot fail to brush up against thousands of 
livLng dialogic threads ... it cannot fail to become an 
active participant in social dialogue. (p.276) 
Language as a Form of the Social and the Foundation of an 
~orizon of Understanding 
So far I have written of language in the singular form of 
the noun as if all languages are the same. This formulation 
requires correction tor there is not one language in the world 
but there are a multiplicity of languages, which create and 
present differing aspects of the world. (So, there are both 
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multiple individual accounts of the world and multiple languages 
for those accounts.) Bakhtin calls this multiplicity of 
languages "heteroglossia". Beteroqlossia presents an image of 
a fragmented world in which energized fragments fly about, 
collide, inhibit, facilitate etc. our understanding and 
communication processes. 
There are, I would say, at least three dimensions of 
heteroglossia. First, of course, there are languages of 
different peoples. These different languages may be associated, 
conventionally, with certain national characteristics. For 
instance, the French language is often called the language of 
love as if love is best expressed and maintained in French. 
Such conventional notions, however erroneous they might be, do 
represent the idea that to speak a certain language is to color 
the way the world is seen and understood. A second kind of 
heteroqlossia, exists within a single language. In a single 
language there are a multiplicity of regional dialects 
(vocabularies, accents, ways of forming phrases and sentences 
all of which effect the logic formations of the speaker/writer) 
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which capture and promote a particular consciousness. A third 
form of heteroglossia, and the one most applicable to the 
present study, is the specialized languages of inquiry, composed 
of ordinary language and special language (jargon) which bring 
the user to see the world in, for example, psychological, 
sociological, aesthetic, historical, political, literary, 
spiritual or religious terms (to name a few) . 
The function of using a particular language within the 
heteroglossic scheme is to carry for the user special meanings, 
one of which is that possession of the language permits 
identification by and with a particular community of like 
speakers/writers. This sense of membership further fragments 
the world in that the language acts as an 
exclusionary/inclusionary device for identification with the 
group of chose. This does not mean that a group uses words 
understandable only to them but that they use words in a certain 
way understandable to them. For instance, the English word God 
which is used by Christians, Jews, Moslems, atheists, Hindus, 
etc. but references very different concepts and relations. 
Membership is determined by the contextualized meaning of the 
word so that one knows which "God" is being referenced. The 
language form is not an empty vessel but is filled by cultural, 
social and personal contexts and the form itself is not 
separable from these contexts as it offers only certain kinds of 
culturally contextualized contoured vessels for having thoughts. 
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Therefore while individuals from different groups may negotiate 
the meanings of commonly held language formations these 
negotiations are, ultimately, limited by the differing contexts 
which can never be fully articulated. Bakhtin {1981) points out 
multiple contexts of meaning when he writes of the "background" 
of speakers and listeners against which the actual meaning of a 
given utterance is understood (p.281). 
Bakhtin points out that th.e daily interaction of the 
heteroglossia of languages is in the form of a conflict between 
the dominant unitary language, consisting of culturally 
normative modes of expression, such as the King's English, which 
acts as a "centripetal" force for maintaining the unity of the 
community over against "heteroglossia" which acts centrifugally. 
At any given moment of its evolution, language is 
stratified ... into languages that are socio-
ideological ... the centrifugal forces of language carry on 
their uninterrupted work of decentralization and 
disunification. {p.272) 
Th,~se multiple languages provide the wherewithal for a person to 
hold multiple group memberships and n,ultiple contexts of meaning 
which may be in conflict with each other. These various 
contexts of meaning (multiple memberships of a person) may be 
understood as comprising what a number of German hermeneuts have 
called the "horizon" of understanding of any person and image a 
person as being composed of a number of fragmented individuals. 
A person is not a person but is many people. These many may be 
experienced as unified into one person or as a set of fragments. 
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In either case, the particular multiplicity which a person is 
defines his/her "horizon'1 • 
This person lives within the boundaries, metaphorically, 
of an horizon beyond which he/she cannot see. Horizon is similar 
to the concept of language determinacy (which situates what we 
can know of the world) but adds the dimension of uncertainty 
about whether or not we can know more beyond the horizon. To 
know that there is an horizon, a limit, is to know that there is 
that beyond the horizon which is, for the moment, unavailable 
and about which we are uncertain. Under this metaphor our 
individual worlds appear to be partial and limited. Heidegger 
(1962) uses the term "horizon" in this limit manner in Being and 
Time. The translators of that book write of his use of 
"horizon" as follows: 
... the English speaking reader is likely ... to think of 
horizon as something which we may widen or extend or go 
beyond. Heidegger, however, seems to think of it rather· 
as something which we can neither widen nor go beyond, but 
which provides the limits for certain intellectual 
activities performed 'within' it. (p.l) 
From this perspective we are given to understand that 
constructing a world depends on having a limited perspective. 
Gadamer (1975), on the other hand, describes horizons as 
expandable. 
A horizon is not a rigid frontier, but something that 
moves with one and invites one to advance 
further ... [H]orizon intentionality, which constitutes the 
unity of the flow of experience, is paralleled by an 
equally comprehensive intentionality on the objective 
side. For everything that is given as existent is given 
in terms of th~ world and hence brings the world horizon 
\olith it. (p.217) 
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Gadamer envisions how the world is brought to us in a full way. 
He is indicating how each person exists within his/her horizon 
which is complete unto itself, comprehensible and whole. Within 
this construct experience is encountered as a unified flow. 
That which is experience, the "existent" (the world taken-for-
granted} comes from the world and carries with it the world 
horizon whose scope is global. There is a meeting of horizons 
which brings a person into the world (which is also by its own 
limited horizon, partial) . Gadarner writes that Husser! 
conceives of this world horizon as the "life-world, i.e. the 
world in which we are immersed in the natural attitude that 
never becomes for us an object as such, but that constitutes the 
pre-given basis of all experience" (1975, p.218) . The life-
world is "an essentially historical concept" (p.218) which 
is always at the same time a communal world and involves 
the existence of other people as well. It is a personal 
world, and in the natural attitude the validity of the 
personal is always assumed. (p.219) 
The Construction of the Self-World in the Light of the Other-
World 
I have written that people may have the taken-for-granted 
attitude that they comprehend the world in toto. Through the 
process of encountering others and their worlds, through reading 
or other means, this attitude is subject to shattering as people 
encounter that other people understand the world differently. 
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This shattering can bring horne to people the partial nature of 
their individual visions, make visible their ho~izona and bring 
horne to them that there is a world MQut there" which they do not 
comprehend in its fullness. 
Whatever is known of the world "out there" becomes just 
one model among many, a schematization upon which ongoing events 
are mapped into the partial, constructed world so that these new 
events may be made sense of. The encountering of difference can 
bring about the understanding that nothing is known in a 
transparent way. Indeed the evidence of multiple, individual 
worlds can tell us that, unless we are totally megalomaniac, our 
world is separate from and not necessarily true to the world 
"out there". 
Reading can be one attempt to encounter other worlds. 
Gadarner (1975) wrote that reading is always an attempt to answer 
a question and that the question always is: what was the 
question of the author which motivated the writing which stands 
as an answer to the author's question. The reader queries the 
text to uncover the question to which the text is an answer. To 
come to know an author's question, Gadarner writes, 
[W]e place ourselves in the situation of someone 
else ... becorne aware of the otherness, the indissoluble 
individuality of the other person, by placing ourselves in 
his position. (p.272) 
This suggests either an empathic connection or the "application 
of our own criteria" to another. Gadarner seems to focus upon 
how reading illuminates our own criteria as he writes that an 
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expansion of horizon occurs which functions to "look beyond what 
is close at hand - not in order to look away from it, but to see 
it better within a larger whole and truer proportion" (p.272). 
The reader is actually about corning to know his/her world better 
by corning to know another's world. 
There is a sense, however, in which we are not necessarily 
nware that. worlds other than our own exist even when we read. 
How are we brought to be aware of the existence of other wv=lds 
when reading? I will suggest, adopting Paul Ricoeur's point of 
view (in McFague,l982) as to why anyone feels the need to 
interpret a communication, that such awareness occurs when we 
come to know that we have misunderstood someone's communicative 
action. This begins the process of having to understand. In 
this process the receiver of the communication is, initially 
passive, prodded to action by the misunderstanding. It may be 
that disjunction is always predicative of the need to 
understand, that until that moment the receiver, 
phenomenologically took it for granted that the speaker/writer 
occupied the self-same world. The disjuncture dispels that 
image and complacency. 
Having been shaken from the sleep of complacency, the 
receiver is forced to consider that his/her present world is 
incomplete. Perhaps this understanding and subsequent action 
may be understood as a war metaphor: the wall of consciousness 
is breached and must be repaired. This is certainly one 
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response. It is a response set on attempting to "freeze" the 
world as it was by restoring the old wall surrounding the 
fortress of consciousness. New materials may be used to replace 
the old which means change. While the materials are new the 
attempt to repair under this metaphor is to minimize the change 
and to reestablish the old. Another possible response to the 
breach is that at the breakdown of consciousness rather than 
repairing we seek better forms of consciousness. We may 
innovate by examining the cause of the breakdown and the 
weakness of the old consciousness and by forming responses which 
address the weakness and strengthen or reinforce the weakness. 
Or we may respond by valuing the breakdown because we gain 
access to a new world which by comparison is a better world. 
Perhaps, in this case, we expand our fortress to include the 
surrounding countryside (an imperialist image) . These various 
images present a protection, adjustment response to 
misunderstanding. The status quo is repaired, fortified, 
reinforced, or domesticated through the annexation of the new 
world. 
There are other possibilities. For instance some 
misunderstandings bring us to discard our original world and 
adopt wholly the promise of the new world. This is the process 
of conversion experiences. Or, some misunderstandings animate 
dormant sectors of our own world, altering consciousness by 
making available more of what we already are. This points to 
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the notion of individuals having multiple language communities 
and multiple worlds some of which may not be consciously used or 
dwelt in for long periods of time but which may be re-animated. 
In this vision of the individual as having a taken-for-granted 
image of completion and as having multiple worlds some of which 
are either dormant or temporarily suppressed or not in use, the 
paradox of a dialectic arises. We may sense completion but with 
not all of our worlds available to us such completion is 
partial. We are both complete (feeling unified) and partial 
(feeling fragmented, multiple) . Awareness of completion seems 
to be an inevitable component of consciousness which is, through 
misunderstanding, brought to an awareness of the lack of 
completeness, the response to which is to establish a new 
completeness in some way. 
The action of play (written of earlier in Gadarnerian 
terms) is a central response to the re-formation of a world. 
This play may take the form of an examination of the breaching 
new world for its possibilities and trying on some aspects of 
that world for fit. The initiation of play may stimulate the 
player to further precipitate or evoke thought which departs 
even from the new world. The new world becomes a base upon 
which a still newer world might be founded. Play, as both 
appropriation and as imaginary, is always limited by the 
original horizon, the context which language provides. 
Selection of aspects of the world to try on begins in what is 
known and is directed by what is possible within the scope of 
the original world. Building upon the base of the new world 
involves selecting possibilities in part from the old world. 
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The results of such a process, in its amalgam of new and 
old, gives us a sense of continuity to consciousness. There is 
no escaping the old for, in fact, to correct the above metaphor, 
it is the old upon which the new is built. This very much 
echoes Gadarner's emphasis upon tradition which has been much 
attacked by critical theorists (Eagleton, 1983) . I am not 
arguing here in favor of tradition. It simply seems clear that 
the old is part of the new (indeed we could not know newness 
without having a comparative base which is the old) and that, to 
state it more strongly, the so-called new is predominantly old, 
although old made never the same. It might be said that the old 
becomes reshuffled and that new connections are made among the 
terms of the old. Having linked the making of metaphors with 
the renewal of worlds I must remind us that under language 
determinacy metaphors also invest language in a deep way in 
which they motivate us without our knowing that they are doing 
so. The incursion of the vld upon the new shows that any 
movements we make toward self-completion within an act of 
understanding are modified by metaphor, by the old and that the 
act of understanding is always a completion which is limited. 
The notion of horizon also mediates the active 
construction of the self-world. As with Bakhtin's dialogism the 
possibility of knowing my own "world" is predicated not on an 
hermetically sealed self but on what Gadam~r (1975) calls the 
"situation" of the horizon. 
"' [S]ituation' ... represents a standpoint that limits the 
possibility of vision." Within "situation" "the horizon 
is the range of vision that includes everything that can 
be seen from a particular vantage point." All self-
knowledge proceeds from what is historically pre-
given ... because it is the basis of all subjective meaning 
and attitude and hence both prescribes and l.i :-~· '·;s every 
possibility of understanding any tradition whatsoever in 
terms of its unique historical quality. (p.269) 
Part of the making of a world must be understood within this 
horizon and the connections between wcrlds may be found within 
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the contents of the horizoned space. It is these contents which 
are commonly shared, which are placed within the horizon by the 
commonly experienced social world. 
Dialectics 
A number of dialectical relationships emerge out of the 
discussion in this chapter. These dialectics ere important for 
understanding and analyzing the texts with which I will engage 
in the next chapter. 
Individual/Society 
Dialectically, the knowing from within the horizon is 
individual and autonomous (personal) but what is known and how 
the knowing proceeds is commonly held and exists within 
language. The diale~tic is between the individual and society 
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in which the individual in relation to which the individual is 
both autonomous and not autonomous. 
Language is a social construct into which we are initiated 
and does not arise sui qeneris. Bakhtin (1981) locates this 
commonality within, at least in part, the unitary language of a 
community which is "ideologically saturated, language as a world 
view, even as a concrete opinion, insuring a max~ of mutual 
understanding in all spheres of ideological life" (p.271). Such 
ideology does not stem from the group in toto but often tends to 
privilege one sub-group over another or other~. This idea is 
captured in Bakhtin's notion of heteroqlossia in which the 
various languages are in conflict, particularly with the 
unitary, centrifugal language. 
This ideological life represents social life. Gadamer 
(1975} utilizes the notion of "tradition" to represent a social 
setting in which the historical flow of understanding allowed to 
us by tradition permits understanding in both our daily 
interaction with others and our ability to understand texts from 
another era. How to come to a level of awareness of tradition 
becomes a hermeneutic problem which Gadamer puts as follows, 
Are there ... two different horizons here, the horizon in 
which a person seeking to understand lives, and the 
particular historical hori~on within which he places 
himself? (p.271) 
(The latter horizon is the horizon of what a person wants to 
come to understand.) Are horizons ever totally hermetically 
sealed? Gadamer answers as follows. 
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Just as the individual is never simply an individual 
because he is always involved with others, so too the 
closed horizon that is supposed to enclose a culture is an 
abstraction ... human life .•. is never utterly bound to one 
standpoint ..• The horizon of the past, out of which all 
human life lives and which exists in the form of 
tradition, is always in motion .•. When our historical 
consciousness places itself within historical 
horizons ... they constitute the one great horizon that 
moves from within and, beyond the frontiers of the 
present, embraces the historical depths of self-
consciousness. (p.271) 
Russel Jacoby (1975'1, on the other hand, writes on this 
point of commonality in socio-political, critical theory terms. 
"The individual, before it can determine itself, is determined 
by the relations in which it is enmeshed" (p.34). Jacoby cites 
Herbert Marcuse as using a term "'corporealization of the 
psyche' to suggest the psychic p=ocess: the translation of 
psychic energy into 'unconscious automatic reactions'" (p.44). 
These reactions appear natuLal to us but, writes Jacoby, 
it is not a question of pure nature. Rather it is second 
nature: history that hardened into nature ... What is second 
nature to the individual is accumulated and sedimented 
history ... Second nature is not simply nature or history 
but frozen history that surfaces as nature. (p.31) 
This frozen history is the history of unfreedom, of physical, 
social and economic oppression sedimented into consciousness in 
such a way as to appear to be the right and proper "way the 
world is". Jacoby also calls this second nature "common sense", 
those beliefs we hold in common which are often used to validate 
common ways of thinking as fundamentally correct. Jacoby and 
Gadamer clearly differ in terms of the ideological life. 
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I have written that on the level of common sense we feel 
ourselves to be autonomous. Clearly, such "common sense" must 
be called int0 quBstion as we may ask the typical sociology of 
knowledge question: whose sense are we making (Cuddihy, 1974)? 
It is held in common but favors one particular set of beliefs 
and practices over another. If we take it that a world made 
seems to be a common sense world to the maker on the surface of 
that world we may ask whether or not what the maker had made is, 
below the surface, of his/her own making, serving his/her own 
interests. Understanding that language imports into the world-
making interests of some sub-group, .::.t is clear that he/she has 
not made his/her own world autonomously. But more deeply, just 
as language is fragmented into groups which are not equally 
powerful in terms of setting the agenda of discourse (Bakhtin 
writes of this when he writes of the contest between the 
dominant language and all the subordinated, heteroglossia) so, 
too, the world-maker in question utilizes a language which may 
import someone else's agenda which is not meant to be beneficial 
to the individual world-maker. 
Returning to the dialectic of the autonomous self, the 
individual and the common surround of culture or society, the 
autonomous self which seeks expansion is in dialectical relation 
with the historical self. The historical self demands 
understanding in exact proportion to its hiddeness from us. By 
this I mean that uncovering a particular reading, while it may 
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be involved with uncovering both what the reader and writer want 
to tell us about their world, it is also involved with what the 
reader and writer are unable to tell us, at least directly, 
about their world and their reasons for constructing the world 
in the ways that they do, unable to tell precisely because they 
did not create it, the historical self. The historical self may 
oe in command of the reading. 
This makes it important to understand the dialectic of 
individual and this historical self, this society in which the 
individual is embedded, in a strong manner. All the theorists 
with whom I am dealing recognize this issue, although in 
slightly different ways. Bakhtin (1981), for instance, attempts 
to counter the traditional (what Jacoby calls bourgeois) image 
of language utterances as a 
self-sufficient whole ... presuming .•. no' other 
utterances ... [as a] closed authorial 
monologue ... lock[ed] ... into the monologic context of a 
given self-sufficient and hermetic utterance, imprisoning 
it, as it were, in the dungeon of a single context." 
(p. 273-274) 
Over against this, Bakhtin asserts, "we must deal with the life 
and behavior of discourse in a contradictory and multi-languaged 
world" (p.275). He writes, further, that individual writing is 
"dialogized heteroglo:::sia, anonymous and social as language, but 
simultaneously concrete, filled with specific content and 
accented as an individual utterance" (p.272). He writes that 
"·che nature of language" is "a struggle among socio-linguistic 
points of view, not an intra-language struggle between 
individual wills or logical contradictions" (p.273) 
Gadamer (1975)also recognizes the social nature of 
understanding although he does not seem to acknowledge the 
struggle between the historical and present selves. 
[T]he horizon of the present is being continually formed 
in that we have continually to test all our prejudices. 
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An important part of this testing· is the enco·.mter with 
the past and the understanding of the tradition from which 
we come ... the horizon of the present cannot be formed 
without the past ... Understanding ... is always a fusion of 
these horizons which we imagine exist by themselves ... In a 
tradition this process of fusion is continually going on, 
for there the old and new continually grow together to 
make something of living value. (p.273) 
Gadamer goes on to write, 
Historical consciousness is aware of its own otherness and 
hence distinguishes the horizon of tradition from its own. 
On the other hand, it is itself ... only something laid over 
a continuing tradition, and hence it immediately 
recombines what it has distinguished in order, in the 
unity of historical horizon that it thus acquires, to 
become again one with itself. (p.273) 
"The fusion of horizons" seems a useful and important 
understanding which needs to be accounted for. Gadamer 
describes the sense of unity we feel with another when we verify 
our understanding of another's world. We fuse horizons with the 
past and lay over the past our own horizon. This raises the 
possibility of conflict which Gadamer does not seem to 
acknowledge. By fracturing language in the way that Bakhtin 
does (by demonstrating the differences between language groups 
down, even, to the social unit of the f.amily) Gadamer's 
formulations become useful as first-level understandings of the 
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natural attitude. The sense of unity is underlain by the depths 
to which our selves are formed by social relations which 
fracture the unified sense of self into two selves, the natural 
and Jacoby's idea of second-nature. Second-nature, by its 
definition, seems to subsume nature so that it may seem, due to 
our introjected social relations, that we do not and cannot know 
our self except in the light of second-nature. 
Nature/Culture 
Despite the power of the "second-nature" analysis there is 
a feeling which people have that we possess or are possessed by 
nature which is within us and around us. The issue of nature 
cannot but bring some level of contradiction to the social 
construct formulation. Even Jacoby (1975) provides some 
insights here as he discusses the workings of biology and 
society, writing that a social activity is the particularized 
social expression of more "universal11 biological needs and 
drives. He quotes Otto Fenichel that the "materialist 
advantage" of psychoanalysis is that it has shown that ideals 
such as truth and justice "'are not ... genuine strivings but are 
formed out of biological needs by socially determined 
experiences'" (p.96). This maintains the necessary dialectic 
which, on the one hand, will not release from consciousness the 
materials with which we are born and, on the other hand, will 
make a place for them in the theory by examining how differing 
social contexts deal with them. 
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The image of nature, when placed over against the image of 
second-nature, suggests that there is a world "out there" which 
we struggle to come to know which does not come out of the 
social context although it is effected by that context (Rorty, 
1989). This world of nature exists inside us as genes and 
physiology and is not socially constructed. Both genes and 
accidents of conception and birth bring about differences 
between people which individualize each of us as to, among other 
aspects, the individual process of language acquisition and 
realization. Nature can also be understood as the serendipitous 
event which cannot be predicted or controlled by social 
construction. In fact it is these very aspects of nature which 
cause, I believe, a rupture in the notion of second-nature, of 
social construction and participate in bringing about the 
possibilities of uniqueness and newness for which the idea of 
social construction cannot account. I attempted some 
formulation of this when I developed the seed/hostile 
environment metaphor which proposed an alteration of world-view 
through accommodation to serendipitous events. 
In that metaphor difference also was imaged as the 
capacity to become different, the capacity for adaptation. 
Depending on the ability of a plant for adaptation, it may or 
may have survived. Some individual member of that conceptual 
group might have possessed more adaptive powers than other 
individuals and, thus, possess more likely-hood of survival. 
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The plants were different from each other at germination and 
held differing capacities for becoming different. This suggests 
difference which is not socially constructed. 
When I wrote earlier that language powerfully determined 
our world I could only refer to the way language determines so 
that there is always the suspicion that nothing can be new for 
us. Nothing can be new because we re-cognize "newness" via 
language which carries only pre-givens. The world, in this way 
of thinking, is always made old. On the other hand, the idea of 
nature and serendipity allow for the world to be made new. To 
be sure it cannot ever be made wholly new for there must be some 
aspect of the old in the new, otherwise language could not 
assimilate and translate it into cognizable features. 
Nevertheless, I would assert that there is a certain level 
of significant difference, located in personal biology and 
history which mediates total determination. This will ~e 
further elaborated in a later chapter on the personal. For now 
I will state that all of the above suggests that for 
interpreting both the processes of writing and reading 
distinctions must be sought between what pre-understandings 
inform texts and readings, what stands out against these pre-
understandings as "new" and how this newness is tied back into 
the ground of the pre-understandings. In addition, distinctions 
must be made between the reader's pre-understandings and new 
contributions and the writer's pre-understandings and new 
thinking, all the while tying the reader and writer back into 
each other. 
Subject/Object 
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Underlying much of this discussion there has been a tacit 
dialectic of subject and object. The subject, in this case, is 
the speaking or writing or reading subject (person) and the 
object is the world which is spoken of, written of or read. 
There has been the assumption that there is a distinction 
between subject and object. I should like now to explicitly 
explore the concepts of subject and object on their own. 
To begin with, there is the difficulty of teasing apart 
the subject from the object. That is, the ways in which the 
subject is tied into his/her world and the levels of 
consciousness which are informed by the world and the way the 
world changes as the subject moves through the world all speak 
of the complex interaction between subject and object. To 
conceptualize them as separate is to lose the dialectical 
dimension of their interrelationship as well as obscuring the 
difficulty of separating them, the one from the other. Bakhtin 
(1981) givee voice to this when he writes, "[I]t is often 
difficult to penetrate ... [the] obscuring mist" of dialogisms 
which "envelop" the utterance (p.276). Even the personal 
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dimension of thought (Polanyi's tacit knowing) is hard to come 
to except by distancing the knower (the subject) from the known 
(the object) . This is indicative of an important dimension of 
the interrelationship between subject/knower and 
object/knowledge: the lack of rational control over the 
relationship. Rationality will neither serve to bring the 
relationship to light nor to bring it within our control. 
To bring forth this knowledge of subject/object to a form 
with which we can deal, we must act like the sculptor, painter, 
or choreographer and.step away from knowledge in order to 
observe it and make decisions about it. Through the lens of 
language determinancy when we step away what we see is that, 
ironically, the traditional view of knower (subject) and known 
(object) becomes reversed. Under language determinancy the 
person is the object of the subject (the knowledge, the 
language). By being subjected to language the knower becomes 
its object. Because language is so close to us, we identify 
with it to such an extent that it is literally out of sight and 
yet moves us, makes of us its object (just as the artist makes 
an object of his/her work) through its unseen directiveness. 
Conversely, to step away as the artist does and focus upon the 
knowledge of language is to, once again make it an object and is 
to allow us to become subjects to the extent that we can come to 
consciousness of that language knowledge. This knowledge of 
which we become conscious is the knowledge of our social 
conditioning, our personal dimensions and our biology. 
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By showing the way in which we become objects and lose our 
subjectivity by being subsumed by the hidden forces of language 
I am attempting to raise up the Freudian notion of the 
unconscious. I gain this understanding from Jacoby. While 
Bakhtin and Gadamer speak from sociological (the former) or 
philosophical (the latter) points of view Jacoby insists on 
maintaining the psychological dimension. He warns against the 
development of sociologisms and psychologisms as a development 
which destroys the dialectical character of experience and 
understanding. He proposes that much post-Freudian psychology 
(Jung, Fromm, Maslow, Rogers) has abandoned the sociological 
implications of Freud, focusing instead upon the individual as a 
self-enclosed monadic subject and that much of post-Marx Marxism 
has fallen prey to a dismissal of the individual, focusing 
purely upon the sociological formation which makes the 
individual an object moved by objective forces thoroughly beyond 
his/her control. 
In contrast to these tendencies Jacoby (1975) offers the 
critical theory (Frankfurt School) position which "sinks into 
subjectivity until it hits bottom: society" (p.79). 
"[S]ubjectivity is pursued till it issues into the social and 
historical events that preformed and deformed the subject" 
(p.79). "To bring subjectivity to objectivity entails teaching 
it how to speak about what it bespeaks: society and history. 
Such an effort is an objective theory of subjectivity" (p.SO). 
The "preformed and deformed" suggests the Freudian unconscious 
and it is to this unconscious that I refer in pointing out the 
lack of control we exercise as subjects in the world which is 
subject to heteroglossic dialogization of our utterances. 
Conclusion 
Our individual world-makings are never independent acts. 
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We acquire a world though a complex interaction with other 
worlds. The mode of presenting a world to others is language in 
which exists all of our social and personal understandings of 
the world. It is to language that we can turn to bring this 
understanding to light. Doing so aids in working through 
(without controlling) the preformation and deformation and 
adding to our stock of possibilities. In the next chapter I 
shall analyze dance education texts in the light of these 
understandings. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THREE DANCE EDUCATION TEXTS 
The World and Language of Dance Education Research 
Research into dance education is involved, for the most 
part, with studying the practice of teaching dancing to people. 
This research focuses upon such items as pedagogical classroom 
practice, the way the body functions anatomically, 
physiologically, medically and the psychology of learning and 
the psychology of art-making. Often such research is modelled 
either on traditional science or social science models. The 
former is often set within an empirical-analytic point of view. 
The latter may take the form of, for instance, interviewing 
dancers, ethnographic participant-observer research, or the 
setting up of psychological experimental modalities designed for 
testing variables. 
Dance education research, being a rather new field of 
inquiry, has tended to work though existing modes of inquiry as 
can be seen in the above. There has been, more recently, a 
reaction to this usage in the form of a search for new 
approaches which can acknowledge the specific and unique way 
that dancing is a particular form of knowing. I see these two 
points of view as functioning from opposed, unarticulated 
assumptions. To work though existing modalities suggests that 
inquiry into dance is contiguous with the rest of the world, 
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that dancing is only another form of the basic content of the 
world. To seek new approaches is to suggest that dancing is 
separate from the rest of the world and needs its own modes of 
inquiry if its true contribution to the world can be understood. 
Another way of understanding the split is to characterize 
the borrowing tendencies and the new approach tendencies as both 
utilizing particular languages of inquiry to forward their 
separate projects. Some use science language and some use other 
languages. I have already noted that some research is oriented 
toward natural science or quantitative social science and 
adopts, consequently, an empirical-analytic mode of discourse. 
Within the social sciences approach there are, also, the 
ethnographic studies which, tend to use more reflective, 
personal language into which is mixed the scientific discourse 
of anthropology. The new approaches attitude which seeks to 
understand dance as distinct and unique tends toward the use of 
aesthetic or phenomenological languages or the development of 
new language which it attempts to claim are wholly new languages 
(without admitting that the use of these terms appropriate well 
developed, socially constructed languages) {see Coros, 1988, 
Fraleigh, 1987, Sheets-Johnstone, 1966). 
It should be clear, from the first chapter, that I 
consider language to be a central issue in world-making and I 
reiterate that stance here. The kinds of languages that are 
used and how they are used present specific kinds of worlds. 
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Different languages forward different worlds. A mixture of 
various languages (heteroglossia) presents a still more complex 
image of world-making. Awareness of the significance of 
language requires that we be aware of the languages in use in 
dance research: awareness of their sociological, historical, 
philosophical and psychological (personal and social) 
implications. In becoming aware of the implications of language 
we encounter the problematics inherent in dance research as we 
come to grips with the contradictions, conflicts and 
contiguities which can be found to exist among various 
implications. 
In developing such awareness I will address two questions. 
What values inherent in various languages are imported into 
dance education research values? What are the problematics of 
various languages in dance education research? 
At this point I need to address a problem which language 
analysis may encounter vis ~ vis dance education texts. Dance 
educators are often suspicious of language and intellectual 
pursuits as being inadequate to or subversive of the dance 
project. This attitude causes difficulty as they also seek 
validation within the larger world which requires the use of 
language and values intellectual approaches to understanding. 
Dance educators tend to feel forced into a system of inter-
change and validation which seems to run counter to how they 
conceive their project. The present work may be able to yield 
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some clarification of these issues in distinction to the usual 
level of disagreement in which there is mutual disregard between 
those dancers who reject language and intellect and those dance 
researchers who, in exasperation, attack the former as wooly-
headed and overly romantic. Certainly the latter have Sv"ne 
cause for co~cern as the Habermasian notion of corrmunicative 
action and competence underscores the necessity for language if 
we are to have a world at all. On the other hand, hermeneutic 
theory also makes it clear that language distorts reality and 
leads interpretation, a point which I believe the anti-language 
dancers may tacitly perceive quite clearly. 
The Texts 
The set of texts which I named in the Introduction belong 
to a particular strand of dance education, namely creative dance 
education which was developed in the 1930s, 40s and early 50s. 
I am interested in creative dance education in part because its 
practitioners and proponents made explicit attempts to 
understand dancing as a mode of education answerable to issues 
of general education (as opposed to being answerable to the 
specific vocation of a particular discipline and body of 
knowledge). In addition these educators seem to have been aware 
of issues which I would contend are important issues for dance 
such as the body/mind problem and the nature and place of 
creativity within a technical art. 
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The two educators and their texts, Margaret H'Doubler and 
her Dance, A Creative Art Experience (1940) and Alma Hawkins and 
her Modern Dance in Higher Education (1954) and Creating Through 
Dance (1988) are two of the most influential thinkers in dance 
education and their books are considered classics in the field. 
In terms of this study these texts are particularly useful. 
While most dancers avoid talking and writing about dance, these 
dance educators explicitly wrote these books to lead the field 
into improved, theoretically sound educative practice and 
discourse. They are recognized both for their centrality to the 
making of a particular dance education tradition and are, 
simultaneously, considered to be of contemporary usefulness as 
curriculum guides and inspirations. 
In discussing each of these books, I shall do two things: 
lay out the ideational content and develop some thoughts on the 
implications of the language which is used to express the ideas. 
In laying out the ideational content I will quote extensively 
since the purpose of the study is to illuminate the tensions 
which exist between what the author seems to be attempting to 
say (as gleaned from the declarative and imperative styles of 
discourse} and what the language used conveys. 
Having examined the ideas and language of an individual 
text I shall, finally, ask the Gadamerian hermeneutic question: 
what is the question of the author to which the text is an 
answer? In so doing I shall attempt to reorganize the text 
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according to how the question is answered and ~:hat implications 
that answer holds for both the specific creative dance education 
pedagogy and for the act of developing a world-view. 
Margaret H'Doubler's Dance, A Creative Art Experience 
Introductory Remarks 
Margaret H'Doubler did not start out as a dance teacher. 
Initially she was a physical educator at the University of 
Wisconsin who attended Teacher's College in New York City to 
study for her Master's degree (Kraus and Chapman, 1981). When 
she had departed for Teacher's College she was "encouraged" by 
Blanche Trilling, the director of the Department of Physical 
Education at the University of Wisconsin, to study dance at the 
same time that she worked on her master's degree (Hawkins,1954). 
Trilling was aware of the developments in educational dance 
being pioneered by Gertrude Colby at Teacher's College and by 
Bird Larson at Barnard College and, according to Alma Hawkins, 
, Trilling "sensed the importance of this new dance for college 
women" (Hawkins, 1954, pp.7-8). H'Doubler did study dance and 
brought what she learned back to Wisconsin where she eventually 
established the first university dance major in the country and 
became very important to the development of dance education 
through extensive writing and publishing of influential texts 
(Kraus and Chapman, 1981). 
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Dance, A CreatiYe Art Experience was originally published 
in 1940 with a second edition published in 1957. H'Doubler wrote 
three books, A Manual of Dancing, Suggestions and Bibliography 
for the Teacher of Dancing (1921), followed by Dance and Its 
Place in Education (1925) (which was an elaboration of the 
manual) followed by the text I am considering. This book 
supplanted the others in its importance to the field. It is an 
expression, as she puts it, of "a theory and a philosophy of 
dance that will help us to see dance scientifically as well as 
artistically" and her purpose is to present "dance from a more 
general point of view" (1940, p.ix). 
What we have to examine, then, is waht the "more general 
point of view" of this book is, how she elaborates that point of 
view and what meaning·s may be inscribed within her mode of 
elaboration. Gertrude Johnson, who wrote the Foreword to Dance, 
A Creative Art Experience, gives us an initial vision of this 
point of view. She writes that H'Doubler began to teach dance 
at a time when dance held literally no place or thought of 
place in the educational plan of any academic institution 
in the country ... Margaret H'Doubler has been chiefly 
instrumental in bringing dance to its present state, where 
it is recognized as an educational factor in a great 
number of schools and colleges. (H'Doubler, 1940, pp.vii-
viii) 
This point of view is to see in what ways dancing is 
educational. As we shall see education is posited as a means to 
social ends. 
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Social Critique 
H'Doubler (1940, all subsequent references will be to this 
book) begins by proposing to develop two specific lines of 
thought: 1) to (as I have already written) "set forth a theory 
and a philosophy that will help us see dance scientifically as 
well as artistically" (p.x) and 2) to show how dancing 
contributes to a social agenda. In terms of social agenda she 
asserts that "Dance ... [is] of great social value" and "must [be 
brought] within the reach of the laity ... must be a vitalizing 
experience to them" (p.x). Dance has a "power of 
civilization ... as a control over life in giving artistic form to 
its expression" (p.x). Through these two lines of thought she 
hopes to "bring dance into universal use ... to help in the 
development of a more general appreciation of human art values" 
(p .x) • 
In setting out a social agenda she also engages in social 
critique. She writes, for instance, " ... we are overcommercial, 
overeager for riches" (p.27) and 
And, 
Art does not come to a people while they are struggling 
for existence. And, likewise, the ease and 
irresponsibility of a too pampered life do not key to a 
pitch for vibrant expression. Rather they are apt to make 
flabby and nonresilient the sounding board of vital human 
responses. (p. 28) 
Although we live in a land of great individual 
opportunity, we carry on a deadly conformity in the midst 
of our much-boasted freedom and individualism ... We feel 
safe in conforming, in being like others. Psychologically 
we are not yet mature ... Conforrnity .•. quells the spirit of 
inquiry and the impulse to create. (p.28} 
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She complains that "often ... education [is] defined as ... no more 
than a means of bettering one's economic condition" (p.60}. She 
writes of workers as being alienated from his/her work. 
The detail of the office, the piece job and the assembly 
line rob the worker of any opportunity to identify himself 
with his work. ne has no chance to create beauty of form 
or to share his aesthetic experiences through artistic 
creation. (p.161} 
H'Doubler analyzes her world in both sociological and 
social psychological terms. Sociologically she analyzes human 
experience economically, seeing a world in which people struggle 
for economic existence (her attack on the pampered life and her 
description of the work place) . In social psychological terms 
she sees the individual subsumed by conformist ideology 
referring to this subsumption of individuality in developmental 
terms ("we are not yet mature"). Further, For her the world is 
made of individuals who desire individuality, personal freedom 
and who quest for the spirituality of aesthetic endeavor 
(psychologically} but are denied these by too great an interest 
in physical well-being and by an economic and educational system 
which denies them both the skills and opportunities for 
fulfilling such desires and quests (sociologically} . 
H'Doubler offers a counter to these ~ituations by offering 
the ameliorative and transformative effects of creative dance 
educat~on. She enumerates the possible positive consequences of 
encountering a creative approach to dance education, listing 
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them in ascending order of importance. They are: having a 
"healthy mental life", "physical effectiveness", "exhilaration 
of vigorous physical movement", the "power to carry the 
individual beyond himself, into a broader world of imaginative 
experience and understanding", a knowledge of all the arts 
since all arts are fundamentally the s~~e, cultivation of the · 
"aesthetic attitude", the improvement of "mental life" in terms 
of the quality of intellect, the appreciation of great artists, 
and, most importantly, the "carry[ing] over [of] knowledge into 
a technique of artistic living" (pp.162-167). With each next 
value she uses ccntrastive language such as "even more 
important" and, with the last value she states "The contribution 
dance can make to [artistic] living is its primary value to an 
individual life and to society" (p.167). She argues that 
To help our people mature and raise our cultural level, we 
must give them the same opportunity for artistic and 
spiritual growth that has been afforded them in other 
branches of education. (p.29) 
This help comes in the form of the several benefits which stern 
from a creative dance experience. 
In the above the vision of the transformation of the world 
into a world of "artistic living" is contrasted to a world of 
herd-like conformity. Artistic living is mentally healthy, 
exhilarating, transcendent, democratic and spiritual in contrast 
to a more crass economic living which is shackled to the 
struggle for existence, a struggle which results only in a 
desire for the merely physical (pampered life) . In her 
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comparison between dance and "other branches of education" there 
is a desire to bring dance education into line with other 
educational endeavors. 
This desire is the desire to reorient the teaching of 
dance toward the inclusion of social values and the teaching of 
dance to everyone. She seems very clear that her pedagogy is 
not oriented toward educating professional dancers, although 
they are important. Her concern is, rather, with the 
development of "a sympathetic and understanding public" (p.x). 
It is important to show, writes H'Doubler, that 
dance is available to all if they desire it and that 
it is an activity in which some degree of enjoyment 
and aesthetic satisfaction for all may be found. 
(p. ix) 
It is not that H'Doubler desires a world without 
professionals. She is interested in the professional artist and 
is only trying to make us understand that the artist and public 
are symbiotic in their relationship. The professional artist 
needs a public "as much as the public needs the artist to 
realize and give back its dreams" (p.x). H'Doubler's pedagogy 
is meant to aid the "community'' in "possess [ing] ... a dance 
spirit [from which] many artists will rise from the ranks to 
carry dance to its highest unfoldment" (p.xi). It is the task 
of "us today to rediscover and seek [dance's] influence" (p.x). 
For H'Doubler it is up to educational institutions to 
achieve this influence for it is through the schools that "dance 
can reach everyone ... [for] few studios are interested 
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in ... democratic art activity" (p.x). Schools, on the other 
hand, can give every child throughout his/her school experience 
the opportunity to experience dance as a creative 
art ... [to] enrich ... his adult life ... by keeping pace 
with his developing physical, mental, and spiritual 
needs. (p.x) 
H'Doubler notes that "Students bring a wealth of natural 
endowment to a study of movement" (p.xxvi). But, she asks 
What are we doing with this endow.ment? .•. Not until 
provision is made in the curriculum for creative 
activities can we hope to renew much-needed aesthetic 
sensitivity in our lives today and be freed from 
herd-like conformity. (p.xvii) 
She continues, 
The individual's culture as well as the culture of 
the social order is dependent upon man's ability to 
create and produce. These are human qualities which 
must be saved. To release and foster creativity is 
one of education's greatest challenges. (p.xvii) 
The specifics of H'Doubler's pedagogy for change rely upon 
psychology, physiology and anatomy for the necessary 
understanding of the aesthetic experience. She writes, " ... the 
impelling force in art creation is to be explained by the 
psychology of feeling and by the need for communication" (p.51) 
and 
This desire to express all feeling in order to continue 
pleasurable states of feeling and to relieve those which 
are not pleasurable has its basis in the physiological 
phenomena of all life. (pp.Sl-52) 
Such physiological necessity is found literally in "all life" 
(she presents the amoeba as a primary example of moving toward 
pleasurable experience and away from unpleasantness) . She 
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notes, "All that we have at our disposal for human development 
is this natural and universal setup of simple feeling" upon 
which "we elaborate our superior feelings which later will serve 
us as our preferences" (p.52). She characterizes the desire to 
cormnunicate as "instinctive" (p.52), a biological metaphor. 
H'Doubler's world is constituted, here, as a natural one at base 
which has both, in valuable ..,1ays, become more cultured and 
civilized and, problematically, lost its way as witnessed by the 
loss of natural aesthetic affect as a virtue. 
To rediscover the natural base H'Doubler teaches that the 
pedagogy must attend, in part, to "movement forms" based "on the 
laws of bodily motion ... in all the forms characteristic of human 
responses" (p.65). In the chapter, "Technique and Expression", 
H'Doubler goes on to explicate these laws in anatomical, 
physiological, and behaviorist terms. Coming to an 
understanding of these laws and their accompanying processes of 
expression is very important since science "will contribute to a 
more truthful a:;.:t" by bringing about "understanding" and 
"analysis of conditions~ for "expression" and "consciousness of 
our abilities" (p.94). 
On the other hand, H'Doubler warns against overemphasizing 
such rational understanding. 
[T]oo much analysis may obscure the real significance of 
reality - something may escape, so that in the 
reconstruction there is less of substance than in the 
beginning. Also, we may become so engrossed in facts that 
we lose the vision of the finished whole, and thus the 
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emergence of ideas that give significant meaning and val·ue 
to facts is blocked. (p.95) 
But, she reassures, "There is no danger in this process if we 
continually realize that the real phenomena resides in the 
whole" (p.95). Here we can see the struggle between valuing the 
uniqueness of dance, a non-rational activity, and the 
importation into it of the value of science as an important form 
of rational analysis. H'Doubler is trying to mediate between 
them so as to develop truthfulness and yet retain the inchoate 
gestalt of dance. The rationalist side of the dialectic marks 
out her world as a place where there is truth which is knowable, 
concrete and immutable: "laws" and "facts". The non-rationalist 
side raises facts to the level of "significant meaning." 
Science discovers facts and art reveals "the real significance 
of reality", of facts. Unable to ignore these opposed truths 
H'Doubler is caught within a paradox whose tensions she 
acknowledges. 
Nature/Culture 
In H'Doubler's world the metaphors of "nature" and 
"organic" are imaged as the ground out of which "grows" the 
culture of human beings. Human beings have an animal "nature" 
which they transcend by elaborating "superior feelings." 
H'Doubler writes, 
The forms of plants and the movements of animals and human 
beings as well as their biological functioning are the 
results of an inner determining activity. But man goes 
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further. He of all creatures is destined by the very laws 
of his nature to achievements of another order. Unlike 
the animal, he is driven by convictions and ideas of the 
perfect that are not innate, but are the results of 
experience and education. How much simpler life would be 
if the development of an individual .•. were as simple as 
that of the plant and animal .•• determined by an 
instinctive ordering. But the expressive forms of man's 
ideals nevertheless are organically related to an inner 
activity ... tak[ing] the raw materials of 
sensation ... organiz[ing] and relat[ing] them, thus 
endowing experience with a structure and individuality of 
its own. (p.102) 
These biological metaphors function as a language for 
description, explanation and, I believe, legitimation for the 
pedagogy. In terms of legitimation the workings of culture 
("experience and education") are legit:i.:rnated by metaphorizing 
them as "organically related to an inner activity". "Tak[ing] 
raw materials" is the biological ground and "organiz[ing] them" 
is the cultural extension out of that ground. By linking her 
ideas with biology she suggests, I believe, that her ideas have 
a facticity as inevitable as nature. They partake of the 
quality of biology even though they are not biology. If one 
were seeking truth then nature would seem to present one version 
of solid ground for truth. Those ideas not grounded in biology 
would be moving away from truth. (We have seen already that 
H'Doubler is interested in "a more truthful art.") 
Nature also functions literally in her discourse as the 
basis for cultural understanding as for instance science as a 
form of cultural life. She writes, 
The original, more instinctive form becomes conditioned by 
the ideal form. And only as the mind can conceive of 
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these new forms as related to the familiar organic forms 
will a true expressive style develop. The vitality of 
movement is subject to and controlled by deep-seated 
influences that are of, and for, the organism. In 
building technique, then, we should try .•• to release 
[deep-seated influences] in order that they may contribute 
to, and co-operate with, the goal-aiming efforts of the 
mind. (p.93) 
I take this to mean that the cultural artifact called dance 
technique is a cultural elaboration of the natural, instinctive 
mode of living of the organism. "Only as the mind can conceive 
of these new forms will a true expressive style develop." 
H'Doubler seeks a fundamental and essential truth through the 
mind which examines material existence (organic forms) and comes 
to know ideal forms through that examination. 
Mind/Body 
This theme of mind/body has an important role within her 
pedagogical world. She writes that "the educated, cultured, 
individual life [is] dependent upon the growth and function of 
the mind ... to know, \'lill , imagine, create, and execute 11 (p.60). 
Later she writes, 11 The success of any act ... depends upon a 
conscious direction of effort toward the ideal 11 (p.91) by which 
she means that the direction is under the control of the mind 
or, as she puts it elsewhere, under the direction of the "higher 
mental and spiritual natures of people" (p.129). 
The purpose of educating the mind is to lift the human 
being out of his/her primal, instinctual life. She writes of 
composing dances, for instance, in the following way: 
Reason enters ... and causes other judgments to appear 
... aesthetic judgment is lifted form the level of 
instinctual and elemental feeling to that of intelligence 
and understanding. (p.ll3) 
And she writes that education 
trains these [instinctive impulses] to serve the will and 
desires of an intellect impelled by ideas so that the 
individual student can bring all his powers to bear upon 
the life of his choosing. (p.97) 
The dialectic of nature/culture is both unified (culture as an 
elaboration of nature) and split apart (culture is lifted away 
from nature to the level of intelligence and understandings 
which is distinct from nature.) 
The relationship of the mind and body ( culture and 
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nature) is clearly hierarchical in this discourse. The organic 
body, the "instinctive impulses" are trained "to serve the will 
and desires of the intellect". Mo.st of H'Doubler's discourse is 
focused upon educating the mind in its several aspects, either 
physiologically, intellectually or emotionally, such aspects 
being useful for education in the creative mode. In the one 
chapter more heavily involved with the body, "Technique and 
Expression", the language shifts from "education" to "training" 
signalling a different attitude toward the body and a different 
approach t.o mind education when it is directed toward the body. 
In dance, as in every art, it is essential to train the 
~nd to use some tool ... In dance the body is employed as 
the instrument .•. train[ed] to use the body to reflect its 
condition ... [and] to be responsive to the expressive mind. 
(p. 70) 
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This training makes "the meaning of education as the 
disciplining and training of our powers and the attainment of 
skill in execution" (p.63). What occurs is that the "drives" of 
a person 
subjected to 
and executed 
our energies 
personality. 
the restraint and directions of the intellect 
by the physical ... result in a fusion of all 
with the focal point centered in the 
(p. 63) 
Through mental activities 
perception, intuition, feeling, and conception ... our 
personalities assimilate experience and work it up into 
our own substance and the world of thought, emotion, and 
will. 
Without this metabolism of experience damage is done 
to the emerging personality. (p.62) 
H'Doubler is not unaware of the problem of the 
hierarchical mind/body relationship. In a footnote she writes 
that the "term" "mind" is "used here for convenience to 
designate the mental aspect of the total organism, and not to 
imply a separation of mind from body" (p.70). She writes that 
she believes in "the organic wholeness of man" (p.63) in which 
"the body should be given as careful a study and as high a 
perfection of technique as the associated processes of thought 
and feeling" (p.63). At other moments H'Doubler seems to be 
seeking both a reconciliation of the mind and body as equally 
important (:: [t] he most completely developed person is the one 
who has trained all his powers with equal dignity and 
consideration" [p.63]). At the same time she understands them 
to be significantly different in terms of the needs of education 
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and the contribution which they can make to education. She 
writes that the body is the "agent" of the mind. 
The body should be considered as the outer aspect of 
personality ... the agent through which we receive 
impressions ... and by which we communicate. The body is to 
be "mastered." (p.65) 
The mind is valuable in the 
degree of strength of the stimulative and regulative 
processes wnich follow upon the perception of a 
stimulus ... A properly functioning mind ... transforms 
[impressions] that they may better serve its purpose. 
(p. 71) 
From all this we can see just how complicated her argument is as 
at first she takes one position and then another. 
Her concern with the mind/body relation is that dancing 
will become too body oriented. The dancer must take care of 
uniting his/her inner (mental) and outer (body) rhythms, 
otherwise "the dance is likely to be too much of the body, 
rather than the mind through the body" (p.86). In order to 
guard against such an eventuality technical training of the body 
should function so that "[r]epeated activity becomes automatic 
and is finally executed with little or no thought, thus freeing 
the mind for the activities of artistic creation" (p.90). The 
mind should be free of body concerns and should not have to 
attend to the body which serves the mind. Later she writes that 
aesthetic experience ... [is] primarily a feeling 
experience ... it is upon this basic tendency to pleasurable 
responses that art education should be built. Mere 
sensation is not enough - emotional consciousness is 
needed. (p.114) 
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The term "consciousness" refers, here, away from sensation or 
sensing and toward awareness of a mental state, the emotions. 
In making the body an agent of the mind, an agent to be 
mastered, and not responsible for creative activity, H'Doubler 
tacitly separates the body and mind in an operational relation 
in which the body never takes the lead except as a primitive 
sense organ which can nonetheless be trained to have "motor 
intelligence" ("Technique of the physical instrument is motor 
intelligence" [p.91]). In fact, 
to acquire technique one must first have desire ... to find 
out the hews and whys. Intellectual curiosity does not 
permit any rest until there is a solution. (p.91) 
This indicates that the body cannot be skilled without the 
imposition of an intellectual desire and reflects the 
nature/culture dichotomy in which culture is an elaboration of 
nature. At the same time (and reflecting the complexity of the 
issue) H'Doubler writes positively of the intelligence of the· 
body as dancers "tend to think in terms of images derived from 
movement ... dancers are endowed with vivid motor imagination and 
memory" (p.118). This may indicate that there is a body mind 
(motor imagination and intelligence) distinct from intellectual 
or emotional consciousness. 
Emotions 
H'Doubler writes often that dancing is about feeling. What 
is meant by feeling is complex for there are "feeling states of 
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pure sensation" (p.116) and "feelings that accompany activity" 
which are "mental states that become recorded ..• for future 
reference" (p.117). The association of ... feeling and movement" 
("mental states" and "feeling states of pure sensation", mind 
and body) become relied upon by the artist to "bring about an 
emotional experience by recalling and experiencing the motor 
phase. 
Like all works of art, a dance expresses emotions aroused 
by images, which are sensory or psychic, objective or 
subjective ... images derived from movement ... When [an] 
image is clearly and vividly sensed, it demands 
release ... over the motor paths •.. The observable form is, 
therefore, biologic and organic ... The sources are life 
itself ... life forces dictate the fashioning of the 
expressive medium. (pp.118-119) 
In the above the dancer has pure, objective sensation 
("sensory ... images derived from movement") which is remembered 
(subjectively) . Subjective associations are made between 
objective sensations motivated by movement and mental states. 
Images are created out of recalled associations. The 
originating emotions (associated body/mental states) "dictate" 
the forming of the image. The image itself begins in the mind 
(subject) and releases into the body (object) . Emotions are 
central to the pedagogy since they provide the possibility of 
images. 
On the other hand, while dancing is an emotional act 
dancers, to be artistic, must control the emotions for 
expressing emotions is not art. 
It is the systematizing, according to the laws of the 
medium, that separates art from mere accident and nature. 
It is only when these random yet expressive movements are 
subjected to the harmonizing influence of rhythm, and 
consciously given form, that dance comes into being as an 
art form. (p. 56) 
The difficulty with intense emotion is that it 
causes an audience to become self-conscious and 
embarrassed because of an emotional nudity which can be · 
made presentable only by abstraction and restraint. 
A dance ... must be an individual thing, but not a personal 
thing. 
A dance is an image stimulus. 
[A] dancer must have the capacity for expressing human 
emotions without appearing to share them personally. 
(p .119) 
In using the term "emotional nudity" H'Doubler metaphorizes a 
mental state with a body image. Emotions are being understood 
negatively and, be inference, the body also gains a negative 
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connotation. I would say that it is possible to understand the 
above as saying that for art to exist the body and emotions must 
be left behind. Previously I wrote that the body is to become 
automatic and unthought. Here emotion is to lose its personal 
quality. 
H'Doubler seems to make emotion problematic in that 
emotion escapes, when uncontrolled, the values of balance and 
harmony. For instance, in discussing the use of repetition in 
composing a dance the dancer must guard against the emotional 
build of too much insistent repetition for such ·a build 
"gene~·ates more emotional energy than can be satisfied, and 
often an explosion results" (p.142). The way in which quality 
art can be recognized is in the quality of its emotional 
restraint. H'Doubler writes 
Experience tends to universalize the individual to the 
extent that concrete emotions and concrete dramatic 
situations take on a more abstract form in the art 
expression of them. 
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[M]odified by his growing realization of the effect of his 
own actions ... expressive movement became art dance- a 
form consciously pursued for its art values. (p.43) 
H'Doubler prefers "balance" (p.141). 
Excess emotion also has psychological consequences. 
Every high strong emotional state which has not found its 
appropriate outlet causes movement by which we 
instinctively try to get rid of the feeling of restraint. 
(p.51) 
Strong emotion restrains and requires an "appropriate outlet", a 
proper form. H'Doubler cites Yrjo Hirn to support her view that 
art, while it does not '"serve only as a sedative for human 
feelings'n does have, according to Hirn, "'a relieving and 
cathartic mission ... [that] bestows upon him [the human) that 
inward calm in which all strong emotions find relief!'" (p.51). 
A person would be relieved from, be without, strong emotion and 
this can be found in dance. 
[O]nce a reflex outlet for strong emotional pressure, 
dance has become deliberate creation in which the 
intellect and will dominate the automatic and emotional 
responses. There is a gain in consciousness, but no 
change in the essential working of biological and 
aesthetic processes. (p.45) 
This "deliberate creation" has led to a "genuineness of feeling, 
which leaves little chance for superficiality" (p.44). 
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From this lengthy discussion of mind/body/emotions an 
image of the world as it is and as it should be emerges. The 
individual is a mind separate from a body and in order for both 
the individual and society to become civilized the mind must 
take the lead, both in understanding and governance. The more 
base aspects of human beings, especially unbridled emotions, 
must be safely relieved via proper channels ("appropriate 
outlet"). In addition, for the world to be cultured the 
personal must be eschewed in favor of universalization based on 
the general laws of the body and art. (Here we may note a 
conflict between H'Doubler's initial call for individuality, 
against conformity, and, here, where she values a depersonalized 
world in which individuals understand and obey fundamental, non-
individual laws.) Further the world as it should be is a world 
of balance and harmony or, in other words, without conflict. 
Harmony, Dance, and the Social 
Limiting and controlling conflict is a clearly articulated 
value in the discourse. B'Doubler writes of "the harmonizing 
influence of rhythm", "balance", and "inward ca1m." She also 
uses the word "adjustment" extensively. These terms mark the 
pedagogy as moving toward a pacific state of being for both the 
individual and society. H'Doubler writes, "The desire to find 
peace within ourselves and to bring about an adequate adjustment 
to the life around us is the basis for all mental and physical 
activity" (p.60). Life is characterized as 
a series of conflicts ... not only between man and his 
world, but within man himself - between the instinctive 
demands ... of his complex nature .•. [these instinctive 
impulses .•. need to be trained to serve the will and 
desires of an intellect impelled by ideals •.• [f]inding 
peace ... [through] adequate adjustment to ..• life. (p.69) 
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A person's "ability to adjust himself and survive depends" upon 
"more experience and a better understanding of his world" and 
"upon his mental powers rather than on physical powers alone" 
(p.43). Toward this end "[e]ducation 
should be a building toward integration of human capaciti~s and 
powers resulting in well-adjusted, useful, balanced individuals" 
(p.60). 
The achievement of harmony of such integration which 
results in balanced individuality occurs through the social 
actions of human beings. She writes, 
We are social creatures ... seek[ing] ... one anot:•.er' s 
approval ... social inheritance and training have gradually 
evolved socialized artistic values ... [These] to a certain 
degree ensured agreement as to that which is pleasing, 
satisfying, and admirable. (p.ll5) 
In this light 
art education may be socializing ..• for it should free the 
individual to enjoy all that has been found good in the 
past as well as to enjoy the art creations of his own age. 
(p .116) 
While she writes of simple feelings as the physiological basis 
for superior feelings she also writes, "Generally speaking, most 
of our feelings, except the simplest organic ones, are induced 
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by ideas of things" (p.l26). "Ideas of things" may mean learned 
ideas or social ideas. It may also refer to her notion of ideal 
forms which she uses in conjunction with relating science and 
nature ("The original, more instinctive form becomes conditioned 
by the ideal form", p.93). Indeed she writes later, "The mind 
must express itself logically and can comprehend meaning only 
when the elements are arranged in a telling and meaningful 
fashion" and that "taste and standards" must be taught (p.l43). 
What we, as readers of H'Doubler, may take from her use of both 
ideas of biological determinism and social construction is a 
message of the dialectical interpenetration of the two. 
This dialectic leads to the development of the good 
society. She focuses strongly upon dance as a means to that end 
and she struggles to free dance education from a vocational 
orientation toward dance (although not totally successfully as 
she values beautiful, perfected dance which suggests to me the. 
art of great artists) wanting dance to be for everyone, wanting 
"democratic art activity" (p.x) which, I would argue, represents 
the good society. 
On the other hand, even within a democratic valuing this 
good society does not discard the standards of great art. While 
she finds that it is true that great art can only be made by 
great attention to professional specialization 
i·t is just as true that a genuine appreciation and even 
true artistic creation are possible to all ... At the same 
time it is necessary to maintain a real appreciation of 
the efforts of those who are greater artists. (p.SO) 
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Making art, however, is important for all because developing the 
"art spirit" brings about a person becoming an "'inventive, 
searching, daring, self-expressive creature'" (quoted from 
Robert Henri) (p.50). A bit later she writes that while "not 
everyone can be an artist in the narrow sense", since everyone 
shares in "the nature of the original impulse" everyone "who 
approaches his work in a creative spirit and makes it the 
expression of his own vision of life is an artist" (p.53). 
This implies that to have the good society requires 
"work". The term "work" has especial significance as she 
counters it to "play". Recalling Gadamer's valued use of "play" 
for metaphorizing the alive quality of language here we find 
play to be denigrated. H'Doubler writes that "art ... cannot ... be 
reduced to the play impulse" (p.51). The expression of feeling, 
she writes, is "in order to continue pleas,Jrable states of 
feeling and to relieve those which are not pleasurable" (pp.51-
52). The evolution of consciousness moves from such "simple 
feeling" to "superior feelings". Play is, thus, severed from 
superior feelings. Art cannot be "reduced" to it. The superior 
feelings seem to be the "experience [of] the sheer joy of the 
rhythmic sense of free, controlled, and expressive movement" to 
which every human being is "entitled" (p.66). 
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Conclusion: Dance and Education 
Gadamer has stated that the reader of a text seeks to 
uncover the question to which an author's text is an answer. 
While the major question of H'Doubler's text might seem to have 
to do with dance, I will claim that it is what constitutes a 
viable society which interests her. I claim this because in the 
end what she points to is dance as a means to important social 
ends. In general terms her explicit answer as to how to develop 
a viable society is based in a valuing of individuality in an 
artistic sense. Every individual lives his/her life in an 
aesthetically creative manner in order to achieve social ends of 
non-alienation, etc. between people and their society. While 
she uses lar.guage, in discussing alienation, reminiscent of 
Marxist thinking (the worker is "rob[bed] of any opportunity to 
identify himself with his work") her solutions have little to do 
with politically or economically changing the conditions of the 
work place. Rather she relies on a personal solution or 
adjustment to the situation by changing the way the worker 
..._,_.!-1~-
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There are a number of ways in which her pedagogy presents 
contradictions to her valuing of individuality. First, she 
values tradition for providing a standard of quality by which to 
value art-making. (This valuing lays her open to the same kinds 
of critiques applied to Gadamer's valuing of tradition. 
Specifically, they both ignore or deliberately downplay the 
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conflictual quality of social life and the political 
ramifications of such conflict.) These traditional standards 
are those of the professional artist. Throughout the text 
H'Doubler utilizes the term "ideal" and similar words such as 
"perfection." For instance she writes "It is difficult in 
practice to separate the elements of physical skill in dance 
from its ideal essence" and she writes that the "perfection of 
the body ... must mean ... a trained, enriched attitude of the whole 
human being" (p.89). She writes, "[W]orking from the ordinary 
to the ideal causes the body to take on an abstract impersonal 
quality resulting in innate, unsought classical beautyn (p.94). 
By wanting to bring students into contact with great art and 
artists and into experience with their (the students's) own 
abilities to shape their lives in an aesthetic manner, her 
pedagogy is aimed at revering the tradition of great art. 
Second, she calls for the development of individual and 
societal harmony and balance. Such balance, within the terms of 
her description, requires an individual to yield to the social 
pressures of his situation, being brought into the fold of 
society. In eschewing conflict, she avoids actually confronting 
the inequities uf her day. Her social critique then appears to 
be not aimed at changing the material circumstances of workers. 
Her concern is to alter or adjust their mental lives so as to 
bring them individual satisfaction within the boundaries of 
their already spoken for lives. 
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Third, H'Doubler deal~in biological determinism in laying 
out her pedagogy. If she is correct in linking human beings's 
biological nature with their cultural development (that human 
culture is an elaboration of basic biological drives) then in 
whatever ways that culture has developed are, essentially, 
correct. (Jacoby, on the other hand while ceding the notion 
that culture gives particularity to general biological drives, 
would not accept H"Doubler's tacitly held corollary notion that 
all cultural developments are, thereby, naturally good. He 
recognizes the deformation as well as the formation of cultural 
individuals.) For H'Doubler, the cultural development becomes 
incorrect only when people forget the biological underpinnings 
of culture and depart from following that natural strand of 
development. What society needs, in order to improve society, 
is to recall the biological necessity of artistic expression and 
act upon that understanding. Therein lies the solution to human 
social problems. (Marcuse, 1955, may be following a similar 
strand in his desire to liberate the primal sensuality of human 
beings.) 
Valuing tradition, social harmony and the belief in 
biological determinism not only contradicts the value of 
individuality but may be read as being an attempt to transcend 
the social problems of alienation etc. themselves. 
Transcendence, as a value, occupies an important place in 
her discourse. She opens her text by referring to people as 
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"laity" and calls dance a "vitalizir.g experience". This is 
religious terminology and, I would suggest, that H'Doubler is 
teaching that dancing experience, like some religious 
experience, seeks a transcendence of the mundane. 
The valuing of the ideal forms which it is prescribed that 
we should try to find, also partakes of an attempt to transcend 
the mundane. H'Doubler's idealist approach seems to be 
reminiscent of Plato's work in a transcendental approach to the 
solution of mundane problems. H'Doubler directly invokes Plato, 
at one point, when she cites him to prove the importance of 
dancing. At another point H'Doubler writes that dance, no 
matter in what historical period, reflects "no change in the 
essential working of biological and aesthetic processes" (p.45). 
The pleasure of obeying the impulse to move and to express 
in ordered movement our responses to the forces of nature 
and of our environment remains the same in every time and 
place. (p.45) 
This notion of unchanging character of these processes aligns 
her discourse with the classical Greek philosophical position 
which understood history to be cyclic and repetitious. 
Explanations for historical change were not to be found in 
changing material conditions but, rather, in the natural cycle 
of human affairs and institutions, a cycle understandable only 
in the metaphysical realm of insight. 
The religious and Platonist traditions exist at subtle 
levels in the text in that they do not get forwarded in very 
explicit terms although they can be found in the kind of 
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language she uses. Here we can see how language contains worlds 
sedimented within it. These worlds mediate the process of 
negotiation between individuals importing into the text other 
worldsr other contexts of understanding. This is an example, I 
believe, of Bakhtin's heterog1oasia. On par with Bakhtin's 
motion of the conflictual character of heterog1oaaia it ;nay be 
noted here that the importation of Plato's world in a discussion 
of democracy can be questioned as to its efficacy in promoting 
the values of democracy. After all, Plato did not call for a 
democracy as H'Doubler might think of it, calling as he did for 
a philosopher-king who would know the truth and tell everyone 
else how to act according to that truth. 
ALMA HAWKINS'S MODERN DANCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
Introductory Remarks 
Like Margaret H'Doubler, Alma Hawkins attended Teachers 
College for her graduate work, receiving an Ed.D. from that 
institution. Beyond the fact that she has taught at UCLA for 
many years and was Chairman of the Department of Dance, I have 
not been able to locate other biographical materials. What I do 
know is that, according to the back-cover material of her book 
Creating Through Dance, she has written extensively in the 
field. 
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Modern Dance in Higher Education was originally published 
in 1954 and reissued in 1982. In the reissue version Hawkins 
wrote, in a new Preface, that 
I have presented a point of view about dance in education 
as I saw it in 1954. I believe that the basic concepts 
are still valid, though my approach to the implementation 
of certain concepts would be different today. (unpaged 
Preface) 
She also wrote, on the same page, "I still believe that the 
creative development of the individual is of central 
importance." This indicates that one way to approach this book, 
in preparing to contrast it to Hawkins's second book, is to 
investigate the contexts and purposes of creativity in this 
first book and examine how her implementation of creativity 
changes in the next book (since she claims that a change 
occurred for her) . It will also be informative to keep in mind 
H'Doubler's work since H'Doubler also claims the paramount 
importance of individual creativity. 
Prior to beginning, however, one contextual difference 
between H'Doubler and Hawkins exists which is alluded to in 
Hawkins's book by the lack of attention she pays to this issue. 
H'Doubler, as Gertrude Johnson put it, brought dance into 
education and her struggle was to legitimate is presence in 
academia. Hawkins, on the other hand, was writing at a time 
when dance education was already established in academia. 
Therefore she does not write of legitimation issues and her 
reasons for writing her book and the struggles with which she 
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deals early on in the book place the book not in the sphere of 
an apology for dance nor establishing the worth of dance (these 
are part of H'Doubler's concern) but in the sphere of working 
out the details of how it ought to be developed now that its 
basic worth is already accepted. This creates a rather 
different mood, as we shall see. 
The Rift Between Dance Educators 
Alma Hawkins begins Modern Dance in Higher Education 
(1954, all subsequent references will be to this edition) by 
focusing on the rift between dance oriented and education 
oriented dance educators. She writes that there is a 
"confusion ... [and] controversy ... concerning the role of modern 
dance in education" (p.l). This confusion stems from "the 
spontaneous and rapid growth of modern dance programs in 
colleges across the country, plus the powerful influence of 
concert dance on these programs" (p.l) which has left little 
time for thinking about the proper course of development. 
Rather, such growth emphasized" 'selling' dance" (p.l) and 
after all the proselytizing years, 
[Dance educators] want to know what educational concepts 
and principles should guide the teacher of dance; they 
want ar,swers to many questions raised by the conflict of 
various points of view. (p.2) 
These conflicts arose because 
[i]n most cases teachers based their thinking upon 
personal experience with dance. Discussions usually 
started and ended with dance - not education - as the 
focus of attention. And it is not surpr~s~ng that 
educators who had studied dance with professional artists 
and in studio settings had difficulty in arriving at 
agreement about the role of dance in education. (p.23) 
Educators, in attempting to resolve their differences, failed 
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primarily because they "spent all their effort supporting their 
own viewpoints" (p.22). Hawkins proposes to take the discussion 
out of "personal experience'', to avoid the "emotional framework 
which complicates any discussion of problems of the dance" 
replacing it with "sober consideration" (p.l). 
Hawkins offers to resolve the conflict and clarify the 
confusion by positing "an over-all philosophy of education" 
which distinguishes educational dance from professional dance. 
Such a philosophy is necessary because "the purposes of 
education and professional dance are different" (p.23). Hawkins 
stresses that the "primary difference ... is in the approach used 
and the ultimate goals sought" (p.37). She distinguishes 
between these approaches. 
The goal of professional dance is "perfected dance", 
evaluating "each dance in terms of rather absolute standards of 
excellence" (p.l06). By "absolute standards" Hawkins means the 
principles of movement which embody the canons of beauty and 
meaning instituted in dance and to which the individual must 
adhere. The individual is to become as much like the standards 
as possible. In this situation the ends (perfected dance) 
justify the means. 
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The means of professional dance are hierarchical. There 
is a "leading artist" who makes all the choreography for a dance 
group and there are "members of the group [who] are used to 
produce an end product which conveys the artist's ideas" 
(p.107). Only a few people are able to "make a place for 
themselves either as second level concert artists or as members 
of a top level artist's dance group" (p.107). The professional 
artist's life is restrictive, both because of the above "highly 
selective process" by which people get admitted into the 
professional world and because "different points of view and 
individual movement must be shaped in the light of the final 
product desired by the artist" (p.107). Success "may require 
endless hours of rehearsal, elimination or strict limitation of 
many other aspects of living, and extreme conformity to the 
artist's ideas" (p.107). In a positive vein Hawkins believes 
that this process and situation "makes possible the achievement 
of excellent dance" and that there must be high selectivity "if 
the goal of professional dance is perfected dance" (p.107). The 
kind of dance education which grows out of this traditional 
point of view has been based on "mere acceptance of another's 
point of view and imitation as a basis for teaching" (p.2). 
In educational dance, in contrast, "[i]ndividual and class 
experiences should be planned and guided always so as to 
contribute to the development of the individual, and secondarily 
so as to lead to good dance" (p.37). Educational dance is based 
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on "a true understanding of the potential contribution of dance 
experience to the growth of an individual" (p.2), "growth 
resulting in more mature and effective behavior" (p.35). In 
contrast to the highly selective process of professional dance 
which allows only a few individuals to participate, Hawkins 
seeks participation by all people. "The dance teacher's task as 
an educator is not one of producing artists and artist works 
but, rather, one of contributing to the education of many 
persons" (p.34). This is the essence of education in "our 
democratic society" (p.l08). 
That essence finds fulfillment when each student [is 
helped to] discover and develop his power of 
expression ... to grow in his understanding of self and in 
his relationship to others and these gains will, in turn, 
contribute to his progress towards total development. 
(p.l08) 
Moreover, this kind of education will only come about when 
process is emphasized over product. 
In the above we may discern hierarchically organized 
dichotomies. For instance, she dichotomizes "sober 
consideration" and "emotional framework" (and implicitly 
associated with emotion is "personal experience") preferring and 
privileging the rationality of "sober consideration" over the 
affective aspect of mind, "emotional framework", for use as 
valid criteria for making educational decisions. Whatever value 
the professional dancer places upon his/her experience is 
dismissed by Hawkins as mere personalism with no valuable force 
for supporting aubsequent pedagogy. Thus sober "consideration" 
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seems hierarchically arranged over emotion and personal 
experience. Paradoxically, Hawkins complains of the hierarchy 
in professional dance and yet presents this dichotomy in an 
hierarchical manner. Hierarchical reasoning is so pervasive 
within the culture that even as she dismisses it from the 
content of her ideas, it reappears within the very pr.esentation 
of these ideas. 
Hawkins also dichotomizes "true understanding" which leads 
to maturity and effectiveness for the growth of individuality 
from "mere acceptance of another's point of view" and 
"imitation." "Mere acceptance" and "imitation", linked to 
traditional dance education (in which a student studies with an 
acknowledged master of the art form who him/herself studied with 
an acknowledged master) represents tradition within the form. 
In providing an antidote to tradition via the true understanding 
of proper dance education Hawkins implies that tradition will 
lead to immaturity and a lack of growth of the individual. This 
hierarchical valuing of her pedagogy over others also represents 
a developmental approach to the curriculum as she associates her 
version of education with "maturity". What she seeks in the 
growth of individuality away from the imitative conformity of 
professional dance is an autonomy of action on the part of the 
student. Maturity equals autonomy. 
In order to bring about maturity, autonomy and true 
educational goals (as opposed to professional goals) Hawkins 
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identifies three areas of interest as being central to that 
purpose. These interests are identified as needs: "helping 
students to satisfy their needs for an adequate body, satisfying 
expression, and effective human relations" (pp.lOS-109). 
Attending to these needs will lead to 
[c]hanges in understandings, attitudes and 
behavior ... [dance education making] particular 
contribution to the development of the individual in the 
area of self-realization and human relations. (pp.lOS-
109) 
The identified needs become the organizing principle for her 
pedagogical discourse. She devotes one chapter to each need. 
The Body and Its Biological and Social Bases 
In the "adequate body" chapter she begins by 
characterizing the human being as a "biological and 
social. .. organism" which is in "interaction within the organism 
and between the organism and its environment" (p.39), She 
further characterizes interaction as "adjustments", writing that 
the "adequacy and quality of the organism's adjustments in this 
interaction depend upon the ability of the body to function 
effectively in each particular situation" (p.39). She writes 
that "[t]o a large extent [adjustment] results from involuntary 
motion" but, also "each individual has the ability, within 
certain limitations, to develop and improve the effectiveness of 
his body [through] conscious and learned adjustment" (p.40). 
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Hawkins presents us, then with two forms of adjustment: 
involuntary adjustment (the automatic biological adjustn~nt of 
the body to various circumstances such as the "fight or flight" 
syndrome} and voluntary adjustment in the form of each 
individual's limited ability to "improve the effectiveness of 
his body". Involuntary adjustment is out of human purview and 
control; voluntary adjustment is both under conscious control 
and is learned. Voluntary adjustment is the site of educational 
effort. 
Hawkins's value of adjustment to life-situations links her 
discourse, at least in this respect, with that of H'Doubler's. 
Seeking effective levels of functioning and response seems to 
parallel H'Doubler's seeking ways of maintaining a non-
conflictual relation with the world. Adjustment may be taken as 
changing oneself in response to a changing situation rather than 
changing the situation to suit oneself. This will become 
clearer through detailing Hawkins's ~ontexts of adjustment and 
effective functioning. 
The contexts in which adjustment takes place are those of 
the biological and the social. Hawkins writes that the "desire 
for an effective body" which adjusts well has "biological and 
social bases" which she also interprets as "developmental needs 
and ... social pressures" (p.39}. Developmental needs are 
associated with biology, taking on the form of a natural 
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inevitability (similar to H'Doubler's ideas). Biological 
metaphors are used to discuss both biological and social bases. 
Biological bases refers, specifically, to "total fitness" 
by which Hawkins means "[t]he functioning of all parts of the 
body in such a manner that the organism makes satisfactory 
adjustment to its environment" (p.41, emphasis added). The 
environment is considered to be stable and the person changes in 
order to adjust to it in an involuntary manner. This "total 
functioning and organic fitness should be considered ... as a goal 
or purpose" (p.41, emphasis added). Goal or purpose, here, 
seems to refer to the goal of all living beings which then 
becomes a goal of education. Education supports and enhances 
the inevitable need for "fitness". This is only right and 
proper for fitness is a biological necessity ('Man is meant to 
be an active animal" manifested through "[t]he significant role 
that movement plays in the functioning of the organisms [which] 
makes the human being's need for activity apparent" (p.4l). The 
biological image is further underscored by such statements as: 
activity "produces [physical] power needed to carry on everyday 
tasks" and "maintain[s] balance in the various tissues and in 
the organizing capacities of the tissues" (p.41). 
Hawkins generalizes people into these kinds of categories 
by which all people are understood to be the same. In the above 
the category people are biological "organisms". The individual 
disappears, replaced by the generic body. (This categorization 
makes her project paradoxical in the light of her valuing 
individuality.) 
Hawkins also gathers people into general social 
categories. When she begins to write of the social bases she 
notes that 
A realistic attempt to understand the college student's 
feeling of need for an effective body must take into 
account the social goals of youth. This is so simply 
because the adolescent feels and tends to interpret this 
need in terms of social relationships rather than of 
biological performances. (p.45) 
Individual students become youth and adolescents in general. 
According to Hawkins, biological and social bases are 
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simultaneously in play in a person although the student tends to 
only focus upon the latter. The specific social bases, being 
concerned with the desire of the student to be accepted by 
his/her peers through conforming to social norms and learning 
how to fit in with social expectations tend to make biological 
needs invisible to the student. In this wise she writes that 
the student comes to understand that the 
appearance of the body ... has significant effect upon his 
social relationships ... he gives serious attention to 
changing the appearance and functioning of the body so 
that he can conform to group standards. (p.48) 
For teachers it is important that they understand these social 
needs and "remember that man is a social animal .•• constantly 
striving to maintain a satisfactory relationship with this 
social environment" (p.47). She metaphorizes society with a 
biological image (social animal) and, similarly to H'Doubler, 
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she links the social with a form of biological determinism 
(since biology is understood as an inevitable fact of 
existence) . 
While Hawkins presents the biological and social bases 
separately, she also notes how the biological becomes social. 
She notes that "physical skills have high status value", that 
the college student "attaches great importance to his 
performance in certain [popular] physical activities 11 
(i.e.sports) (p.48). What she understands is that when people 
strive to improve their bodies they often do so at the behest of 
social rules and roles, accepting or rejecting changes in their 
bodies for purely social reasons. The "natural" body with its 
origins in biological necessity (of which she writes) is 
transformed into a social body which is altered to enhance 
social acceptance. In this there may be a tacit recognition of 
the social construction of body rooted in and identified by 
social codes which may be read in a person's body. She writes, 
[A]dolescents ... constantly measure themselves against the 
prevailing norms of feminine and masculine 
attractiveness ... Girls feel great pressure to be "good 
looking and graceful," while boys want to appear "strong 
and manly." According to Murphy [Gardner Murphy, 
Personality, NY:Harper and Brothers, 1947,p.517], physical 
appearance is more important for women than for men in 
most modern cultures and is codified to a large degree 
with social status ends. (p.49) 
In using the terms "needs" and "drives" to characterize 
the students' social functioning Hawkins injects an element of 
inevitability to the psychological analysis. Needs and drives 
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are inborn to the animal and as with biological metaphors which 
carry the force of nature (to which we respond but which we 
cannot resist or change) so the psychological terms of needs and 
drives achieve a similar effect. Needs and drives are not 
psychological forces which we can choose to attend to or not, 
but are utter necessities which demand attention. 
Hawkins's world seems circumscribed by such determinisms. 
Her value of adjusting to circumstances is focused upon an 
accommodation to the various inevitabilities of biology, society 
and psychology. There is not a moment, within her body 
discussion, when she argues for resisting them. Hawkins, at 
least in this section, opts both for an acceptance of the social 
surround and for a pedagogy which enables people to both have 
effective action and become adjusted to it. 
Mind/Body 
As with H'Doubler, Hawkins, in writing of the body, 
distinguishes between mind and body and tends to subordinate 
body to mind. She writes of "the human body as an instrument 
for movement and expression" (p.40) ar.d in so doing instru-
mental-izes the body and subsumes it to the mind's control by 
having the body be an instrument for "expression". She also 
writes that "satisfying expression ..• is dependent on an 
instrument that can translate creative ideas into movement" 
(p.50). The body instrument is made to mediate between the 
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mind's thought ("creative ideas") and the signification of 
thought ("movement") . The body does not think its own kind of 
thoughts nor does it contribute to the shaping of the 
signification of thought (except as the body is adequate or 
inadequate to the body's function as instrument). She argues 
for "an intellectual base" in which "the student should 
understand why he is practicing a technique" (p.57), thus 
calling for mind activity to guide body activity. She also 
writes, "Best results accr1;c w~en an activity is meaningful, 
especially when the participant sees close relationship of the 
activity to something he values" (p.57). "[M]eaningful" is 
meant here as personally and socially meaningful and "seeking a 
close relationship" means understanding. Understanding is, 
conventionally, a cognitive, mental function and so, once again, 
mental activity is privileged. 
It would be wrong, however, to understand Hawkins as 
wholly making the body a subordinate actor to the mind. In her 
chapter devoted to the second human need, "satisfying 
expression", she writes that we know the world through our 
bodies, through "the felt relations of the body response" 
(p.74). Dancing develops "a heightened awareness of body 
movement and its meaning" (p.74) and through dancing a person 
"becomes a more sensitive instrument, capable of responding to 
life situations with increased feeling and meaning" (p.75). 
Here the body of a person is capable of knowing and providing 
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knowledge of the world and is not only a means to other ends. 
The increase of feeling and meaning goes beyond the adjustment 
value in that it provides for meaning making beyond the 
immediate necessity of adjustment. She writes also that "[b]ody 
movement and dance are natural outlets for man's need for 
expression of his feelings and idea" and that "[m]ovement is 
familiar and meaningful." Further, man "responds" bodily to 
situations: "movement seems the most elemental source of 
response" (p.65). 
In all these cases Hawkins writes of the body as a 
valuable connection to the world, and as a "source" and a 
"natural outlet" and although she continues to use language 
which references the mind (feeling and meaning making being 
mental states and activities) and writes of the body as an 
instrument, generally her approach seems not only instrumental 
but also aware of the values which are associated with body 
knowledge. By making the body more primary than previously 
Hawkins's discourse presents a complex attitude toward the body. 
In this way Hawkins's world which I previously described as 
being composed of hierarchical dichotomies now presents, also, 
at least one dialectically related component - the body and 
mind. 
"Satisfying Expression" and Adjustment, Determinism and 
Behaviorism 
The second fundamental need of h~rnan beings which Hawkins 
identifies is "satisfying expression". In her discussion of 
this value Hawkins continues her valuing of adjustment and 
continues to center her ideas upon a deterministic framework. 
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She begL-.s 'oiitll psychological terminology and focuses upon 
individual "self-expression". Self-expression is a "strong and 
persistent need ... [which] appears early in childhood and 
continues throughout life" (p.59) and she cites Carleton 
Washburne (Carleton Washburne, A Living Phjlosophy of Education, 
NY:The John Day Company,1940,p.37) as averring that "satisfying 
outlets for expression which do not result in irreconcilable 
conflicts with oneself or with one's environment are essential 
to mental health" (p.60). She also quotes Daniel Prescott 
(Daniel A. Prescott, Emotion and the Educative Process, 
Washington DC: American Council on Education, 1938, p.102) as 
saying that arts release tensions in a "'mature'" way thus 
"'avoiding less desirable emotional reactions'" (p.69). 
Emotional release, a result of satisfying creative activity and 
expression, is for "effective functioning" and to "maintain good 
mental health" (p.69). In writing of the body I pointed out 
that Hawkins was concerned with adjusting to social norms so 
that conflicts would not develop between a person and his/her 
social situation. Here, similarly, shP. is concerned with 
developing and maintaining non-conflictual mental health. 
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Harmony with life's circumstances is a dominant theme for 
Hawkins (as it is for H'Doubler). 
Adjustment is linked to the value of self and social 
integration. As in her body discussion in which the purpose is 
to integrate individuals into the existing social framework, so 
here her attention is upon the integration of the individual 
personali'i:.y. 
Efforts directed toward adjustment contribute to the 
integration of personality ... [art contributes by 
developing skills for] logical arrangement of ideas. ,,to 
arrive at generalizations ... [art is] a means by which 
personal experience may first be clarified and then 
expressed ... repeated creative efforts ... increase 
understanding of a particular object or situation. (p.71) 
Such appreciation also helps the individual identify 
himself with his contemporary culture and to understand 
something of the flow of culture throughout the years. 
(p. 7 5) 
By emphasizing "logical arrang·ement", the "use of symbols" and 
"concepts" as one of the important characteristics of the 
creative act, the mind is, again, made to be both the dominant 
force for integration as well as that which needs integration. 
Biological and body metaphors are in use when Hawkins 
links the need for self-expression with aesthetic expression and 
creative experience. She writes that aesthetic expression has 
body implications: aesthetic expression "affords rich sensory 
stimulation and produces a feeling response that is satisfying 
to the individual" (p.61). Aesthetic experience is biologically 
metaphorized as being "as essential. .• as food and drink" (p. 61) . 
She writes further that "the desire for aesthetic experience 
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[is] related to the needs of man's nervous system". 
Psychological force is brought to bear as she labels aesthetic 
need as the "need for a specific form of experience", selecting 
"the most delightf~l organization" (p.61-62). Human beings have 
[t]he urge to perceive relationships and to organize 
experiences into satisfying wholes •.. [which] strengthened 
as man developed ..• The perceiving of that which has unity 
produces a feeling of well-being. (p.62) 
Creative experience allows for 
expression of ideas and feelings ..• progressive 
symbolization ... the consolidation and integration of day-
to-day experiences ... the achievement of a harmonious 
relationship with the various aspects of life as he 
experiences them. (p.60) 
In discussing the specifics of creative activity, Hawkir.~s 
uses the behaviorist language of stimulus/response. She writas 
that a "stimulus ... produces tension within the organism" to 
which "the individual responds with his feelings and ideas or 
concepts" which are then "shaped" and "reshaped" to produce a 
formed response to the stimulus (p.63-64). She notes "three 
important characteristics" (p.64) of the creative act. These 
are 
the self is central ..• concepts are essential elements. The 
individual sees and thinks in relation to concepts,i.e. 
meanings result from experiences •.• inner relationships, 
not surface ones ... the product of the expressive act has 
form. (emphasis added,p.64) 
In addition each person will make a unique dance, "his 
statement, which is influenced by his unique being" (author's 
emphasis, p.67). This behaviorist language seems to continue 
and deepen the determinist current of her discourse. The 
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stimulus/response idea posits a world in which people act by 
responding exclusively to influences over which they have no 
control. In behaviorist thought there is no self which exists 
apart from such influence. 
"Effective Human Relations" and Determinism 
Hawkins then turns to the third need, that of effective 
human relations and with the impact of contrasting aesthetic 
experience with the general culture in a negative way. She 
writes that "existing cultural patterns tend to stifle the free 
expression of feelings" (p.69) and that the arts do not (similar 
to H'Doubler's attack on conformity). She also writes, 
"Unfortunately ... the problems of human relations are often 
baffling and little understood, and too frequently they are 
simply overlooked" (p.86). The emphasis in education has been 
upon intellectual development but this must change. Good human 
relations "contribute to greater achievement in individual and 
group enterprises other than intellectual endeavors" (p.87) and 
contribute to successful intellectual work as well. Later she 
writes of the contribution which aesthetic experience can make 
to solving the world's problems. She writes, "Skill and success 
in working creatively may well be the greatest contribution that 
dance can make to the individual and to society" (p.75). 
A crucial task that man faces today is the solving of his 
social problems. Instance after instance points up his 
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lack of insight and skill in handling social problems even 
though it is recognized that the preservation of culture 
and progress to a better way of life depend upon improved 
methods of solving these problems. (p.76) 
Like H'Doubler, Hawkins understands her world as problem-
filled. While H'Doubler reads the problems in economic and 
spiritual terms, Hawkins reads them in psychological terms as in 
"human relations" and in cultural terms, as in "preservation of 
culture". In desiring to preserve culture Hawkins basically 
accepts and adjusts to culture. For both she and H'Doubler the 
problem of human relations seems to simply lie in the 
interpersonal sphere of society in terms of adjusting to 
society's exigencies and the pedagogue's p~oblem is how to teach 
so that people can relate to each other in a more satisfying 
manner within the rules and roles of society. While the 
interpersonal might seem to reference moral issues there is no 
moral argument utilized in this discourse. 
The pedagogue responds to the social problems and 
recognizes the validity of the various needs and drives of her 
students. The teacher should "start with the student's needs 
and goals rather that with any preconceived plan geared to the 
teacher's interest" recognizing that these needs and drives are 
inevitable. Another consideration for the teacher is that 
"[educational] experiences ... become meaningful only as they are 
related to the learner's aspirations, interests and present 
stage of living" (p.38). The teacher must plan educational 
experiences which enable the student to fulfill his/her needs 
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but the rate of fulfillment is determined by the developmental 
stage of the student. This mediation between needs and 
developmental stage is best accomplished 
through teacher-student planning, a process through which 
members of the group clarify their individual 
goals and together determine group goals and directional 
plans for activity. (p.54) 
In terms of how worlds get negotiated within the classroom, this 
can be seen in the way that Hawkins wants to lead the student to 
an understanding of the similarity between dance and non-dance 
events which will lead to the student being able to "transfer" 
learning from dance to other activities (p.54). Over and over 
again Hawkins's world view calls for a world which holds still 
and is inevitable and for a pedagogy which brings the student 
into line with that world. 
The teacher's job, then, in Hawkins's explicit terms is to 
aid in the process of accommodation by aiding the students to 
achieve their own goals. The teacher's contribution to this 
stems from his/her 
large background of knowledge ... familiar[ity] with certain 
kinesiological factors ... understand[ing] about behavior 
and the individual's response to activity .•. [S]kill in 
teaching ... [put] the educator ..• in a position to provide 
experiences that will contribute to the individual's 
goals. (pp.SS-56) 
With this in mind 
The educator starts with the student and aims to shape 
dance experiences so that they contribute to the student's 
development as an individual; but throughout this process 
he constantly strives to help the student enlarge his 
understanding of dance as an art form and become 
increasingly proficient in technique and creative 
expression. (p.37) 
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At the same time the educator must be concerned with developing 
"a sound body ... for future dance experiences" (p.56). Hawkins 
elaborates a list of possible relationships between developing a 
"sound body" and general educational goals. Her list includes 
how dancing contributes to general physical fitness (including 
increased strength, flexibility, endurance, control and 
"heightened kinesthetic awareness"). Improvement in conscious 
physical control and physical appearance are important for self-
regard. Such self-regard leads to improved social acceptance, 
thus fulfilling the need for good social relations. Creative 
expression teaches about problem solving and so may be 
transferred to the general social need for good problem solvers. 
There is a paradox which informs Hawkins's entire book. 
While she attempts to escape from the influence of professional 
dance by focusing on dance as an education tool for solving 
social problems she, nevertheless, leaves innumerable traces of 
the standards of professional dance within her discussion. For 
instance, Hawkins envisions good quality dance even in the 
educational setting, valuing the development of physical 
strength, flexibility and other professional dance qualities. 
(While it can be acknowledged that anyone could benefit from 
such bodily qualities, the benefits, in this case, are tied into 
making good dance.) She writes, 
102 
This point of view does not imply that dance in education 
cannot be taught as good dance. Dance is an expressive 
art form and should be considered and taught as such. 
(p. 37) 
She also understands that a person desires perfection, "fitness 
of parts", "harmonious relationships" and Hawkins lays down 
principles for guiding the creative act (p.62). Her interest in 
"good dance", her call for teaching the student to be interested 
in the art form or technique per se and her call for the 
development of a "sound body ... for future dance experiences" 
seems outside her focus upon educational goals. The educational 
values which I have characterized as corresponding to 
professional dance values cloud her distinction between 
professional and educational dance. Wnere she has, early on, 
strenuously argued against the values of professional dance here 
she makes them part of the goals of educational dance. 
It may be that, for her, the difference between 
educational and professional dance lies in the degree to which 
their goals are pursued. She does write that the difference in 
the dance forms lies within their disparate goals. Yet she uses 
the word "adequate" to discuss the desired outcomes of 
education, writing that one of the needs of people is to possess 
an "adequate body" (p.l09) and she writes of people's need for 
adequate social relations. The words "adequate" and "good" 
(good dance in educational settings) are comparison adjectives 
which require something else against which to compare the words 
that they modify. By focusing upon quality dance I would 
103 
suggest that the comparison point foL her project is 
professional dance, representing as it does excellent body and 
excellent dance. Educational dance can be understood as 
suffering by comparison. In the rest of her discourse it is 
clear that she does not think of her educational goals as merely 
second-best, as adequate, but as important to the project of 
this country, a project in which the good of the individual 
ought to take precedence over excellence of a particular 
activity. Her world seems marked by a substantial paradox. 
A complementary paradox exists between valuing dance for 
its own sake and valuing dance for the sake of educational 
goals. At some points Hawkins calls for students and teachers 
to jointly plan classes based on student needs. (She readily 
admits th~t students' plans will not often include a need to 
!::>ecome "proficient dancers" [p.46].) She also writes that only 
by linking dance to the learnerrs needs will "[educational] 
experiences ... become meaningful" (p.38). At the same time she 
also writes, "Dance is an expressive art form and should be 
considered and taught as such" (p.37). Seeing the educator's 
job as constantly striving "to help the student enlarge his 
understanding of dance as an art form" (p.37) dance interests 
seem to displace educational interests since Hawkins makes no 
arguments for how understanding dance as an art form contributes 
to social adjustment or adequate body or any of the other values 
she so tirelessly develops. 
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The contrast between dance interests and her other values 
raises a problem for the call for joint planning of classes 
based on student needs. Hawkins writes about students' 
"aspirations" guiding the pedagogy yet emphasizes the need of 
the educator to promote the art form then the teacher leads as 
Hawkins writes about the teacher "shaping" student experiences, 
planning them since students are not knowledgeable about the art 
form. Students can only be followers in this situation, a mode 
of learning which Hawkins decries when describing professional 
dance. 
Conclusion: Hawkins and H'Doubler 
As with H'Doubler's discussion I would ask what dominant 
question informs the creation of Hawkins's text. While 
H'Doubler engages in an attempt to broadly critique society and 
offer an alternative vision, Hawkins more narrowly focuses upon 
the world of dance educators and rather than criticizing social 
life, offers many ways to accommodate to it. Hawkins's question 
seems to be not, "How do we change the world" but, rather, "How 
do we change the individual to fit the world?" Where H'Doubler 
appears to be utopian, Hawkins appears to be pragmatic. Where 
H'Doubler appears to spiritualize human activity and experience, 
Hawkins appears to value the mundane. H'Doubler seems to desire 
to transcend problems. Hawkins appears to accommodate to them. 
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This is not to say that they are altogether different. 
They both identify certain inevitable characteristics of life, 
for instance biological inevitabilities. They also both 
envision a non-conflictual world as the desirable world. They 
both believe that fostering creativity leads to such a world and 
that dance creativity is a matter of the mind and is underpinned 
by proper body understandings. They both speak to the value of 
the individual and the need to pedagogically focus upon 
individuality and the value of connecting the individual to 
human traditions as a way of ameliorating social problems. 
Where they depart from each other is on the point of how 
to understand the relationship of the individual to society. 
H'Doubler criticizes and wishes to transform society, taking a 
transcendental attitude. Hawkins seems to accept society and 
wishes to learn how to accommodate to it by delving into the 
practical realities of social living. 
The origins of Hawkins's accommodation ethic are not easy 
to identify by looking at this particular discourse. What we 
can note is that most of her citations are from psychologists 
who have a clear bent toward controlling the psychological life 
of the individual so that he/she is neither too much in one 
psychological direction nor too much in the other. This might 
also be characterized as an adaptation ethic whose purpose is 
for survival. When Hawkins writes of improving effectiveness it 
appears to be a matter of successfully surviving within the 
social setting. 
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To write that she is i~terested in survival is to suggest 
that there is a psychology of concern over whether or not 
survival is possible. The difficulty in locating the evidence 
within the text of such a concern is that she provides no 
explicit statements to this point. We might surmise, though, 
that the psychology of her society was, at that historical time 
(the late 40s and early 50s), focused upon survival. This would 
be logical considering the war-footing of the country, the 
immediate fear of atomic war with Hiroshima and Nagasaki being 
recent memories, the U.S. engagement in the Korean conflict, and 
John Foster Dulles and others promoting a belligerent and 
fearful attitude toward the Eastern bloc and China. There is no 
mention of these concerns and so I can only suggest them as 
possible conditions which can account for a survival ethic 
placed in social adjustment concerns. 
There is also the possibility that Hawkins was influenced 
by the functionalist sociology of her day. This sociology 
posited that a healthy society was a non-conflictual one in 
which all groups agreed to participate in a consensual manner. 
Conflict was viewed as aberrant behavior (Himes, 1980) . All of 
these arguments suggest that Hawkins was a member of her 
culture. Such a statement is similar to pointing out the 
Platonist qualities of H'Deoubler's discourse. H'Doubler was 
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also a member of her culture and tended to focus upon an asspect 
of that culture different from Hawkins. What I have tried to do 
in both these cases is locate the ways in which their discourses 
reflect particular aspects of their culture. It is an open 
question, at the moment, as to why they chose different aspects 
of their culture upon which to focus. 
As we turn away from Hawkins's first book it is worth 
recalling that she wrote in the 1982 reissue of this book that 
she still believed in the basic tenets of the book. These 
tenets, as I read them, are, in sum, the necessity of adjusting 
to society in order to become a functioning member of society 
and the value of creative experience for enriching social and 
more personal interactions as well as for solving the problems 
of society. The basic change unit of society is the individual 
who both changes in accord to and helps to bring about change in 
the social surround. 
Alma Hawkins's Creating Through Dance 
Introductory Remarks 
Alma Hawkins wrote Creating Through Dance in 1964 and it 
has recently been revised (1988} . This revision seems to 
consist, in the main, of adding photographs and a new 
Introduction by Charlotte Irey. In terms of the book's 
importance to dance educators, I am informed by Richard Carlin 
of Princeton Book Co., Publishers that it is the most adopted 
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book for classroom use of their entire list. Since that company 
is the major seller of dance books we can gauge just how valued 
this book is. Modern Dance in Higher Education, in contrast, is 
important more for its place as an historically important moment 
and in raising issues which have yet to be resolved. Its 
relevance is clear from it being reissued nearly 30 years after 
its publication. Hawkins is known, now, however primarily by 
Creating Through Dance. 
I wrote that Hawkins, in Modern Dance In Higher Education, 
seemed concerned with accommodating to the social surround. In 
Creating Through Dance (1988) she moves slightly away from this 
position in two directions. First, she makes statements akin to 
H'Doubler's social critique and, like H'Doubler, makes the 
individual the location of social change. Unlike H'Doubler she 
does not criticize the material problems of society but does 
criticize the loss of an individuality which she would, through 
her pedagogy, restore. Thus, second, she focuses upon 
creativity education for the individual as the basis for social 
change (an interest which is less explicit in her first book) • 
To be sure the book is primarily a book on creativity education 
but the social focus is used to introduc~ the c~eativity agenda. 
The following is an overview of the book. 
Overview 
She starts out writing that her primary purpose in this 
book is to 
contribut[e] to the idea that the vital and persisting 
core of dance is creativity and that every aspect of the 
dance experience has a significant relationship to 
creative development of the individual. (p.vii) 
More specifically her project is to give 
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thought ... to the phenomenon of creativity and its relation 
to the study of choreography ... [and to] the relationship 
between the creative aspects of dance and the development 
of the dance instrumsnt. (p.vii) 
Her reason for her concern with creativity stems from her 
concern about the "ever-expanding technological developments 
that place great-::= and ;=e.?.ter emphasis upon specialization" 
(p.7). This "trend towards specialization and segmentation" 
causes people to lose their "feeling of wholeness" (p.7). The 
individual [has been] encouraged to conform rather than 
transform ... to reflect and re-produce rather than to 
create ... to take in and receive rather than to give out 
and contribute. (p. 7-8) 
Hawkins has written this book "with the belief that those of us 
interested in creative dance have an obligation to give serious 
attention to thE~ art of movement as a whole" (p.vii). Hawkins 
presents the present situation as being very serious. "Today, 
as never before, educators must be concerned with ... " (p.7) 
indicative of her sense of the direness of the situation and she 
und~rscores this when she writes 
Surely an essential part of the educator's task is to 
develop people who are creative and have confidence in 
themselves as individuals of worth and integrity. (p.B) 
"' In order to counter the problem of specialization and 
segmentation 
the human being needs experiences that aid him in 
achievjng a feeling of wholeness ... he must find adequate 
sources of communicating with his fellow 
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man ..• communicating and sharing that result in a sense of 
unity and belonging. (p.7) 
The educator's job is to "assist him [the student] in becoming 
an integrated personality capable of relating to others and to 
his environment" (p.7). The student needs "a sense of adequacy 
and uniqueness" in order to "function effectively" (p.7). This 
can be achieved by 
[t]he involvement of students in meaningful experiences 
that provide a counterbalance for the high value now 
placed on technology, mechanization, and materialism ... 
(p 0 8) 
Hawkins characterizes this as "the challenge of our day" (p.8). 
In this there is the strong element of accommodation modified by 
her criticism of conformity. We can see this in her joining of 
the words "adequacy" and "uniqueness". By "adequacy" she may 
mean "success" (the student needs "a sense of success and 
uniqueness") but she does not use the word "success". 
"Adequacy" is weak, by contrast, and connotes some level of 
ambivalence or accommodation toward the "challenge of our day" 
as in, perhaps, "If you cannot be successful at least you can be 
adequate". I take "adequacy" to, therefore, contrast with 
"uniqueness" and further to cancel the effect of uniqueness. 
"Adequacy" can reference norms to which a person·accommodates 
and "uniqueness" can represent how a person defines him/herself 
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outside of norms. Hawkins takes the naturalistic determinism 
of her first book and discusses how the natural becomes 
transformed into art by the abstracting process in which what 
the creator makes is an "illusion" of the everyday and the 
natl.lral, making an "objectification of human feeling" (p.49). 
Dance differs from the everyday in that" everyday gesture ... is 
distorted or removed from the natural and transformed into art" 
(pp.4-5). Her pedagogical prescriptions for achieving these 
ends center on the psychology of creativity and the need for 
developing a body and its attendant senses and sensations which 
will yield to the creative necessity and, also be a partner in 
the creation of formed art works. 
She addresses herself exclusively to the dance teacher, 
dividing the educational world into the two camps of teacher and 
lea~ner. She metaphorizes the te2cher as guide, efficient 
manager of a classroom, and motivator and stimulator of learner 
creativity. The learner is a person who is supposed to alter 
his/her behaviors (p.133), stimulated towards ever-increasing 
amounts of autonomous and self-directed creative activity. 
In this we can see a particular type of negotiation 
between the world of the teacher (a world which needs to be 
guided, managed and controlled) and the world of the student 
(characterized by, implicitly, too much dependence and a world 
which the student needs to give up in order to become 
autonomous) . The teacher is instructed by Hawkins in the ways 
112 
and means of most efficiently and expeditiously facilitating 
each individual's growth and change in the direction of 
autonomous creativity. These ways and means center around pre-
planning of educational activities , modes of stimulating 
autonomy and creativity, and means of assessing (evaluating) and 
measuring (grading) the learner's progress. This last is in aid 
of the learner understanding realistically what has been learned 
and developed and what may still be missing from his/her 
education. 
Values and Metaphors 
From this sketch of the contours of her curriculum and 
pedagogy a difference appears between it and her previous book. 
In her first book Hawkins (1954) argued for developing an 
educational philosophy which attended to, essentially, social 
needs ("adequate body, satisfying expression and effective human 
relations"). She wrote of the "total development" of 
individuals and linked such development with democracy. In this 
present book she focuses almost exclusively upon the dance art. 
This shift towards dance can also be seen in the way she 
writes, reassuringly, that her focus upon developing students 
according to their individuality does not sacrifice dance 
values. This stress on the student ... does not imply that the 
content or subject matter is unimportant. On the 
contrary, the quality of dance experience is of 
utmost significance ... The richer the dance 
experience, the greater the opportunity for 
individual gains. (p.119) 
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In her first book she attempted to caution against concern over 
the quality of dancing. Here she makes quality dance central to 
the success of her project. In her first book she criticized 
the rift between professional and educational values, declaring 
professional values to be inappropriate for education. At the 
end of this book she writes of the split between educational 
modern and professional modern dance "in recent years". 
Such a differentiation seems unfortunate ... [I]t would be 
more accurate and desirable to think of dance as an art 
experience that is basically the same in an academic or a 
professional setting. The difference lies in the specific 
goals and the adaptation of the activity that is 
determined by the uniqueness of the situation. (p.121) 
These statements are similar to her first book (the difference 
between professional and educational dance being a matter of 
differing goals) and yet they are also different. Whereas 
previously all professional dance was inappropriate now she 
makes space for all dance by relying on a situational frame of 
reference and in the adaptation to whatever kind of dance is 
involved in a situation. This is a more flexible and 
accommodating framework that reveals a softening of her position 
toward professional dance. 
Her valuing of nature and psychology which pervades this 
book more than it does her previous book, is used to validate 
her focus upon creativity and also to ground the methods of 
evaluating the kind of dancing which should result from the 
pedagogy. She consistently calls for dances to be organic, the 
unity of the "materials" of dance being "organically related" 
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(p.93). In discussing developing aesthetic awareness she writes 
that the teacher seeks "full responses and movement which is 
organic in the true sense" (p.41). (Hawkins uses the word 
"true" throughout her discourse, referring to ••the true dance" 
and "true awareness.") The term "organic" becomes a technical 
term within the scope of her pedagogy as it becomes a criteria 
explicitly employed for evaluating dances. 
Great value is placed on wholeness and unity. These 
metaphors are applied to all the areas of her interest. She 
calls for unifying and integrating the individual, planning 
curriculum so that the elements are unified, planning individual 
lessons which have a unifying theme and in which "every class 
should give the learner a sense of arriving and concludingn 
(p.120). She writes, 
Surely the wisest appro~ch is based on beliefs and 
principles that are related to the concept of wholeness in 
the day-to-day learning situation •.• [because of] the 
learner's overall situation. (pp.ll9-120) 
In writing of wholeness she provides two mathematical 
metaphors. She writes that the "total concept and feel of dance 
is the matrix from which he reaches out and to which he relates 
new experiences" (p.120) With new experiences "the matrix 
expands and his insight and sensitivity for the next encounter 
are increased" (p.120). She also describes 
the dancer as a figure surrounded by a circle that 
represents his dance world. As each new idea, element, 
and skill is differentiated, related, and finally 
integrated with other experiences, the circle expands. 
(p.120) 
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With both these metaphors there is great stress upon the value 
of dance per se. 
These two metaphors have a particular quality which is 
reminiscent of the way Hawkins presents a circumscribed world of 
biological and social inevitability in her first book. The 
matrix may be understood as a map of previous knowledge upon 
which new knowledge is mapped. In similar fashion the 
figure/circle metaphor images a person bound inside the geometry 
of the dance world. The figure is "surrounded" by the circle 
and the circle which surrounds expands but the figure does not 
expand. Both of these metaphors are suggestive of the way 
previous experience bounds and guides present experience and 
future activity (not unlike the notion that the self is socially 
constructed) . Hawkins states as much when she writes, in 
discussing creativity, that freedom is set within a framework. 
"Within this framework the learner should be free to select and 
develop his own ideas. He should sense that boundaries are 
flexible, not rigid" (p.17). Hawkins's words can be understood 
to raise up the dialectic of freedom and discipline (the 
framework of dance knowledge and skill). 
The dialectic of freedom and discipline is one which, in 
this case, begins by stressing discipline (studying problems and 
movements provided by the teacher) and moving progressively 
toward what Hawkins calls "self-direction" or what I would call 
freedom. In terms of what I think she would mean by freedom she 
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writes, "The essential in each [creative] experience, exploring 
or forming, is an opportunity to be self-directed" (p.18). She 
contrasts such self-direction with an imitative pedagogy 
(excessive discipline) in which the ~tudent merely imitates the 
teacher. She claims this will not develop creativity because 
for creativity to occur "the self must direct the action 
response" (p.19). What Hawkins seems to mean here is that the 
teacher does not demonstrate but describes and suggests, the 
student then choosing the actual movements in response to the 
descriptions or suggestions. In writing of the sequencing of 
improvisational activities she suggests moving from structured 
problems (the structure being designed by the teacher and which 
represents discipline) "toward the open and less structured 
ones" (which allow for greater student self-direction and 
represem::s freedom). (p.23) Much later on she writes, "The human 
being's self-actualization is accompanied by great capacity for 
self-direction" (p.106). This suggests that increasing self-
actualization is accompanied by increasing self-direction. Thi .. s 
self-direction, however, needs guidance. It is mediated by 
skill. Through developing "understanding and skill ... self-
directed activity will not be aimless and will become more 
meaningful and mature" (p.18). 
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Teacher Directed Pedagogy 
Hawkins's call for self-direction is set within a pedagogy 
that is strongly oriented toward teacher directed activities. 
In her chapter called "Increasing Aesthetic Awarenessv' the 
teacher is instructed in all the things he/she should tell the 
student to do. She writes, "Without the right leadership the 
experiences ... could be a waste of time. With skilled leadership 
the experiences can further self-direction" (p.22). Later she 
writes "[The teacher] should try to surround and immerse the 
learner with stimulation that causes creative action" (p.29). 
Here it seems as if the student is placed within a carefully 
contrived situation from which he/she will emerge with what the 
teacher wants. Still later she writes that the teacher needs to 
find a better way than imitation pedagogy to "get inside the 
learner" (p. 37) . In the chapter "Presenting and Evaluating ·t:n-e 
Dance Experience" the teacher's work is to "stimulate the 
learner" (p.l34) so that the learner can "alter his behavior" 
(p.133). In evaluating the student's work "[t]he teacher 
establishes criteria and guides the evaluative discussion in 
accordance with the pupil's level of development and the needs 
of the group" (p.140). The teacher's work is about "getting 
students to think ... and feel ... stimulating the learner to 
create ... [which] causes him to perceive .•• and experience" 
(p.140). 
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In the above Hawkins appears to be in direct contradiction 
to her first book where she called for joint teacher-student 
planning based on the student's interests (although those 
interests are based in the common and inevitable needs of 
biology and society, thus making all student interests 
essentially alike) . She appears to be, here, highly 
interventionist calling for an active and directing teacher who 
is involved in getting students to do this or that, in causing 
their activities. Such an interventionist approach may be 
understood as making the teacher the author of the students. I 
would say that Hawkins, here, is functioning in an authoritarian 
mode. This authoritarian approach, however, does not seem to be 
based in a desire to control but, rather, is characterized in 
caring and nurturing terms. Hawkins writes tLat the teacher 
should be "understanding and accepting of students" (p.31), that 
the teacher "opens the way for understanding" (p.30) and that 
the teacher needs to empathize with the students. "There is 
only one way for the teacher to identify such readiness [for 
being self-directed- ed.] and that is through his empathy with 
the student's creative activity" (p.28). And she writes that 
"[IJ.n the early dance experience the student still needs to be 
led out cautiously" (p.19). These show concern for the 
student's psychological well-being. Indeed she calls for a 
psychologically safe and affirming atmosphere as most conducive 
for fostering creativity. 
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The calls for self-direction and teacher-directed pedagogy 
present a paradox. It seems clear that, through her disavowal 
of imitation, she doe.s not mean total teacher control. It is, 
also, clear that she does not mean total student self-direction 
on the part of the student since she writes that some self-
directed activity can be aimless, meaningless and immature. ~~d 
it seems clear that she cares about the well-being of the 
student. I would say that the problem of their joining is 
"solved" through recognizing that Hawkins, like many other dance 
teachers, posits the necessity of developing skillful, normed 
activity (which can only be learned from a teacher who knows the 
norms) in order to have successful self-direction (which can 
only come from the student). If skill is required to make self-
direction meaningful and mature and if that skill comes to the 
student from the teacher then we can speculate that the skill 
taught is informed by what the teacher understands to represent 
meaningful activity and maturity (notwithstanding the 
possibility of alternative understanding on the part of 
students). The relationship between teacher information and 
student self-di~ection is paradoxical because of these 
difficulties. If the teacher's information and the student's 
self-direction were to be dialectically related then the reader 
might expect teacher direction to be presented as both promoting 
and not promoting student self-direction and might expect that 
student self-direction would inform teacher direction as well as 
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vice versa. Instead what is presented, here, is a functional 
and uni-directional relationship, exemplary of the situation 
whereby, in the negotiations of world-views of the teach~r and 
student, the teacher's world prevails. 
Skills and Norms 
Hawkins presents the development of skill in a neutral 
fashion as merely functional for creativity. 
The body instrument and movement material is made 
functional for the imaginative work in dance when man's 
creative spirit is working with a high degree of 
consciousness and kinesthetic awareness. (p.70) 
She writes that "understanding of ... basic concepts [movement 
principles] frees the creator to control and mold movement in 
his own image" (p.64). This knowledge creates a "foundation" 
for expression (p.71). Understanding the 
proper structural relationship [between body 
parts] ... provides a homebase or functional framework from 
which the dancer can proceed to experimentation that is 
more demanding. (p.72) 
In one of her summaries she writes, 
Obviously the dancer must discover certain norms in 
balance and movement, explore movement possibilities, and 
learn basic principles that govern efficient movement. 
(p. 81) 
Norms represent socially agreed upon ways of doing and 
being. Norms are group criteria. A tension exists here between 
such criteria and "mold[ing] movement in his own image." Norms 
are about being in the group's, not the individual's, image. It 
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is important to examine what kinds of norms are meant to inform 
the individual. 
She writes that dance movement is aesthetically 
"motivated" movement that is specifically "sparked" by "sensory 
experiences and feeling responses" (p.63). 
[M]ovement becomes dance because it is impregnated with 
abstracted feelings ... Dance is both physical and 
emotional. These ... are interwoven and never exist in 
isolation. Physical movement is transformed so that it 
creates an illusion of feeling state. (p.64) 
The physical aspect of dancing should focus upon movement in 
which "energy is used efficiently" (p.66). "[E]fficient and 
economical [movement] must ... become habitual. Then and only 
then can the balanced instrument become functional" (p.67) so 
that the dancer develops "adequacy of the instrument" and 
"creative freedom" (p.78). The physical norms here are 
efficiency, economy, habits and balance. These norms present an 
image of the body which is workmanlike and held in check 
(balance) and in which the body is instrumentalized, made into a 
tool in the same category as a hammer or saw. 
While Hawkins instrumentalizes the body she also writes 
that "dance is both physical and emotional" and in avowing 
wholeness as an integral part of her pedagogy she is attempting, 
I believe, to not characterize the physical in a merely 
instrumental way. She writes of the value of awareness (both 
physical and emotional) and she writes, in discussing how to 
teach, of the question of how teachers can "help students 
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unleash feelings and imaginative responses" (p.118). She 
writes, 
The dancer is not convincing when h::.! moveD .i.n a mechanical 
and imitative manner. Only [his] ..• full 
awareness ..• conveys sincerity and conviction ... to produce 
an honest projection of images and feelings. (p.64) 
[M]any of [the dancer's] motivations spring from images 
and feelings that cry out for movement that is 
precariously balanced and irregularly shaped ... Within the 
play of gravity [always present in precariousness -
ed.] ... tension must be maintained in order to keep these 
[body] parts in balar.ce ... so that balance is stabilized. 
(p. 69) 
In the above we can see how the emotions, like the body, 
must be controlled in order to have good self-directed art. She 
begins with motivations which "cry out for movement" (a highly 
charged emotional image) and she ends with a body which is "in 
balance" and "stabilized". Emotions, like the body, are placed 
within a framework and brought under control. The question is: 
how can strong emotions and body sensations be stabilized and 
yet maintain "sincerity and conviction"? In the light of 
understanding that Hawkins describes dance as the 
"objectification of human feeling" (p.94) which are "removed 
from the natural and transformed into art" (p.S) it is difficult 
to understand what is meant by either the unleashing of 
feelings, sincerity, or honesty. A central norm, then, is for 
body and emotions to be controlled and circumscribed and this is 
manifested through skillful activity. 
Also normative is the value of illusion. She writes of 
dance as an "illusion of feeling state" and writes that the 
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"illusion" of art conveys "the essence of human experience" 
(p.6). She writes that dance "possesses a magic quite different 
from the utilitarian activity of everyday life" and that the 
dancer "must transform movement in such a way that the dance 
takes on a magic quality" (p.64). She writes that there is a 
"mysterious quality of dance ... [which] cannot be conveyed 
through verbal explanations or any other method" (p.79). And 
she writes that "helping the student unravel the complexity of 
his art still remains somewhat of a mystery" (p.ll9). 
Illusion, magic and mystery mark the discourse with a 
sense of the limits of Hawkins's own knowledge. That which is 
mysterious is not fully knowable. These words are also meant, I 
believe, to convey an excitement about and awe of the dance 
experience. {In this vein she calls improvisation a "flight 
into the unknown" [p.22] .) But they are also norms and as such 
they represent a group understanding which might inform the 
pedagogy. In light of the emphasis upon teacher direction of 
the pedagogy it seems to me that the teacher's (as a 
representative of society) understanding of these ideas can 
define them within the classroom. 
Hawkins's understanding of magic is located in her 
description of the "illusion of art. She writes 
Movement is removed from the world of actuality and 
transformed so that the inherent force relationships 
create a world of magic and, at the s~~e time, evoke 
meanings that are associated with life experiences. 
felt 
(p. 6) 
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She is saying that we must move away from life to see life. In 
prescribing what experiences will foster the development of an 
aesthetic sensibility, Hawkins provides a list for valuable 
experiences outside of the classroom: "art exhibits, concerts, 
the theater, good literature and nature" (p.34). Noteworthily 
absent from this list a~e daily, social, ordinary expz=iences. 
This absence is noteworthy because I take it that daily, 
social ordinary experiences are the mundane world and, by their 
absence, leave room only for their opposite that of transcendent 
values. Hawkins is espousing, I would argue, transcendent 
values of art (reminiscent of H'Doubler). Transcendence may 
also be noted in how Hawkins relates various activities of her 
pedagogy. She writes, in the same chapter, that "exploring and 
improvising are stepping stones that lead toward the discovery 
of the full creative act" (p.28). A stepping stone is under the 
foot and of the earth. Improvisation is described as a "flight 
into the unknown." Since stepping stones are of the earth and 
improvisation, a flight, leaves the earth destined for 
creativity, creativity itself must be understood as being of 
heaven. The mundane is transcended. 
When Hawkins writes that dance is emotional, in the light 
of transcendence it may be that emotion, too, may be 
transcended. The honest portrayal of emotion might be falling 
down and wailing. But abstraction and illusion lead away from 
this. At one point Hawkins is quite explicit about the problem 
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with being very personal while dancing. She writes, "As the 
illusion [of art] is lost the experience becomes personal rather 
than aesthetic" (p.S). And she writes that art occurs when 
"[p]hysical movement is transformed so that it creates an 
illusion of feeling state" (p.64). In sum, the norms of 
illusion and magic can be seen to function so as to remove both 
the student and the audience from the actual experiences of 
their lives. 
Another important norm is that of efficiency. This norm 
is promoted for educating the body and has an important presence 
within how the teacher ought to manage classroom a~tivities. In 
prescribing the use of lesson plans Hawkins writes that the unit 
plan 11 is a device ... [which] will save time in later planning and 
will insure better teaching" (p.125). Transitions from activity 
to activity within a class period should be "smooth and 
efficient" (p .12 9) . She wants to avoid 11 \>lasting time" ".nd 
"avoid wasteful repetition" (p.134) and wants to use time 
wisely. 
The emphasis on time efficiency metaphorizes the dance 
classroom in terms of industrial life. There is a common adage 
in the culture that "time is money", which informed the 
activities of time study experts who studied worker motions and 
assembly line activity in order to prescribe new motions and new 
factory activities and environments which would take less time 
and produce higher production output. It is the managers of the 
factory, or of any work place for that matter, (and not the 
workers) who are concerned with efficiency. This metaphor 
suggests that dance teachers be efficient managers of their 
classrooms. 
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The efficiency value is problematical in the face of tne 
individuality value of the pedagogy. Efficiency in the factory 
involves stream-lining, standardizing and the elimination of 
what is extraneous. Standardization jeopardizes the development 
of unique individuals. It is the differences between 
individuals which cannot be accounted for by efficiency. 
In sum, then, Hawkins's curriculum contains the following 
values. She values the development of physical and emotional 
skill in order to make quality art. These skills are the norms 
of dancing. Normatively, physical and emotional skill is 
represented by restrictiveness and control. Both the body and 
emotions are instrumentalized to the purposes of making art. 
Art, itself, is, normatively, illusion and magic, and, to be 
successful, the art should seem organic and life-like. Art 
succeeds when the mundane is transcended in favor of illusion 
and magic. To successfully achieve these skills and norms the 
body and emotions of the dancer and the teaching of the teacher 
must aspire to efficiency. 
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Mind/Body 
As in the other two books discussed Hawkins, again, 
subordinates the body to the mind and, on occasion, understands 
the bod:;·~::; being a valued knower in its own right. These two 
approaches create a tension with the text. 
In terms of valuing the body Hawkins writes early on, "We 
use movement as a means of experiencing and knowing" (p.4). 
Improvisational experiences should be kept "at a kinesthetic 
level" (p.23). She makes the body primary when, in discussing 
improvisational exploration, she emphasizes permitting the body 
movement "to expend itself" rather than "stopping the acticn" by 
which she means intervening arbitrarily before the body has 
completed its actions (p.39). She writes that "experiencing and 
feeling" are the primary sources of learning (p.47) and that 
"felt [spatial] tension evokes a kinesthetic response that makes 
possible the perception of meaning in a work of art" (p.Sl). 
The body (kinesthetics) allows for meaning. In writing of 
teaching rhythm Hawkins avers th<:..t it would be "more logical for 
the dancer to ... develop kinesthetic awareness and 
understanding ... before the intellectual concepts and symbols of 
music" (p.54). 
This last almost makes an hierarchy of the body over the 
mind. She seems to wish, at some points, to be clearly 
understood as not valuing the mind too strongly. She quotes 
Andre Malraux's description of creativity ("'creating means 
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seeing, reducing, and ordering'" [p.ll]) and follows this with 
the statement that she and Malraux do 
not mean 'seeing' in the usual sense, which motivates an 
act of cognition and verbalization - in other words, a 
mental act. Seeing ... involves experiencing and perceiving 
by the whole person with a high degree of inner and outer 
awareness. This seeing is more than recognizing and 
reporting. (p.l2) 
She is distancing herself from intellectualization, attempting, 
perhaps, to widen the scope of what is normally thought of as 
valued understanding encapsulated by the metaphor of "seeing". 
This can be further understood when she writes that through 
improvisation a student develops "a new awareness ... of the 
integrity and rightness of the movement when you let it just 
happen rather than arrange it" and when she writes that, in 
improvisation, "[a]ctions go easily, and each new action sets 
off another oner which extends and expands the experience" 
(p.22). 
On the other hand the mind is also valued strongly, 
perhaps over the body. For instance, experiencing the quality 
of movement "contributes to a functional understanding of 
quality as an aesthetic element" (p.39). Bodily experience is 
valuable in that it functions for creativity, is instrumentally 
and not intrinsically good. She writes that "the choreographer's 
success ... depends on his ability to conceive •.. and 
control. .. imaginatively" (p. 43) and that "[d) ance form .•. must 
follow motivation not precede it" (p.45). Motivation and 
imagination are, conventionally, psychological (i.e. mind) 
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language and are made to lead the creative process. The task of 
forming a dance depends on having an "idea", of "abstracting the 
essence" of "sense data", of transforming, manipulating and 
projecting "qualities from their everyday setting into an 
artistic form" (p.96). Art may begin in the body (kinesthetic 
awareness) but seems to end in the mind dominating the process. 
Conclusion: Wholeness, Harmony and Repression 
In this book wholeness is the central value of the 
pedagogy. It may be said that the basic question of the book is 
"How can wholeness of the individual be achieved?" Wholeness of 
a person is marked by the integration of all aspects of a person 
and such wholeness is visible in the successful creative act. 
She draws most of her ideas on wholeness from the third-force 
psychology of self-actualization. This is evident from her 
extensive citations of Carl Rogers and from a book called 
Creativity and Its Cultivation (ed. H.H.Anderson,l959). In this 
wholeness the physical, emotional and intellectual aspects of a 
person join together in a unified way to present the individual 
as a smoothly integrated system. No one aspect overawes the 
other aspects. The values of this are harmony and balance (as 
with H'Doubler and Hawkins's earlier book). 
I would say that harmony and balance are achieved by 
repressing certain aspects of a person's being. The emotions 
are to be abstracted, leaving out personalisms. Balanced 
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emotions are valued which eschew strong, out of balance 
emotions. Efficiency means not paying attention to the unique 
attribu"i..~s of individuals which means that their wholeness is 
jeopardized. Freedom is understood in terms of a dancer's 
ability "to be himself and to create in his own way" (p.l7) in 
creative situations. This cannot be taken to mean that the 
dancer should be him/herself in a whole way since there are many 
aspects of self, some of which would surely escape the limits of 
toleration for the teacher or other students. Wholeness is 
clearly a matter of balance. I recall a student whose 
choreographic assignment was to make an outrageous dance. She 
proceeded to throw a bucket of water on her teacher as part of a 
dance composition. In doing so she got water on some important 
audio tapes and the teacher angrily instructed the student that 
this was totally inappropriate. A contradiction existed between 
asking for the outrageous and expecting decorum, control, 
balanced sensitivity to appropriateness. Clearly, the wholeness 
of emotions and individual action are not valued here, but only 
certain selections of them. "Wholeness" may be simply an ill-
defined term requiring either definition or the use of another 
term which is more accurate within the scope of the discourse. 
The term "wholeness" seems to me to be rather a grand 
term. Of the three books which I have discussed, both 
H'Doubler's and this book are marked by a kind of grand approach 
to theory in which the books appear to be as much apologies for 
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the approach as they are contributions to pedagogical 
understanding. Through H'Doubler's book there are references to 
the spiritual dimension of dancing and she presents most of her 
prescriptions without definitions as if the reader, of course, 
knows what, for instance, the "art of living" means. 
In Hawkins's case "wholeness" lends an air of grandeur to 
the discourse as it is a global concept which is unmediated by 
considerations of the greater complexity of the subject. She 
also engages in hyperbole as for instance when she writes of 
improvisation that 
[a]t the end of the experience, or during a fleeting 
moment ... the creator feels a great sense of joy, a kind of 
ecstasy. Suddenly everything seems integrated and he 
senses a unity that is profoundly satisfying. (p.22) 
In invoking magic and illusion, in calling improvisation a 
"flight into the unknown" there is a feeling of language almost 
too strong for the event. 
Such hyperbole may also have a political function, used as 
a way of promoting dancing which has been long denied a 
validated place within the culture. At the very end of her book 
she writes of the grading process and writes, 
One may feel that [grading] contradicts everything we say 
about evaluating dance and seems to be in direct violation 
to all that we believe about ways to further creative 
growth of the individual. But until a different system of 
grading prevails, the dance teacher has no choice ... Some 
people suggest that students in the arts would be marked 
pass or fail, thus avoiding a dilemma; but such a policy 
would only create another dilemma. If dance and other 
arts have a justified place in the academic world, then 
the dance student's achievement would be recognized and 
receive grade points in the same manner as achievements in 
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other areas of learning. With the increased emphasis on 
quality in all phases of education, the dance teacher must 
lift his sights and constantly enrich and improve the 
quality of the dance experience. This goal can be 
attained without violating the true concern for creative 
development of each individual. (pp.151-152) 
I have the sense of struggle here as the teacher struggles to 
find acceptance within the system and also remain true to her 
values which seem in opposition to the system. Hawkins's call 
for the dance teacher to accept the status quo by accepting the 
grading system in order to receive validation from the 
institution. She tries to rationalize this acceptance with the 
hope that the teacher can also accomplish her goals. It has 
been said that when Percy Bysse Shelley wrote "In Defense of 
Poetry" he overstated the case because Romanticism was under 
such attack. It may be that Hawkins writes in her strong manner 
for precisely the same reasons. 
Introduction 
CHAPTER THREE 
PERSONAL BODY 
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In Chapter 2 I presented three examples of dance education 
prescriptions and worlds, three examples which provide idealized 
versions of how dance education ought to be and what kind of 
ideal world is achieved through such education. As is the case 
with any idealization there are distinctions to be made between 
the idealization and the reality to which it is addressed. 
These distinctions represent the process of negotiation between 
the teacher and the student as to what kind of world will exist 
in the classroom. 
I would say there at least three kinds of distinctions. 
First, a distinction may be made between what the ideal implies 
and what actions are actually possible or actually occur. For 
instance, were these authors to prescribe as essential to their 
pedagogy the teaching of four hour daily dance classes in a 
university setting, the reality of the university setting would 
exclude the possibility of successfully forming the prescribed 
world. Second, a distinction may also be made between what is 
idealized as definite results of the pedagogy and what may 
actually result. Creative dance education might, in reality, 
not provide any of the stated results or might, as an example, 
result in greatly lowered individual creativity than expected. 
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Its predictions and results might not match. Lastly, a 
distinction may be made between the beginning assumptions in the 
ideal about how the world is for these educators (which they 
wish to change) and how the world is for others. When H'Doubler 
decries the alienation of workers, is she decrying her own 
perceptions of their situations or their perceptions? Perhaps 
they do not feel alienated. 
In this chapter I will focus on this last distinction, 
i.e. between assumptions and realities. As a way of gaining 
insight into this area-I want to present my own dance 
educational activity and experience as one example of the 
disjuncture which may occur between the ideal and concrete 
individual reality and the negotiations of teachers and 
students. 
Personal Body 
I began dancing at the age of twenty-one, a late age for 
most aspiring professional dancers. At the time of my beginning 
I did not have such aspirations. I came to take a dance class 
at the behest of a male friend who wanted to take class but did 
not want to be the only man there. At the time of my agreement 
to go I did not know why I had agreed. I surprised myself in 
this regard. 
Prior to that time I had never considered myself to be a 
"body" person. I did not do well at sports; I never played on a 
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school sports team; I viewed my body as inadequate to physical 
success. My view of my body represented certain cultural facts. 
First, I viewed sports as the only body possibility in deciding 
what constituted a legitimate outlet for a desire to move. 
Second, I viewed myself as inadequate to a sports endeavor 
because the culture defined what an athletic body was; I did not 
have such a body. Third, I came from a family which valued 
intellect and devalued physical activity. Whatever aspirations 
I might have had in a sports direction would have been met with 
at least disinterest if not outright scorn by my family. I did, 
in fact, have such aspirations, but I was too small (according 
to the culture) for the sport I wanted to play (football) and 
not good at the sport I tried to play (tennis). I was hemmed in 
by a variety of cultural situations. 
In addition I was acculturated into believing that social 
issues were of paramount importance. Artistic and body 
endeavors (two ideas associated with dance) were extraneous to 
this value. Contrary to this acculturation, however, I wanted 
to be an artist. This may be understood from two perspectives. 
My oldest brother was distinguished in languages a.nd history; my 
middle brother was distinguished in mathematics and science. In 
part, in order for me to find something in which I might be 
distinguished, I gravitated toward the arts. In addition, ever 
since my eighth grade English teacher had praised my use of 
words I had decided that writing was my strength and, in 
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particularly, poetry which appeared to be more purely focused 
upon language itself (as opposed to story) . I enjoyed the 
praise and enjoyed the construction of writing, the working with 
the resonance of language and meaning in order to produce a 
response on the part of another. 
Despite my gravitation toward art I felt a conflict 
existed between this interest and my social conscience. A way 
of characterizing this conflict is to understand the artistic 
desires as having personal or private relevance and importance 
and to understand the social conscience as having public or 
external relevance. What I had learned was that the public, 
external matters were more important than personal or private 
matters. Engaging in private, personal pleasures required a 
justification in public, socially responsible terms. 
Despite this conflict and despite the fact that I tried 
but waa hard pressed to ever discover or construct a "good" 
socially useful argument for either writing poetry or enjoying 
body activities I continued to do both. I continued to write 
(which had a certain social legitimacy because I could conceive 
of a career in it) and engage in moving activities (which had 
little or no social legitimacy because it had little career 
potential, another reason for valuing an activity). I believe 
that I kept at body activity because it seemed almost native to 
me to move, so irrepressible was my desire to move. 
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This irrepressible urge manifested itself in various ways. 
I was constantly in motion in the house, much to my mother's 
chagrin. I enjoyed going into the backyard and running 
incessantly from one end to the other, ending each run with what 
I later learned to call a tour jete, also much to my mother's 
chagrin. I played neighborhood tackle football and liked 
carrying the ball and fighting off tackles with my body 
contortions and manipulations. I especially liked being praised 
in those games by one of the neighborhood boys who did play on 
the high school football team. I felt vindicated in my feelings 
of capability which put in question my not being allowed by 
school rules to play. I liked to play badminton and I 
especially liked the way my body felt when we volleyed for the 
purpose of keeping the shuttlecock in play. 
As a freshman in college I was on the Freshman Fencing 
Team. This experience exemplifies some of the shortcomings with 
my body in culture by which I never even contemplated a body 
career. I loved warming up and learning to fence and disliked 
the in-class competitions at which I was not very good 
(i.e.winning bouts). The person who won most of the bouts was 
very aggressive, showing a fierce desire to inflict pain but 
little or no finesse or technique. I recall resenting what I 
perceived as a dual standard on the part of the coaching staff. 
We were encouraged to develop technique but when it came to the 
point of competition only winning, at any cost, prevailed. I 
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recall, also, that this person was very large and, according to 
convention, should have fenced with the largest of the swords, 
the ep~e, yet was allowed to continue with the foil, a sword 
usually reserved for smaller people (e.g. me). Because of my 
failure in fencing class, I was not allowed to participate in 
intercollegiate competitions. I resented m~ exclusion yet also 
knew that what I valued did not happen in such competitive 
situations. My conclusion was that physical endeavor was not 
for me. 
Upon taking my first dance class, however, all of my 
memories of the good parts of these disparate body activities 
and experiences, seemingly unconnected and extraneous, suddenly 
coalesced into a meaningful whole and received a name, dance. I 
came to believe that in my earlier life activities I had been 
dancing. I had been moving my body for the pleasure of that 
alone, for the feelings that arose in me when I thought through 
my bocl.y in those act.ivities in which I pursued skillful bodily 
action. These feelings were of strength and competence, of the 
pleasure of envisioning certain movements and then aspiring to 
refining my actual activity. My most plea~urable moments were, 
for the most part, not when I had to come up against another for 
the purpose of defeating him, but when I sought to refine the 
activity of my own body. The exception was the neighborhood 
football games. There I found a vindication of my resentment of 
my social exclusion. On the other hand I recalled that inside 
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the feelings of vindication was also a realization of how well I 
thought in my body, how aware I was of sensation and how 
responsive I was to the changing physical conditions of a run 
through the line. 
This is what I realized as I took that first class. All 
of these memories carne back to me in a speedy flood and I was 
surprised and delighted by this understanding of myself. My 
best moment in that class was when the teacher praised me 
because I had straightened my leg as it was in back of me while 
doing what is known as "Graham circle walks". I took great 
pleasure in that moment of skillful execution, I had taken 
great pleasure in attempting to do the movements during the rest 
of the class and I took great pleasure in the recognition I had 
received. In addition I saw dance as a perfect amalgam of my 
two interests, my body pleasure and poetry. I could make art 
with my body. 
This was fortuitous since I had already begun to doubt 
that poetry was my forte. I did not have the abiding interest 
in words as did a poet friend of mine who read the dictionary 
for fun. Using him as a definition of poet I felt I did not 
have the discipline or interest to fully pursue poetry. In 
addition my poetry teacher doubted the quality of my poetry, 
feeling that my readings gave more quality to the poems than 
they actually possessed lying inertly on the page. Dance 
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presented an opportunity to be an artist and utilized something 
I had long decided to devalue (but unsuccessfully so): my body. 
There are a number of important elements in this 
narrative. Fir~t, my own prior experiences .;;,::::lned both 
coherence and legitimacy by subsuming them under a name which 
already had legitimacy: it was a culturally accepted category of 
activity into which I could fit my activity. This category gave 
me a legitimate form and position through which I could fit 
myself into the world. Because of this, I altered my horizon of 
understanding and re-made my world to include and value dancing. 
Second, to do this required legitimate forms against which to 
measure my capabilities. I gravitated toward writing in part 
due to my socially legitimate eighth grade English teacher's 
encouragement and provision of the knowledge of a proper writing 
form (poetry) . Later I doubted my ability as a poet because I 
construed a definition of poet into which I could not fit my 
activity and because my socially legitimate poetry teacher 
(published and teaching the writing of poetry) doubted my 
ability. I accepted dance because, in part, it was a legitimate 
social form and I had been praised by my socially legitimate 
teacher. The best moment in the first class was a moment of 
personal external affirmation. Had the teacher not praised me I 
would not have known that I was doing it "well". I was doing it 
"well" according to external standards. I was aware that I was 
supposed to straighten my leg because the teacher had said so. 
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She provided an officially sanctioned template against which to 
measure an activity which I believed I could not satisfactorily 
measure myself. Third, the pleasure in attempts at skill (as 
defined by the standards of skill) and skillful execution 
dominated my consciousness. The valuing of skill is not a 
merely personal value but is coextensive with a cultural 
surround which so values it and provides definitions of what is 
considered skillful and what forms of activity can be judged in 
skill terms. The naming, external praise and value of skill all 
illustrated the social dimension of legitimating personal 
experience via socially constructed values. 
While this social dimension is connected with pleasure in 
my success, the pleasure which I took in moving cannot be fully 
explained by naming, public judgement and skill because I also 
had taken pleasure in bodily experience when it was neither 
named nor externally validated (when I ran back and forth in my 
backyard). There is a dimension of pleasure which I take to be 
personal and not social. 
I returned to class the next week. I was apprehensive 
about doing so. Something so massive had occurred inside me the 
week before that I was not quite sure whether or not this was a 
good thing to be doing. I was also apprehensive because this 
was an activity not becoming to manliness because I associated 
dancing with homosexuality which I did not consider to be manly. 
I felt the need to rationalize my return in some way that would 
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make sense to me (perhaps educational terms or improving my 
writing poetry or some such thoughts) but, personally, I only 
felt a pleasure which did not fit with whatever attempts I might 
make to rationally understand my return. Pleasure was, simply, 
not a good enough reason, yet I could find no other. 
Throughout my subsequent dance life I have carried my 
social and rational consciousness with me, seeking reasons why 
dancing is a valuable endeavor. I have, along with many 
dancers, cited the Greek ideal of healthy mind and healthy body 
or I have argued that creative activity (making your own art 
works} has a salubrious effect upon behavioi and/or produces the 
ability to live life more effectively and the like. When 
presenting such ideas to those close to me (both dancer friends 
and non-dancer friends} I have often received the response that 
my efforts at justification seem strained at best. My friends 
would ask if I wasn't dancing simply because I liked to do it. 
I would admit that I did like it but such admissions 
discomforted me. Pleasure has continuously been too frivolous a 
reason for doing anything. 
This discomfort with pleasure in general and pleasure in 
my body reveals more cultural consciousness at work. Ours is 
not a culture which has traditionally value~. physical pleasure. 
This is the co~~on sense way of putting what many dancers have 
asserted: that Paulist and Medieval Christianity's rejection of 
the earthly in favor of attaining transcendent heaven has had 
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much to do with the lack of development of dancing as a 
legitimate art until the last two centuries (when the 
legitimating force of Christianity has been on the wane) . 
(H'Doubler discusses this in her Survey of Culture chapter and 
Kraus and Chapman discuss this in their text on the history of 
dance and dance education.) I do not want to enter into a 
history of the body except to note that our cultural 
mind/intellect orientation has meant an historically concomitant 
lack of valuing the body. 
After about the third class I attended I was prevailed 
upon to perform in the spring concert. When I had begun dancing 
a few short weeks earlier I had done so for myself. Now I was 
being asked to dance for others. At first I said no. It seemed 
to me that such a move was uncalled for since I was not even 
quite sure why I was dancing. Although I now realize that 
dancing for others is analogous to writing poetry for others to 
read, at the time I did not want to jeopardize the fragile 
attachment which I had to dancing. Dancing was personal, not 
public. This personal attachment could be damaged by allowing 
myself to be publicly scrutinized before I had confidence in my 
skills. Perhaps I only wanted to dance for my own personal 
pleasure, part of which was external affirmation by a teacher 
but not by an audience and part of which was the sensual 
pleasure of moving in a skilled manner. To agree to perform, 
then, would be to give me a reason for dancing which was not 
mine alone. Nevertheless, I accepted their seemingly greater 
wisd~m and, although I was reluctant and afraid, in the end I 
agreed to perform. 
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This agreement changed my feelings about dancing, placing 
me under a pressure to perform on stage (that is, to produce a 
quality product for an audience) which depended less on my own 
feelings and more on the needs of others. At this point I had 
begun down the path toward professionalization of my activity, a 
path on which the sensual pleasure of dancing was to be less and 
less valued and the naming and external valuation were to become 
more and more important. 
There are two instances in my experience which exemplify 
the ways in which sensual personal pleasure became separated 
from professional dancing. One instance is from early in my 
career, one from much later when I was a skilled dancer. 
A year after I had begun dancing I was talked into going 
into New York City on Saturdays to study at a professional 
studio. I was placed in a small intermediate level technique 
class with the woman who was to become the major influence on my 
professional development. At the end of the first class with 
her we were asked to do solo irnprovisational dances. My dance 
was a wild fling though the space, a vigorous and sensual body 
explosion. Her comment, derisively put, w~s that I looked very 
Spanish to her. That would have to change. I would have to get 
in control and calm down. I took it that the kind of pleasure I 
145 
exhibited was illegitimate. It was not that it had not been 
skillful in the sense of an awareness of what my body was doing 
and being but that the exhibited pleasure was not valid for 
dancing (although valid, I suppose, for a Dionysian rite). 
The second incident occurred years later while dancing for 
a choreographer whose style was very different f£om ~inc. She 
was dry and narrow, very specific in what she wanted, very 
linear and quite controlled in a minimalist manner (much stasis 
in the body) . She requested over and over again that we not 
show any roundness or expansiveness in our movements. "Ple2se, 
don't lush out." I felt as if I were dancing in a strait-
jacket. On the premiere night of the dance I asked my wife and 
others how I looked. They said I looked narrow and pinched, not 
at all like who I was to them. The choreographer herself was 
unhappy with how the piece looked although she thought the 
dancers were being obstructionist. (There was a good deal of 
political tension within the group, This was a joint concert 
involving two companies who were, essentially, at war with each 
other but who were trying to make peace with each other.) The 
next night I decided I could not dance as she asked for. I 
recovered my own pleasurable way of dancing (without marring the 
essential material of her choreography) . My wife and others 
were pleased. I shone. The choreographer was ecstatic with my 
performance. Again, pleasure and professional dancing had been 
made into enemies. Pleasure was recovered and validated post 
hoc. 
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It is important in this instance to note that my interest 
was in how I looked more than in how I felt. The distinction 
between valuing sight and valuing other senses is a distinction 
that has been made quite sharp in recent years by feminist film 
theorists who write of the male gaze which fixes images so that 
the gazer imposes an image of a woman onto the actuality of the 
woman. She is made to be his woman. One way in which this 
occurs in everyday life is by forcing women into being visually 
sexually alluring if men are to pay attention to them. 
Extrapolating this toward a general theory of gaze I would say 
that the gaze may be criticized as a way of controlling another 
by forcing him or her into categories of value in which all 
parties agree to the value of being looked at. Michel Foucault 
writes, in Discipline and Punish (1979), of the panopticon, 
those total institutions (prisons, hospitals, schools) which 
were designed architecturally so that the inmates could be 
controlled at all times via the administration being able to 
view them at all times. In allowing the gaze to be so dominant, 
the parties to the gaze have come to "voluntarily" put the 
panopticon into place without the need for specialized 
architecture. I believe the issue of the gaze is applicable to 
both women and men. The gaze also causes problems when sight 
becomes privileged over other senses. When I turn to a 
discussion of "social body" I shall discuss Luce Iragaray's 
notion (1980) that what is lost in privileging sight are the 
plurality of sensations available to a truly jouiaaant woman. 
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While I am not a woman I would say that my experience of 
initial discomfort with performance is an example of both not 
wanting to be looked at in a certain way, of not wanting to be 
fixed in an image and of wanting to value my non-visible 
experience while dancing (a value at odds with being gazed at}. 
My subsequent dance education was very much about teaching me to 
be looked at and fixed. The last dance experience described is 
an example of such fixedness and of socially, culturally 
mediated pleasure. I placed pleasure within the boundaries of 
another's images (the choreographer's movements and gaze) and I 
agreed to live within the externally imposed constraints of the 
visual pleasure of others. 
The gaze carries with it legitimation: worthy of being 
looked at. Where the gaze takes place can be as important to 
legitimation as the activity. During my first dance class, in 
accepting my pleasure in bodily activity as dancing I allowed 
myself pleasure within the setting of a school. Had someone 
praised me outside of the socially legitimated activity (and 
institution, the school setting) I would, qui~e likely, have 
rebuffed those praises. 
The gaze may also be understood to fix gender. A woman 
may feel less womanly if she is not stared at by men because she 
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identifies womanlines3 with the ability to attract a man's gaze. 
My gender was fixed by how people saw me, as manly or not. One 
of the reasons that I had never considered dancing as a 
legitimate outlet for my physical pleasure was that I associated 
it with homosexuality. I was repelled by this. A friend in 
high school was taking ballet classes and I recall that I felt 
estranged from him after learning that, assuming that he was 
homosexual. On the other hand, I was attracted to the dancing 
of Fred Astaire and Gene Kelly films. They, it will be 
understood, always danced about and with women. 
My homophobic attitudes about myself dancing, when I took 
that first dance class, were overcome by the presence of other 
men in the class who were heterosexual. Because of their 
presence I could feel like a man with the right orientation and 
still dance. (I recall thinking these thoughts at the time.) 
The materials of this class, Graham movement with strong and 
muscular activity also probably helped me distance myself from 
what I took to be the effeteness of ballet which was clearly 
associated, in my mind, with homosexuality. If I claim that it 
was pleasure which motivated my return to class, that pleasure 
could only be safe within the socially safe boundaries of 
correct sexuality. I did not want people looking at me 
strangely. 
The issue of homosexuality did not disappear with my 
entrance into dance. As a teacher of dance I was constantly 
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confronted with the assumption that I was homosexual. On one 
occasion I was taunted by some boys who were in another room 
while I was teaching a class. When teaching in public schools 
with the dance company for whom I worked I was often kept out of 
the gym classes because the boys felt embarrassed by taking 
dance with a person they perceived as homosexual. Even in the 
professional school where I studied one of the gay dancers 
insisted that I must be gay and attempted to force an admission. 
Through all of this harassment I maintained my love of dancing 
and continued in my profession. Despite my coming to believe 
that sexual orientation and dancing were not intimately 
connected, I continued to suffer under misapprehensions which 
angered me, partly because I did not want to be seen as 
homosexual (my homophobia still in place) and partly because it 
prevented people from participating in and enjoying what I had 
come to see as so valuable. 
Clearly, in terms of the way people perceived me when they 
knew that I was a dancer, I was participating in a profession 
that made me seem different. This perception of difference was 
another perception against which I railed. I wanted to be 
ordinary: to be married, to have children eventually, to be a 
man who went to work which happened to be dancing. I often 
asked myself "Why can't dancers have lives like everyone 
else's?" I fantasized ordinary existence. 
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The notion of ordinariness was in conflict with the facts 
of life of being a dancer. I rehearsed seven days a week, 
danced eight to nine hours a day and lived on a very small 
salary (when rehearsal money was available) and on unemployment 
insurance. I had been taught that to be a fine dancer I could 
not have other responsibilities which might vie for my 
attention. The desire to live a life like others, with enough 
to eat, a decent shelter and clothes and the happiness of family 
and friends conflicted with the all-consuming nature of dancing. 
To have a family and friends meant responsibilities outside of 
dancing and yet to dance meant full devotion to dancing. 
Nevertheless I wanted to achieve non-dance objectives within the 
frame of a dance career and I knew there were few models for me 
to emulate. 
Other dancers, male and female, whom I knew did not seem 
to exp~riencc these conflicts. They seemed to revel in the 
difference which being a dancer bestowed upon them. For one 
thing most of the men were gay. For another, when we were on 
tour and at a reception, often the rest of the company would 
disdainfully stand in the corner with each other, laughing at 
the sponsors and their guests who had arranged this reception 
for us. They wanted to dress differently, act differently and 
be treated with a kind of awe at their special status. All of 
this I resented. I felt that the people who had gone to all the 
trouble of preparing a reception for us deserved our attention 
and were worthy human beings. My difficulties with my 
colleagues behavior exacerbated my conflicts. 
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In this sketch of my life in dance several conflicts 
emerge which are not merely idiosyncratic issues but exist in 
the dance texts I have already discussed, in the dance sphere in 
a more general way and in the culture which is the context for 
educational aance. 
The conflicts may be understood, in the most general terms 
as an uneasy relationship between the personal and the public, 
metaphorically between an internal situation and an external 
situation which modifies the internal. For instance, wh~t1 I 
began to dance I took pleasure in the dancing which, in part, 
was a purely personal pleasure in moving. This personal 
pleasure was not a sufficient reason for me to continue dancing. 
I sought reasons in what appeared to me to be the more socially 
acceptable avenues of developing a career or rationalizing my 
dancing on the basis of teaching others to dance for socially 
valudble outcomes. The relationship between my personal 
pleasure (internal, private) and external pressures (make a 
career, be socially responsible) was uneasy because they tended 
to mutually obliterate each other. To be for my own pleasure 
was to be just for myself in a socially unfettered, non-
rational, non-responsible way. The purpose of justifying my 
dancing with socially responsible arguments was to avoid 
admitting to pleasure, to replace pleasure with good reasons. 
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This same tension exists within the H'Doubler and 
Hawkins's texts. They both put forward social responsibility 
arguments for justifying dancing. The arguments rest on the 
ways they can forge a more harmonious public life through the 
use of dancing. At the same time they desire to promote '"·!"• 
individual existence of pleasurable c:;:-eativity which is its own 
justification. I sense my own struggle between pleasure and 
social responsibility within these texts. 
Pleasure itself can be understood within the dyad of 
personal/public. I have written of the kind of free, personal 
pleasure which was not permitted in my dancing experience. The 
legitimate form of dancing is public performing for an audience. 
The pleasure to be derived from such dancing is a pleasure 
mediated by the presence of others. This makes the pleasure 
dependent on an external source of validation. The external 
source (represented in the classroom by the teacher) determines 
the socially acceptable forms of dancing. What is not 
acceptable to this external eye is an unconstrained spontaneity. 
Spontaneity must exist within an already determined definition 
of dance which can be explicated in definite, rationally 
understood terms. When studying with my teacher, she could 
explain exactly how my spontaneity should be calmed down, how I 
could find form in the openness of an improvisational situation 
so that the dancing became legible to others. I worked hard 
over may years to develop the skill to discern emerging form 
quickly and develop the form with the improvisation. 
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My teaching experiences have also been informed by the 
personal/public dyad. It was my own students many years later 
who pointed out the tensions between the personal and the public 
when they questioned how I could question their movement choices 
within an improvisational situation which they understood to be 
dancing freely as they saw fit. I answered them that there was 
skill involved with improvisational performance toward which I 
could guide them. What I had not understood in their questions 
was the implicit critique of always teaching dance from the 
point of view of public performance, of the skill of dancing for 
others. 
Again, years later in an improvisational situation with no 
audience I asked students of mine to simply explore movement 
possibilities. The dancing was not skilled in any usual sens~ 
and could have been dismissed as trivial and impossibly bad 
(perhaps not even dancing at all). This is what I mean by the 
public obliterating the personal. In this situation I chose not 
to dismiss the personal because their own personal experiences 
as communicated to me afterwards made of this a valid dance 
experience, no matter how unskillfully they had danced. The 
difficulties with defining what is dancing and what is quality, 
skilled dancing in these situations points out the tension 
between dancing in a purely personal way and the consciousness 
of dancing for someone else, between the internal and the 
external, between the private and the public. 
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Skill may be used to metaphorize the internal/external, 
private/public, personal/social dialectics. The problem found 
in these dialectical dyads may be found in asking some questions 
of skill. 
What is the value of skills in the face of personal 
pleasure? This question is asked in the face of the kinds of 
skills valued in my own dance education. The skills I developed 
were the skills for being socially acceptable and legitimate 
within the social institution of dance by learning to fulfill 
the proper dance forms. While developing these skills I was 
taught to sacrifice the personal (family, physical comfort, 
friends, all of which carry their own sense of wanting to be 
socially legitimate) in favor of dancing. I was also taught to 
sacrifice the sensually pleasurable in favor of the proper dance 
forms. At the same time I maintained a core of personal body 
pleasure from my pre-dance days based in a seemingly unmediated 
sensuality which I attempted to hold on to as I danced 
"correctly". 
Elaborating the above question: what is the relationship 
between the socially physical acceptable skills and a seemingly 
primary sensuality and what is the relationship between social 
acceptance in career (dancing) and the legitimacy of personal 
life (family, friends, comfort), metaphorically between work 
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place and family place, the latter being seen as less valuable 
than the former? In the H'Doubler and Hawkins texts I showed 
that skill had an important place in achieving the goals of the 
pedagogy. In my own life I have shown how an emphasis on skill 
could be understood to interfere with pleasure. All of these 
skills fall under the rubric of form and discipline: learn good 
dance form in order to dance well. A person can achieve such 
form through disciplining the body, emotions and sensations of 
pleasure and subordinating them to the needs of the aesthetic, 
creative situation. As we shall see in the next chapter, form 
can present a social and cultural, as well as personal, 
problematic. 
This problematic comes in the guise of the meanings which 
cultures associate with such an emphasis on skillful activity. 
What are the meanings? In the next chapter I will also elaborate 
a way of understanding how meanings of such values are formed 
and what meanings predominate in relation to bodily pleasure and 
skill. 
Introduction 
CHAPTER FOUR 
SOCIAL BODY 
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I began this dissertation by discussing how language and 
the world intersect. Implicit in that discussion was the notion 
that language provides a framework for social relations and that 
language comes to represent an individual to him or herself as 
he or she comes to know him or herself. This knowing of self is 
mediated by the language of the culture so that, for example, 
the ability to feel pleasure at fulfilling movement is channeled 
into associating the term "pleasure" (of knowing what gives a 
person pleasure) with certain kinds of activities. 
The ability to feel pleasure may also be a general 
biological attribute which may have certain more or less natural 
outlets for a person. The culture, however, may not provide 
opportunities for such outlets. For instance, there may be 
pleasure to be had in doing something well. Specifically, an 
individual may be born with an ability to move his or her body 
well. He or she is not able to think well in mathematical 
concepts. This person lives in a culture devoid of valuing 
moving but replete with mathematical pleasures. In this case, 
the individual will be stymied in seeking his or her pleasurable 
experiences. Possible responses to this situation are that the 
individual may come to know him/herself as illegitimate or may 
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feel marginalized in his/her pursuit of pleasure or may abandon 
pleasure or may come to forget pleasure or may come to 
understand pleasure as not for him or her, only others, or may 
rebel and attempt to change the culture to enable new kinds of 
pleasure. The culture has provided a particular repartoire of 
pleasures and the individual has come to define him or herself 
vis ~ vis the cultural repertoire via the agency of the 
representative term "pleasure". 
The choice of "pleasure" as an example is neither, as I 
have said, an idiosyncratic nor a gratuitous choice. This 
choice is motivated from two sources. The first source is my 
perception that pleasure is a human capacity which is 
particularly circumscribed in dance education (which many dance 
educators wish to se as serious work versus frivolous endeavor, 
e.g. see M.Turner and E.Pease). The second set of sources are 
my readings in certain French feminist theorists (Julia 
Kristeva, 1986, Luce Iragaray, 1980a, 1980b and H~l~ne Cixous, 
1980a, 1980b) ' .. hose 1r10rk in \-lhat they term jouissance (roughly 
translated as "pleasure") has particularly influenced my own 
thinking. 
In particular I am drawn to their work with the 
disjunctive experiences of woman (as a category or persons) and 
of concrete women (individuals)as they feel alienated from the 
dominant culture. Disjuncture is also a characteristi~ of my 
own experiences in dance and of the teacher/student sc~narios I 
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have outlined. (I know that the teacher/student relation may 
also be characterized as consensual. My thrust herer however, 
is to emphasize the disjunctive.) 
The disjunctive occurs between what a person feels of and 
for him/herself and how society may expect that person to feel. 
Under this dialectic a person may be understood as both an 
independent, unique individual and as a product of society. The 
"Personal Body" chapter presented the idea of the individual and 
this chapter presents the idea of "Social Body" as an image for 
"society". By "personal body" I meant the individual as he/she 
experiences the interaction between his/her body and the 
culture. Such experiences are mediated by prior cultural 
influence but this cultural influence is taken up in a personal 
way in that each individual's experience is a unique complex of 
circumstances, different from all others. "Social body" 
aphorises the notion of cultural influence. "Social body" is 
that body which is experienced as being categorized by social 
and cultural definitions. I use the term cultural influence to 
carry a connotation of not becoming totalized by the culture, of 
leaving a space for the dialectic of the individual and society. 
In the chapter on "personal body" "social body" was a 
constant companion because, in fact, these two bodies are not 
really separable. That is why I discussed how and with what 
meanings I became socialized and acculturated into dance. In 
discussing "social body" separately, I shall not leave personal 
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body out. I will accomplish this inclusion by using social 
theory to analyze certain aspects of my own dancing and from the 
dance education texts and then center "social body" upon 
"personal body". This provides the image of inseparability for 
which I am striving. 
Social Body 
To begin with I will state that we never experience 
pleasure without social understandings. We always have pleasure 
of something and we learn to have pleasure. The available 
objects in which we may take pleasure are culturally 
legitimated or not. Our culture presents us with a limited set 
of choices from which to choose. 
If we take a sociological approach to this issue we learn 
that pleasure (sensuality) has play within society to the extent 
that it is properly put to the service of society. Bryan S. 
Turner (1984), a sociologist of the body, asserts that society 
faces four problems: the reproduction of the population, the 
regulation of the social space, the restraint or directing of 
sexuality and the representation of persons (people must be re-
presented to themselves so that they may know their places 
within the social fabric). Society's problem is to fit pleasure 
into the solutions of these problems. 
Julia K~isteva, a psycho-analyst, literary and cultural 
theorist, links pleasure with language and we may take it that 
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society in part uses language to solve the above problems. She 
begins with the term jouissance {1986c) . By jouissance she 
means a pleasure which is a primordial sensuality which is not 
merely sensual in the ordinary sense of, for instance, smelling, 
tasting or eating with gusto. Jouissanee is connected with, for 
Kristeva (and for other f~m~nistes whose work I shall use a bit 
later) with the act of coitus and all the events and experiences 
which involve a woman's sexual anatomy. Kristeva also 
specifically associates mothers with jouissance. Kristeva 
proceeds to set jo~issance against the symbolic order of 
language which is "a system of signs ... which are organized into 
logic-syntactic structures whose aim is to accredit social 
communication as exchange purified of pleasure" {Kristeva, 
19R6a, p.l50). Kristeva calls language the Symbolic Order and 
also the Law of the Father. Language has literally belonged to 
and privileged men via "a system of speech that involves an 
increasingly logical, simple, positive and "scientific" form of 
communication" (Kristeva, 1986a, p.l51). Central here is her 
assertion that the Symbolic Order is "purified of pleasure" and 
that men and their privilege are linked with a particular system 
of speech. 
While Kristeva (1986a) describes the Symbolic Order in 
patriarchal term8 she also asserts that there is an "underlying 
causality" of language. She writes that this metaphor is being 
used to 
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designate that 'other scene': the unconscious, drive-
related and transverbal scene whose eruptions determine 
not only my speech or my interpersonal relationships, but 
even the complex relations of production ~nd reproduction 
which we so frequently see only as dependent on, rather 
than shaping, the economy. (1986a, p.153) 
This scene is in opposition to the rules, taboos, inhibitions 
and prohibitions which rule not only the symbolic order but all 
aspects of our social existence. The underlying causality is 
repressed "in order that I may enter the socio-symbolic order" 
(1986a, p.153). At the same time this causality also shapes the 
economy (as well as being shaped by it) and in so doing has the 
capacity of "blowing up the whole construct" (1986a, p.153). 
Turning to dance Kristeva's ideas aid in analyzing 
H'Doubler and Hawkins. Kristeva's description of the symbolic 
order is reminiscent of the thought of H'Doubler and Hawkins who 
attempt direct, simple, positive prescriptions and rest much of 
their argument on scientific findings (social science surveys, 
anatomy, physiology, psychology). This kind of language used 
for such discussions is a language, as Kristeva (1986a) would 
have it, 11 Stripped of all stylistic, rhythmic and 'poetic' 
ambiguities" (p.151), which I take to refer to the sensual 
pleasures of language. In these ways some language can function 
to be antithetical to pleasure. 
Returning to Kristeva's ideas, in addition to the Symbolic 
Order stripping away pleasure, it may also be understood to 
function to determine both what it means to be a certain gender 
and how genders are placed in society. According to Kristeva 
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(1986a) particularly womanly attributes are defined by 
"patrilinear society." 
[W]oman is a specialist in the unconscious, a witch, a 
bacchanalian taking her jouiasance in an anti-Appollonian, 
Dionysian orgy. (1986a, p.154) 
Woman is made into woman in this way and her binding to 
particular qualities can be understood as a way of keeping a 
woman in her place. 
If a woman cannot be part of the temporal symoolic order 
except by identifying with the father, it is clear that as 
soon as she shows any sign of that which, in herself, 
escapes such identification and acts differently, 
resembling the dream or the maternal body, she evolves 
into this "truth" in question. (1986a, p.154) 
Truth becomes truth as society has circumscribed her. The 
patriarchy (the male--controlled world) has not been available to 
,.romen as their jmJ.::!.:-:nant selves. A woman may gain access to 
participation in the symbolic order only by repressing her 
jouissance. She does so, according to Kristeva (1986a), in 
either an ecstatic or melancholic mode stripping jouissance of 
its maternal qualities and disallowing the bearing of children. 
In other words, pleasure and participation in the dominant mode 
of living are opposed to each other. Kristeva presents us with 
a complex, dialectically composed reality both made by and 
constructive of a woman's bodily reality. 
All of this may also be asserted about men. - They, too, 
are defined by the Symbolic Order, even if the specific 
attributes are different from women's attributes. The result of 
such defining, however, does not leave men and women equal. 
There is a power differential between men and women. The 
symbolic order's determining of gender sets up a particular 
economy of power, Men in the patriarchy, have the power to 
decide the course of events. 
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According to Bryan Turner (1984) this power resides, in 
particular, in elder males as the rulers and attempts to deny 
participation to both women of all ages and young males. A 
cultural myth is that with age comes wisdom. In order for women 
and young people to accept their position of inferior power they 
would, first, have to agree that with age comes wisdom so that 
without age they cannot have wisdom. 
For women this would mean, in part, that they would have 
to be convinced to disavow the value of their aging. Indeed, 
they are taught a constant denial of aging through the marketing 
of creams, salves, hair colorings, medical interventions and 
life-style manipulations to retard the aging proc~ss. They are 
taught that the successful woman is the seductive woman who is 
seductive only when young. Spending large amounts of attention 
on these goals leaves them much less available attention on 
developing an intellectual maturity equivalent with dominant 
men. 
Applying the above to dance, in dance we can see the way 
that youthfulness functions. Dancers are encouraged to maintain 
youthful bodies to the extent that in ballet companies women are 
maintained deliberately in a pre-pubescent state (Vincent, 1979 
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and Kirkland, 1986) . This naive state may make them much less 
able to question the decisions of thei.r employers. 
In my own dancing story not being a woman I was not 
expected to remain youthful or powerless in the same sense. I 
entered dance with the expectation of eventually having my own 
dance company, of being in charge and giving the orders: in a 
word, becoming a "man". But when I carne to the decision to 
strike out on my O\'m, my leaving was resented. Part of ·the 
message of this resentment was that I should not grow up but 
should remain a dancer for someone else, a child under the 
tutelage of my teachers. 
Youthfulness in dance is connected with an idealization of 
the body to fulfill an atheleticism accessible only by young 
bodies. This idealization comes, in part, in the form of 
specific movements and movement knowledge. Dancers are 
presented with fundamental movement principles and 
understandings which are the ideals of knowledge. These ideals 
represent what the dancers ought to look like. 
The idealized images can be also understood, to use a 
Wilhelm Reich term (1972), as body armor composed of formalized 
images. The dancer is asked to give up the love of body in 
order to achieve dancing images. This is seen in the dance 
literature which has identified bulimia and anorexia as two 
illnesses associated quite commonly with much dance pedagogy, 
two illnesses which are strongly based in a severe lack of self-
165 
love (Vincent, 1979) . It is also seen in the ideas which 
dancers have about their bodies as being inadequate and ugly 
(Stinson, Blumenfeld-Jones & Van Dyke, 1989). The general 
culture promotes this lack of self-love in its valuation of 
slimness and youthfulness of which I have already written. 
Hawkins (1954), in her first book, suggests the alteration of 
bodies for social acceptance as a valuable outcome of dance 
pedagogy. People's bodies are possessed by the culture of dance 
and the culture in general (social body) to the detriment of 
people possessing their own bodies (personal bodies) • 
Another way in which women are defined and then made to be 
second-class citizens is through the emotions. Women are 
associated with emotions which are contrasted with intellect and 
devalued in this culture (B. Turner, 1984) and, thus, women (of 
emotions) are, naturally not women of maturity (of intellect) • 
In the dance education texts we find that Alma Hawkins rejects 
the value of emotions when she argues against conventional dance 
thinking, that it is emotional and, therefore, immature and 
invalid. Hawkins is participating in the hierarchilization of 
intellect over emotions. 
In order to accomplish the transformation of personal 
pleasure into publicly acceptable pleasure for the dancer 
Kristeva's ideas suggest that the dancers must suppress emotions 
and their primal sensuality in order to attend to the ideals. 
She writes that the "role of the 'mother' [is] (the repressed 
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element)" and writes that what is repressed is the "pre-Oedipal 
phase" which "is still full of pleasure and not yet detached 
from the mother/child continuum" (Kristeva, 1986a, p.151). She 
writes, "From the beginning, then, we are dealing with a 
training process, an inhibition, which ... fully asserts itself 
with language learning" (Kristeva, 1986a, pp.150-151) and no 
less with learning the language of dance. It seems to me that 
this is part of the meaning of my stories about pleasure in 
dancing. I was asked to suppress personally important qualities 
of my action and experience in order to achieve dancing. 
The forms of movement may be understood as providing, 
thenr vehicles for inhibitions. Luce Iragaray (1980) writes of 
form in a way that sharpens this critique. She uses the 
distinctiveness of women's pleasure (distinct from men's) to 
formulate a critique of form. She writes, 
Woman's desire most likely does not speak the same 
language as man's desire, and it probably has been covered 
over by the logic that has dominated the West since the 
Greeks •.. In this logic, the prevalence of the gaze, 
discrimination of form, and individualization of fo....:.t. is 
particularly foreign to female eroticism. Woman finds 
pleasure more in touch than in sight. (1980a, p.lOl) 
The discrimination of form with its associated logic is seen as 
being against jouissance. She critiques Western thought for 
promoting a philosophy of form, of identity and unity rather 
than recognizing the multiplicity of consciousness and of sex. 
"Indeed she has many more than that. Her sexuality, always at 
least double, is in fact plural . .. woman has sex organa just 
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about everywhere. She experiences pleasure almost everywhere" 
(1980a, pp.102-103). Iragaray presents the idea that wo~an's 
sexuality lies in her touch rather than her sight. This also 
makes her sexuality plural and "everywhere". There are only two 
eyes but there are innumerable and separate receptors all over 
the body. The significance of this is that form and jouiasance, 
deep pleasure are made antithetical to each other. Although 
Iragaray withholds the possibility of jouissance from men it can 
be argued that the move toward plurality and diffuseness over 
against the singularity of the symbolic order offers a 
possibility for both men and 'l'lOmen. 
Hel~ne Cixous offers some space for the interpretation of 
women's sexuality as being equivalent to diffuseness and 
diffuseness being a counter to the symbolic order of forms. She 
uses, according to Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtrivron, 
jouissance "to refer to that intense, rapturous pleasure which 
women know and men fear" (Marks and de Courtrivron, 1980, 
n.6,p.95). Marks and de Courtrivron further state that 
jouissance is marked by "a giving, expending, dispensing of 
pleasure without concern about ends or closure" (1980, n.8, 
pp.36-37), and is about "fluidity, diffusion, duration" (1980, 
n.8, pp.36-37). 
The dance education theorists whose texts we have examined 
can be understood to present a similar tension. Theirs is the 
tension between, on the one hand, a desire for fluidity and lack 
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of concern for closure (in the valuing of open creativity and 
there being no finally correct answers to aesthetic problems) 
and, on the other hand, a practice focused upon correct body 
£orm and image. The latter is not fluid in the conceptual 
sense, presenting, rather, a final and static image of 
correctness, especially found in the fundamental body 
understandings necessary for good dancing. 
The relationship between non-closure and fluidity, on the 
one hand, and imaging and finality, on the other is not a simple 
alternative, but, rather a political one in which differential 
power is distributed through it. Cixous's contention is that 
the "movement by which ... opposition is set up to produce 
meaning is the movement by which the couple is destroyed" 
(Cixous, 1980b, p.91) and that one side of the couple is 
vanquished through the hierarchalization of the relationship. 
For closure to be present, fluidity must be absented in a 
forcible way. It is through this force that difference is 
established. 
What Cixous (1980b) argues is that the development of 
Western society has relied upon dualisms (reified hard 
distinctions) as the prime mode of understanding the way the 
world works (and that these dualisms have been used to privilege 
men over women). She writes, 
Thought has always worked by opposition, 
Speech/Writing 
High/Low 
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By dual, hierarchized oppositions. Superior/ 
Inferior ..• Wherever an ordering intervenes, a law 
organizes the thinkable by (dual,irreconcilable; or 
mitigable, dialectical) oppositions. And all the couples 
of opposition are couples ... 
Theory of culture, theory of society, the ensemble of 
symbolic systems - art, religion, family, language -
everything elaborates the same system. And the movement 
by which each opposition is set up to produce meaning is 
the movement by which the couple is destroyed. A 
universal battlefield. Each time a war breaks out. Death 
is always at work ..• 
And we perceive that the 11 victory" alw~ys amounts to 
the same thing: it is hierarchized. The hierarchization 
subjects the entire conceptual organization to man. A 
male privilege ... between activity and passivity. 
Traditio~ally, the question of sexual difference is 
coupled with the same opposition 
activity/passivity ..• woman is always on the side of 
passivity. (Cixous, 1980b, p.91) 
Cixous writes "woman is always on the side of passivity." 
The relegation of women to passivity has been accomplished 
through repression, violence, conflict, and privilege through, 
as I have already described, dissociating them from the Symbolic 
Order (which privileges men) and by associating them with 
debased nature and with heart, sensitivity, emotions and body. 
Dancers are passive in the sense that they face ~ance 
forms and knowledge which, as I nave written, are closed and 
final. Passive represents here passive in the power to 
determine their own activity and its quality. The static body 
images of the dance fundamentals hold the aesthetic power and 
are enacted by people who, when they are dancing in someone 
else's creative work, are passive in the face of the orders 
given by the choreographer in charge. It can be said that the 
choreographer (and the teacher who teaches in a directive 
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manner) are active as they move the dancers, as they move from 
aesthetic project to aesthetic project (or pedagogic practice to 
pedagogic practice) out ahead of the dancers who do not know, 
necessarily, what is coming next. In following the 
choreographer's and teacher's leads, the dancers do not act but 
reenact. It is in the reenacting rather than acting (the re-
creating of other's id~as rather than the creating of one's own 
ideas) that the bodily pleasure and activity of the dancer is 
suppressed. The Father's knowledge takes over the child's body. 
This may be an important meaning of the valuing of skill in 
dance pedagogy. Valuing skill is useful in concentrating power 
in the tradition and out of the reach of dancers. 
For men the situ~tion is a bit different. While they also 
engage in reenactment they also have role models (many male 
choreographers) for seeing themselves transcending this passive 
role. The presence of historically important women in dance 
(Martha Graham, Hanya Holm, and Doris Humphrey) not 
withstanding, there are presently few living active world-famous 
female choreographers at work although the situatio~. is 
beginning to shift. 
Admittedly, in the pedagogies discussed in this 
dissertation, the authors struggle against this situation of 
passivity. This is why they propose pedagogies predicated on 
individual creative activity. Nevertheless, I have tried to 
show how their pedagogies also contain contradictions to this 
desire for fostering creativity. 
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The problernatics of form are linked to tha problematics of 
the gaze, which I discussed earlier. The forms of dance are the 
signs and visible action of dance. Kristeva (1986e) writes of 
an addiction to the visible in Western culture as "merely one 
more indication of the impasse in which his or her desire finds 
itself with regard to the other sex" (p.231). Kristeva is 
dealing here with the subject of hysterics and with obsessional 
beings, the latter being an excellent description of many 
dancers. I have already noted that dancers are subject to 
obsessional illnesses such as anorexia. I myself was so 
obsessed with dancing that I could not conceive of existencs 
without dancing. If I stopped dancing I would disappear 
forever. Dancers, being obsessional beings, are people who, 
often being deeply involved with the production of forms, are 
obsessed at the possible expense of bodily pleasure, sensuality 
and jouissance. 
Returning to "social body", the culture places value upon 
virginity (which is linked with the value of youthfulness) • 
There is also a value of virginity at play in the culture. The 
issue of virginity is analyzed by Kristeva. She writes that 
women in the West, for the most part, have been defined by the 
monotheistic Christian order which demands of women that they 
remain virgins if they are to be associated with the symbolic 
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order. Failing being virgins they can atone for their carnal 
jouissance with their martyrdom. The economic system which is 
associated with the Christian symbolic order demands, indeed 
needs, for children to be produced (B.Turner, 1984, pp.13-14) 
but this production, for the woman, censures "the fact that she 
has experienced jouissance in an act of coitus, that there was a 
'primal scene' 11 (Kristeva, 1986a, p.146). The symbolic 
Christian community valorizes 11 Childbearing and procreation in 
the name of the father 11 (Kristeva, 1986a, p.146) and does so 
literally since the child is conventionally given the father's 
last name. In so doing jouissance is again removed from the 
woman. Child-bearing is only another form of social production, 
the child only another sign in the endless chain of signifiers. 
Virginity is also connected, ~ccording to Kristeva, in 
11 Stabat Matern (1986d), with death as the Christian Church has 
traditionally associated sexuality and death. She writes that 
these two things were understood as concomitant and that with 
the development of the cult of the Virgin, 11Mary was contrasted 
with Eve, life with death, 11 (1986d, p.165) Mary representing 
life and Eve representing death. Kristeva points out that Mary 
is made parallel, in Christian dogma, with Christ. One of the 
ways this is accomplished is 
by expanding the theme of immaculate conception, inventing 
a biography of Mary similar to that of Jesus and, by 
depriving her of sin, to deprive her of death: Mary leaves 
by way of Dormition or Assumption. (1986d, p.164) 
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Conception without sexuality is conception without sin and 
only sin leads to death. Eve sinned and so lost immortality and 
was given the fate of death. The sinful body is severed from 
ideal living. 
sexual body. 
The untouched body is contrasted to the naked, 
The human hubris of Eve is associated with her 
downfall. Her chain of signifiers (hubris, body, naked, 
sexuality) is made to stand for that against which society 
strives so that society may progress toward an idealized state. 
If Eve had not wanted knowledge she would still be in a state of 
grace. Knowledge, therefore, is subtly implicated in the chain 
and is not banished but looked down upon. Mary is innocent and 
Eve is knowledgeable. 
At this point in my discussion the issues begin to 
accumulate and intermingle. The issue of power becomes a 
constant as life and the idealized state of a person (idealized 
forms of movement, ideal youthful virginal body, male intellect 
as a knower of ideals) are contrasted to and valued over death 
and body knowledge (the woman's part in culture as she called 
down death upon the whole of humanity by her desire to know) . 
The "gaze" of which I wrote in "personal body" fixes a person 
within defined limits of idealizations. Life predicated on the 
idealizations will have power over death only when ideal forms 
and bodies and minds will take ascendancy over earthy, concrete 
bodies and emotions. Men have access to the former and women to 
the latter. "Naturally11 men should have dominion over women. 
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This is the form of argument which Kristeva, Iragaray and Cixous 
claim has dominated Western culture. 
These values, in the forms of virginity, pre-pubescence 
and youth, have sway in dance and those female dancing bodies 
are not only to appear youthful, etc. but also to not appear to 
be womanly or capable of bearing children. Men are not immune 
from the value of virginity in dance. In ballet companies the 
men are referred to as boys, even when they are in their 
twenties. This keeps them in a kind of virginal state of mind 
if not body. Emphases is upon youth and virginity which deny 
the passage of time and allow power to fall into the hands of 
mature men. 
To write of power which falls "into the hands of mature 
men" is to raise the question of what is meant by "men" in the 
dance context. When thinking about dancing it is impossible not 
to deal with the issue of homosexuality. 
In society's terms homosexuals are aberrations of gender. 
They are neither men nor women. They cannot participate, 
referring back to Bryan Turner, in solving the sociological 
problem of reproducing the society, Michel Foucault (1980) 
asserts that society works to control sexuality in order to 
preserve familial alliances (p.108). The alliances are 
preserved through the defining of sexuality as a specific social 
category which can be made into a medical and psychological 
problem which society then addresses and controls. This has 
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been traditionally accomplished through declaring that there are 
both normal, legitimate sexuality and abnormal, illegitimate 
sexuality. In this traditional context sexuality outside of the 
procreation and preservation of the family unit must be cured 
for the sake of the continuation of society. Such sexuality is 
seen as an illness curable through medical and psychological 
scientific interventions (Aries, 1985). While there are studies 
which assert that the status of the homosexual male is changing 
(Pollack, 1985), it is nevertheless the case that traditionally 
the homosexual has been socially marginalized. 
Despite this marginalization the way in which dance 
history is conceived places all dancers, including homosexual 
dancers, back within the bounds of legitimate society. This is 
accomplished through telling the history of dance via aesthetic 
genealogies using a genealogical metaphor to delineate the 
development of the art. As with any family tree, there are 
he.:. ~·~- seholds . The dance head of household is the master 
artist who ~akes responsibility for the development of the art. 
Teachers, too, may be understood as participating in this family 
metaphor in the way that they represent, in the classroom, the 
master's art, teaching the correct way of dancing. In this 
sense the creative dance education texts participate in the 
family structure of dance. Their books (and most dance 
education books) are teacher, not student texts. The teacher 
studies the teaching of dancing in books. The student studies 
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the learning of dancing by doing. The source of information for 
the student is the teacher. The teacher represents and mediates 
the continuing flow of knowledge from the past to future 
generations, intervening to select and control the knc.~rledge. 
In these senses, while my own experience as a teacher was 
that I had to deal with a society which wanted to make me 
illegitimate by calling me "homosexual" (consequently to reject 
my art), yet my experience as a dancer within that world was an 
experience of reproducing the dominant, male culture. I was 
taught my genealogy. I was expected to pay great respect to my 
masters. I have always, to myself, called my teachers my "Dance 
Father" and "Dance Mother" and "Dance Uncle". This is not by 
accident. We acted, in my education, very much like a family, 
with all of the attendant family difficulties and joys. The 
d~ncer who wanted to force to me to admit to homosexuality may 
be understood to have been attempting to reinforce my ties to 
the family. Once I proved myself to be loyal to the family even 
though I was not homosexual, he ceased his pressure and we 
became good friends. What I can understand from examining the 
family structure of my dance experience is that the homosexual 
overlay of much of my dance experience struggled to be 
legitimated by participating in a dominant cultural value, that 
of family. The Family as representative of the Symbolic Order 
can be seen to be setting the terms of how we participate in the 
177 
dance culture and how we seek legitimation within the general 
culture. 
There is yet another interpretation which may emerge from 
reflecting upon the values of life, youth and death as they 
exist within the culture. They may be taken to represent the 
more general problematic of time as a cultural construct. 
Kristeva (1986f) offers a critique of this time as a 
differentiation between men and women. The time of the male, 
patriarchially dominated world is a linear time, a procession of 
before, now and after. The symbolic order as represented in 
language is also linear and the use of language is most often 
dominated by the rules of conventional narrative time 
(beginning, middle, end). This kind of time denies the 
timelessness of bodies and denies women's time as Kristeva 
(1986f) writes that 
femo.le subjectivity would seem to provide a specific 
measure that essentially retains repetition and eternity 
from among the multiple modalities of time known through 
the history of civilizations. On the one hand, there are 
cycles, gestation, the eternal recurrence of a biological 
rhythm which conforms to that of nature and imposes a 
temporality whose stereotyping may shock, but whose 
regularity and unison with what is experienced as extra-
subjective time, cosmic time, occasion vertiginous v~s~ons 
and unnameable jouissance. On the other hand, and perhaps 
as a consequence, there is a massive presence of a 
monumental temporality, without cleavage or escape, which 
has so little to do with linear time (which passes) that 
the very word "temporality" hardly fits. (p.191) 
This is the time of biological processes which lie outside of 
human intention. It is these times, repetition and monumental, 
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which the patriarchy in its simplistic linearity cannot abide 
and feels the need to subjugate. 
Kristeva is not alone in linking time with gender and with 
associating women's time with repression. Malcolm Ross in "You 
are the Music" has written that, in terms of schools, 
in a work-oriented, sexist society such as ours, the arts 
in education suffer primarily because their image is, 
essentially, illegitimate •.• The arts subjects, I believe, 
are discounted in schools because they conform to the 
illegitimate play/female category [of value] ..• as long as 
the arts are perceived as [female] in a [male] world they 
will continue to have a bad time. (Ross, 1981, pp.152-
153) 
Throughout this dissertation, the jnteraction of 
individual and society has been at play. This last ~oint about 
time indicates that the interaction needs also to be understood 
in terms of interacting categories, in this case those of male 
and female, categor:Lt:s into \><hich individuals both fit 
themselves and into which they are fit. The process of world-
making has been mediated through the dialectic of 
individual/society but also through the dialectic of such social 
categories. I have tried to show how the individual in the 
dance education texts, in my own life story, in feminist 
critique and in language theory struggle to find a place within 
the social construct and also find the ca~egories which are 
appropriate to their construction of a personal world. 
Struggle seems to be the operative verb. A set of 
dialectically related nouns which would be, I believe, equally 
applicable would be those of "resistance" and "accommodation". 
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World-making is a process of resisting the imposition of 
another's world and an imposition of categories and, 
simultaneously, a willingness to accommodate to the other's 
world and to categories. I believe that possible motivations 
for being willing to so accommodate are the desire to enlarge 
one's own world and the desire not to be alone. When we read 
books perhaps it is this desire not to be alone which is at 
play. Perhaps H'Doubler and Hawkins can be understood to be 
offering worlds into which many can enter so that the many will 
no longer exist in a state of alienation, either from themselves 
and their activities or from each other. My own experience in 
dancing was a struggle toward acceptance by the powers of dance 
so that I might dance with them. Once I decided to dance, I did 
not want to dance alone. It was, in part, the desire to be 
accepted into their world which motivated my persistence. To be 
accepted meant functioning in their order, not my own. The 
st~uggle n~~ to make their ~orld mine and at the same time find 
my own world which was different from theirs. H'Doubler and 
Hawkins try to present pedagogies through which one becomes 
initiated into the accepted processes of creativity in order to 
get beyond them. This paradox may summarize the procsss of 
world--making. 
180 
CHAPTER 5 
THE PROBLEMATICS OF THE FRAMEWORK 
As I wrote in the Introduction, offering a framework for 
dance education cannot be the end of this work. I must also 
consider the complex issues implied in the framework as issues 
which exist within a state of problematics and irresolution if 
not contradiction. In contradistinction to a framework which 
reifies ideas, subsuming all the phenomena of a field of inquiry 
to its purposes, I see this critical framework as an active 
investigation which is never ~omplete or capable of explaining 
or describing fully the phenomena which it is used to 
investigate. This is because there are internal ambiguities 
which accompany any attempt at dialectical thinking. Due to the 
joining of opposites there is inevitably a tension which exists 
between the opposites so that they maintain their distinct 
characte= from each other, rather than falling into a sameness. 
The following is offered to provide some ideas of the meanings 
and difficulties of some of the major issues of the framework. 
A major feature of the framework is the positing of a 
"personal body" over agt=d.nst a "social body". The question 
arises: who is a person aside from his or her social existence? 
The distinction between personal and social tends to posit, by 
thb personal, an unmediated existence, an independent "I". This 
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can be seen in my discussion of language in Chapter One as I 
presented Jacoby's reading of Otto Fenichel that social activity 
is the social expression of "universal" biological needs and 
drives. This posits a biological "I" which is given, via 
society, a form into which to mold the "I", as if the "I" is a 
kind of undifferentiated plasma prior to socialization. It can 
also be seen in Chapter One where I wrote that the dialectic of 
nature/culture (biological "I"/social "I" dichotomy) could be 
maintained by recognizing the "materials with which we are born" 
and, simultaneously, making a place for them in the theory of 
the subject by "examining how differing social contexts deal 
with them." 
In all of this the problem is: is there an entity, an "I", 
which is separable from social influence. Julian Henriques, 
Wendy Hallway, Cathy Unwin, Couze Venn and Valerie Walkerdine 
(1984) provide a substantive critique of the kind of dualism 
implied in my splitting of :.he personal and social. The 
critique is two fold. 
On the one hand, for those theorists who attempt to 
explain the socialization process as a matter of internalizing 
social lessons, the status of the individ,lal prior to 
socialization remains untheorized and he/she is either taken-
for-granted as "a pregiven psychological subject, a rational 
individual" or is not thought to have any existence at all and 
has no effect upon the process. (Henriques et al., 1984, pp.17-
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18) On the other hand, there are those theorists who attempt to 
avoid an empty subject by positing a person born with 
predispositions, abilities and an innate drive for structure 
(for becoming socialized) or "varying ad hoc formulations to 
bring content into the individual" (pp.20-21). "The core, 
presocial individual which remains intact in these accounts 
still rapidly reduces to the biologica:n (p.21). By 
acknowledging the presence of a pre-social presence such 
theories undermine the notions of external influence and 
socialization processes by positing an individual who could, by 
bringing his/her pregiven intentions to the process, simply 
evade the mechanisms of socialization. What Henriques et al. 
(1984) are trying to avoid is this dualistic tendency. 
The point that we are making is that wh.:i.lst we should 
avoid founding a theory of subjectivity on a taken-for-
granted biological origin, we cannot constr11ct a position 
which altogether denies biology any effects. The only way 
to do this without granting either term of the biology-
society couple the status of pregiven categories is to 
reconceptualize them in such a way that the implicit 
dualism is dissolved in favour of stressing the relational 
character of their mutual effects. (p.21) 
I take it that my own discourse lies also within this 
difficult and problematic relation of self and society, biology 
and culture in several ways. One of the difficulties is trying 
to maintain a dialectical consciousness toward the issue yet do 
so through the linear, rational mode of discourse of this 
culture which I have employed for the sake of cultural clarity. 
Linear clarity, as a stylistic value, tends to betray the 
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dialectical quality of the relation by being able to write of 
only one term at a time and by tending toward a reified 
separation of two terms. Form is not a minor issue but images 
the difficulties of maintaining a dialectical consciousness. 
Form is its own politics. 
·rhe dialectic (of mutually influential terms) is also 
difficult to maintain when thinking through issues. For 
instance, as an example of the difficulties of conceptualizing, 
I have argued, in the autobiographical chapter, that I possessed 
a predilection for moving in ~ certain way which was distinct 
from how I learned to •nove in my professional education. I 
attempted to imply that my mother's disapprobation of my moving 
was a demonstration of the biological foundation of the seeming 
predisposition (because I seemed to have a need which 
transcended her disapprobation. The difficulty with this is 
that the disposition can be taken as ad hoc, a convenient but 
empty category, in order to maintain the split which I attempt 
to establish. How do I know that the need was not the result of 
some earlier or more subtle socialization? As another example 
of the complexity of the dialectic of individual and society, 
when discussing the neighborhood football game and my feelings 
about not being allowed to play football in high school, there 
was a description of an "I" taking pleasure in moving because of 
the social meaning of the movement and, simultaneously, other 
kinds of pleasure not mediated by a social consciousness. In 
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the light of the dialectics can these two catGgories be 
separated? These are but two examples of the strains which 
exist in attempting to both conceptualize biology alone, society 
alone, and biology and society in concert in a culture which 
tends to value either/or statements (it is either biology or 
society but never both) over both/and statements. Can it be all 
of these possibilities? To be clear, it is not simply a matter 
of more clearly defining the independent "I" but a matter of 
avoiding the either/or and the origins issue: which influences 
which and which carne first, individual or society. 
The difficulties cf the individual/society and biology 
(nature)/culture dichotomies are increased in another major 
feature of the framework, namely the thought of the French 
f~m~nistes. In particular these difficulties arise in their use 
of the notion of difference and in the place of nature in their 
thinking and the difficulties have a political cast (as opposed 
to what may appear to be only epistomological issues of how a 
woman knows) . 
The f~m~nistes, as do all feminists, according to Moi 
(1987), begin their work with the premise that men and women are 
different from each other in fundamental ways. 
The problem of sexual difference is central to any kind of 
feminist politics or theory, since the very reason why 
women as a social group are oppressed is that they differ 
from men. The question is what that difference consists 
in, how far it extends, and how it is constructed in 
relation to power. (p.4) 
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As can be seen in the previous chapter, Iragaray (1980a) locates 
difference in the womanly versus manly body. Moi (1985) writes, 
Iragaray's theory of "woman" takes as its starting point a 
basic assumption of analogy between woman's psychology and 
her "morphology". (p.l43) 
Cixous (1980a) also seems to take the woman's body as her 
starting place, while Kristeva involves herself in writing of 
pregnancy as a way in which women come to de£y the patriarchal 
order of things (see Kristeva, 1986d). 
These theorists have been accused by some theorists 
(Jones,1985 and Moi,1985) of participating in the very system of 
oppression from which they seek relief, thus maintaining the 
political status quo. Such critique of these feminists takes 
the position that women have been oppressed in the culture by 
being identified with nature which the culture has split off 
from itself as a primitive form of life which has no place in 
culture. Succinctly, if there would be culture there cannot be 
nature and so women, positioned as antithetical to culture, 
are, consequently, socially and politically marginalized. 
The celebration of the bodies of women, of which the 
f~m~nistes are accused, places women direct.ly back into the 
subordinate position to which they have been relegated by 
theorizing the body as if it is "a simply physical context" and 
loses sight of the undorstanding that "sexual identity ... never 
takes shape in isolation" and that there is "no essential 
stratum of sexuality unsaturated with social arrangements and 
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symbolic systems" (Jones, 1985, p.92). Jones (1985) argues 
that these f~m~nistes have lost sight of the historical and 
specific character of sexuality and asks of them, 
[I]s women's sexuality so monolithic that a notion of a 
shared, typical femininity does justice to it? What about 
variations in class, in race, and in culture among 
women? ... How can libidinal voice •.. speak for all women? 
(p.93) 
In addition, to appropriate the patriarchy's definition of 
feminine as a definition wort~ celebrating plays into the 
designs of the patriarchy. For example, Moi (1985) writes of 
Cixous, 
In her eagerness to appropriate imagination and the 
pleasure principle for women, Cixous seems in danger of 
playing directly into the hands of the very patriarchal 
ideology she denounces. It is, after all, patriarchy, not 
feminism, that insists on labelling women as emotional, 
intuitive and imaginative, while jealously converting 
reason and rationality into an exclusively male preserve. 
(p.123) 
And Jones (1985) writes, 
Materialist feminists ... are susp1c1ous of the logic 
through which feminite defines men as phallic -
solipsistic, aggressive, excessively rational - and then 
praises women, who, by nature of their contrasting 
sexuality, are other-oriented, empathetic, multi-
imaginative. Rather than questioning the terms of such a 
definition ..• fGminite as a celebration of women's 
difference from men maintains them. (1985, p.93) 
Moi and Jones claim these f~m~nistes do not deal 
adequately with the social meaning of difference but expend 
energy romanticizing the power of the body and dismissing the 
power of the soci~l. Indeed, Cixous, for example has been 
accused of writing "a full-blown metaphysical account of writing 
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as voice, presence and origin" (Moi, 1985, p.119). That is she 
writes of the body as if it did not exist in concrete, 
historical reality. 
The association with nature which can be used to 
subordinate peoples and activities is not, admittedly, rejected 
by the f~m~nistes. But they opt for accepting the association 
and understanding its positive values. Kristeva (1986d), for 
instance, does not reject the value of pregnancy (a natural body 
state) but, rather embraces it and recognizes its status as 
natural and jouissant. Similarly Annie Leclerc (1987) writes, 
It was not man who decided to allot to me the painful 
burden of procreation, but it is he who has done all he 
can to make my lot a painful one. Likewise the division 
of labou= into male and female tasks was determined in 
accordance with principles other than those of virile 
oppression; but once this division of labour was 
established, accepted, man did all he could to make sure 
it is perceived as a division between a bad and a good 
role: on the one hand all the vile tasks, and on the other 
all the prestigious ones; on the one hand, all at once and 
cleverly enmeshed, the proof, the sanction and the cause 
of female inferiority; ou the other, all at once and 
cleverly enmeshed, the proof, the sanction and the cause 
of masculine superiority. (p.74) 
What is presented here is not a rejection of nature (which might 
be expected if women and dancers were to wish to release 
themselves from oppression) but a rejection of the 
interpretation of the relationship between nature and 
legitimacy. What is rejected is a particular set of social 
meanings and attendant power relations. This would seem to 
undermine the critiques of Moi and Jones. 
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The problem with the nature issue for the framework that I 
have developed is that by appropriating these theorists's work I 
am also forced to accept the problematics cf their theories. 
For my own part, I would agree with Moi and Jones that it is 
important to remember that whatever it is that people possess as 
natural bodies is always influenced by the social and cultural 
surround. The danger with strongly valuing a search for a non-
socially mediated body, an essential female or male body, a 
metaphysical body is that we forget that our bodily 
possibilities are presented to us by both the world out there 
and the world inside the body which has been powerfully shaped 
by the world out there. Attempting to gain freedom from this 
social historical construct is not possible. People cannot be 
without social constructs. 
I believe that the French feminist theorists whom I have 
cited are net unaware of the social construct. They do not fix 
upon difference as wholly biologically predicated. They are 
quick to make clear that difference is not automatically 
associated with male and female biology, that difference is also 
a social construct. Cixous (1980b) states that her differential 
categories are "organized by .•. an entire immense system of 
cultural inscription readable as masculine or feminine" but that 
"there are men who do not repress their femininity, women who 
more or less forcefully inscribe their masculinity" (p.9~). 
Further, she asserts that we must take care not to "support the 
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awesome thesis of a 'natural', anatomical determination of 
sexual difference-opposition", for to support such a thesis is 
to "implicitly support phallocentrism's position of power" 
(p.93). 
Of phallocentrisrn, Cixous (1980b) writes that :'.t "is the 
enemy ... of everyone. Men stand to lose by it~ differently but 
as seriously as women" (1980b, p.961 .· What is lost is the 
ability to invent "whether it be philosophidal or poetical" 
(1980b, p.97). The ability to invent comes from 
[a]dmitting the component of the other sex [which] makes 
[men and women] at once much richer, plural, strong, and 
to the extent of this mobility, very fragile ... there is no 
invention possible, whether it be philosophical or poetic, 
without the presence in the inventing subject of an 
abundance of the other, of the diverse ... a certain 
homosexuality interplay therefore of bisexuality making in 
me a crystallized work of my ultrasubjectivities. (1980b, 
p.93) 
Kristeva (1986f) delineates a feminism which "'ill, 
hopefully and eventually, outstrip the category of sexual 
difference and uncover the category of individual difference: 
whether male or female. This outcome will be achievable by 
an interlorization of the founding separation of the 
socio-symbolic contract, as an introduction of the cutting 
edge into the very interior of every identity whether 
subjective, sexual, ideological, or so forth ... which 
characterize each identity, each subject, each sex. 
(1986f, p.210) 
Kristeva's desire is to 
bring out ... the singularity of each person and ... the 
relativity of his/her symbolic as wall as biological 
existence, according to the variation in his/her specific 
symbolic capacities. (1986f, p.210) 
•. 
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This practice will afford "them the possibility of jouissance, 
for various productions, for a life made up of both challenges 
and differences" (1986f, p.211). 
Kristeva and Cixous do not eschew difference but call for 
a new kind of difference (between individuals rather than 
between social categories) , For Kristeva the wrong criteria for 
difference has been historically in place. For Cixous, the 
strong repression of one term of difference prevents the abili• ' 
tn invent, which, I believe, we may take to mean inventing the 
world, society and social relations in a richer and stronger way 
than heretofore. 
These theories might be labeled theories of sameness and 
theories which re-establish bourgeois individualism and they 
might run the risk of supporting the status quo and of losing 
their dialectical logic. I recognize that Cixous (1980b) 
critiques the dialectical approach as supporting male 
domination. She seems to assert that a feminine logic would 
avoid these categories which inevitably reinforce hierarchy. I 
believe however that she is wrong in applying this argument to 
all forms of dialectical thinking. As they dismiss a certain 
form of difference and favor sameness they continue to 
participate in the very hierarchization which they critique. In 
addition, the metaphors of "richer", "stronger", "battlefield" 
and the like, used by Cixous (1980b), may be taken as masculine 
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metaphors which, ironically, may further betray the project of a 
new difference by perpetuating old language. 
I would add to this that while hierarchy seems to be 
totally dismissed as a value such dismissal fails to account for 
the dialectical face of hierarchy. It is possible that only 
through the tension of unequal distribution of Gttribut~s 
(hierarchy) does life proceed. Equality among all entities may 
be taken as a metaphorical death. In physics theory, for 
instance, entropy is the process whereby, for instance, an 
energy system loses its coherence throuqh progressive loss of 
energy. The various entities within the system all with their 
own energies become, in terms of their energies, more and more 
like each other, all moving less and less until the system 
becomes static, death ensues and the system no longer exists. 
For a system to continue to live it must receive new energy from 
outside. In biological bodies (considered as systems of energy) 
the new energy is food which represents not only new energy but 
coherent, differentiated energies, different from the body into 
which they are ingested, which infuses the biological 
system/body with new coherence, preventing the biological body 
from falling into undifferentiated entropic death. The human 
body requires this difference if it is to flo~rish and survive. 
Difference may not be a negativity but a necessity. On the 
other hand, difference in social practice has been predominantly 
used to forward oppression and marginalizations of others. 
Difference is dialectically constructed. 
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Yet another featured issue of the framework centers upon 
the critique of valuing form in dancing. This critique of form 
should not be understood as a prescription for curing society's 
ills through the simple return to sensuality, sexuality and 
pleasure over against form. Neither should the critique of form 
in dance be taken as a prescription for rejecting image and form 
in dancing which might seem to be the stumbling block for 
pleasure. Kristeva (1986c), as a psychoana:jst, notes how her 
patients are patients in this culture because they have been 
unable to appropriate, in the conventional way, the symbolic 
order, language. In their pre-Oedipal state they have not 
separated from the Father power of the symbolic order. They are 
in conflict with the need to separate (in order to become a 
subject in the world, a being who can act on his or her own 
creatively ~nd with person~l power) . They will not be cured and 
brought out of marginality by coming to valu~ the qualities 
which hove been imposed upon them by the insistent power of the 
Symbolic Order. Kristeva argues, for instance, in "Women's 
Time" (1986f), that women coming to emphasize their difference 
and creating a language only they can understand (Cixous, for 
instance, proposes Ecriture F~nine) only further marginalizes 
themselves within the power structure since the power structure 
has already accepted them in that guise. A similar critique can 
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be made of dancers who value their body orientation and silence 
which they claim is voluntarily chosen and transformative. They 
do not understand how their silence prevents them from coming to 
understand their position. Kristeva (1986c) presents a version 
of a cure which does not lose sight of the Symbolic Order. Moi 
writes that Kristeva writes that what is necessary is 
producing subjects who are free to construct imaginary 
fantasies (or works of art),to produce a new language, 
precisely because they are able to situate themselves in 
relation to the Law. (Kristeva, 1986c, p.18) 
Another issue for any framework is the effect which it has 
upon the subject of investigation (Henriques et al., 1984). 
Henriques et al. (1984) are not only referring to how one may 
study such effects as I have done in discussing the effects of 
practice of creative dance education upon individuals, but are 
referring to the effects of an investigation itself upon the 
subject and how this alters and intervenes in the knowledge 
which is generated. The historical circumstances of 
investigation both on the level, in this case, of the internal 
mechanisms of the pedagogy and of the mechanisms of 
investigations upon the subject require an historical awareness. 
For the social sciences these effects are not separable 
from the practices of administration to which these 
sciences are tied. This means that in examining how and 
why psychology has come to be what it is, it is crucial to 
account for the effects inside it of historically specific 
circumstances that refer to social practices and to other 
discourses centred on the individual. (p.92) 
They go on to elaborate how the practices of psychology function 
in concert with economic practices and social stabilization 
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practices, the result of which are psychology as a social 
technology for achieving particular ends: the maintenance of the 
s0cial powe~ structure. They contrast this description of 
psychology with the usual descriptions which center upon 
psychology as a science in which the truth about human beings is 
sought. They argue that psychology is produced through the 
action of the social and that it has little to do with 
discovering truth. Similarly, in dance pedagogy, it is 
necessary to come to understand how its truths are social 
productions, effects of social life. Critically, also, I think 
it is important that the investigator not avoid his or her own 
status as a social effect nor avoid acknowledging that the 
knowledge which develops out of a particular investigation is 
also a social product. 
It seems to me that much work remains in the first area, 
that of historically accounting for the kinds of choices made in 
these pedagogies, accounting for the presence of particular 
pedagogical practices which are tied to other kinds of social 
practice. Hawkins provides a good starting place foL such 
investigation as, in Modern Dance in Higher Education, she 
references educational sources. H'Doubler similarly references 
psychological sources in Dance, A Creative Art E~perience as 
does Hawkins in Creating Through Dance. Inquiry into these 
sources would yield ideas about dance education as an analysis 
of their historical and social nature is linked back into the 
dance pedagogy. 
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An example of this work would be the examination of the 
Tyler Rationale for curriculum. Briefly, this rationale has had 
great influence upon educational thinking. The work which has 
been done on this rationale (Macdonald and Purpel, n.d.) has 
shown how its kind of thinking is highly related to an 
industrial consciousness, importing the values of productivity 
and efficiency into education. The rationale can be seen at 
work in H"Doubler and Hawkins as well as in other dance 
education texts. What is necessary is to sh0\'1 how the 
industrial consciousness is also at work in those discourses, 
thus showing how they participate in the thinking of their 
times. Further, the meaning of thinking in that way needs to be 
developed to show how the pedagogies are bent in a certain 
direction. 
I should like, at this point, to discuss the basis for 
further work which might flow out of this dissertation. As I 
have worked on it and read more and more I ha'..•e come to 
understand, in greater s:pecificity, the meaning of such a 
concept as the cultural surround, the meaning cf Jacoby's 
assertions about the place of society in consciousness and the 
meaning of language as a site of embedded social understanding. 
In this dissertation I have engaged in an act of 
"deconstruction" vis a vis the dance education texts and my own 
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dance life in order to reveal the sociality of the situation. 
Henriques, et al. (1984) present one kind of understanding of 
this act of "deconstruction" which suggests the implications of 
such an act. They write, 
What this kind of deconstruction asserts is that any given 
body of statements, whether in everyday conversation or a 
scientific paper, depends on a number of other bo~ies -~ 
statements, some of which carry deeply entrenched 
convictions and explanatory schemas fundamental to the 
dominant form of making sense of the world at any 
particular period in a culture. Deconstruction retraces 
the system of "dependencies" of a discourse. At the same 
time, it also has a positive foundation, in that it 
reconstructs a history which accounts for how a discourse 
or practice emerged, for the conditions of its emergence 
and constitution (discursive, material and historical) and 
for how it comes'to be what it is at the present. 
Foucault calls this kind of history a genealogy: a trace 
that reconstitutes the present from its traces in the 
past. (p.l04) 
I have begun a nascent genealogy on dance education texts 
by suggesting the origins of some of their concepts, some of the 
social situations which might have brought them to theorize 
dance in the ways that they did including the use of expert 
information from educational and psychological theorists and the 
meanings of those theorists particular approaches to education 
and psychology. I have also indicated some of the historical 
situations (such as w""W II for Hawkins} which mig-ht havt: bro·1.1ght 
a thinker's consciousness (along with those of the other members 
of her society) to think about education in a certain way. I 
have treated my own story as a kind of discursive practice, 
locating that practice in the contested domain of bodily 
pleasure, contested as much in terms of how the concept of 
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pleasure was defined by my teachers and by myself as in what was 
permitted to occur, in practice, both in the classroom and on 
the performance stage. The practices were significantly 
intermingled with the discursive in the ways that pleasure was 
conceptualized through the actual classroom and stage 
experience. The choreographer who didn't want us to "lush out" 
gave up that concept when she brought it up against the reality 
of our dancing, up against other conceptualizations of what good 
dancing and dance were. These alternative concepts were 
embodied in what she was not seeing in practice but what she 
ho;;:>ed for in fantasy. Only in practice could she "know" this 
but she, also, already knew this by her own knowledge, her own 
presence as a location of discursive practices taken u~ by her 
in a distinctive manner mediated by her biology and personal 
history. 
The issue of biolo~y remains a fairly unvoiced issue both 
in this dissertation and in the field in general. As a hint of 
what I mean by biology, I would suggest that the way my body was 
and developed as a body directed the kind of dancing forms I 
could, socially, take up. I do not, for instance, have a 
"ballet body", a particular physical structure for which ballet 
is designed. Had I not been homophobic, had I found ballet 
beautiful and had I wanted to dance ballet, I still would not 
have been allowed to pursue it professionally for lack of the 
proper body and ability to properly do the movements. 
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It seems that the development of such genealogies and such 
biological understanding is necessary in order to begin to 
establish a firmer basis for understanding what is going on in 
dance pedagogy. It is not, to be sure, a basis firm in Truth 
but, rather, a basis firm in the convictions of the investigator 
who is biased toward seeking certain kinds of understandings 
based on certain values whose existence it is necessary to make 
explicit. As Henriques et al. (1984) put it, 
Genealogy is a history of the present in the sense that it 
finds its points of departure in problems relevant to 
current issues and finds its point of arrival and its 
~~~fulness in what it can bring to the analysis of the 
present. (p .10 4) 
In similar fashion I have appropriated H'Doubler and Hawkins and 
seen them both as historical precedents for my own story and 
present practices and as consciousnesses sedimented into the 
present. In a word, H'Doubler and Hawkins are still very much 
with us. To examine them is to examine the present. My status 
as examiner has a strong effect on this. It is very much to the 
point to ask who is doing the determination of relevance and why 
particular determinations are made. These all point to the 
value-laden character of this in~uiry as well. 
Despite the kinds of problems which I have delineated I 
would assert the strength and importance of this framework on 
two grounds. First, I have presented as rigorous an analysis as 
possible about ideas which I think are important and to which I 
want people to. respond and with which I want them to engage. I 
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strongly believe that the issue of bodily pleasure is central to 
an understanding of why people dance and that pleasure is 
quickly forgotten as a value. More important than this 
phenomena is that people are separated early on in their dance 
education from what they already know about their bodies. They 
are presented with the canons of dance and, almost invariably, 
those canons are not them. What they do know must be unlearned. 
Ironically, what is often asked of the mature dancer is a great 
deal of individual interpretation, unique character and an 
ability to apply life-experience to various dance roles. If we 
~·'); ., 
tak~ it that such individuality is based on what people know 
individually then the removal of individuality in favor of the 
canon is problematic. It is not, to be sure, that what people 
know about themselves is, invariably, worth maintaining. 
Initial body understandings require investigation as much as the 
more developed body understandings dealt with in this 
dissertation. The chance for such investigation is eliminated 
when individuality is eliminated. 
Concurrently with the devaluation of what is already 
known, dance students are encouraged to remain in a state of 
child-like innocence toward both the art and those who teach and 
"create" the art. This emphasis on being child-like debilitates 
their ability to confront and think through the issues at hand 
or even to perceive that there are issues with which to deal. 
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This is especially true when the teacher and/or choreographer is 
cast in a powerful parental role: Father, Mother or Master. 
Lastly, these problems are visited on all dance students, 
not only those who aspire to a professional career. I ask 
myself and other dance educators to consider: what is the place 
of dance in the world via education and what kind of dancing is 
appropriate? I think these questions have yet to be adequately 
addressed. I~ ~ddition the thorny problems of form and 
technique cannot be attended to without developing answers to 
important questions about the formation of people in a personal 
and social way. The femenistes have proposed that the insertion 
into the Symbolic Order is a central fact in the construction of 
gender. Hov1 does the insertion into dance language (form and 
technique) consort with this construction? What are the real 
results of creative dance practice on the students of that 
practice, as opposed to the idealizations of the practice which, 
in my estimation, mar these important and estimable texts? I 
believe that we must enable both ourselves and our students to 
interrogate dance education practice on the fronts presented in 
this study. 
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